Mean,Median, Mode III*

Abstract Recently, Van Zwet (1979) has discussed several conditions under which the celebrated mean-median-mode inequality holds. This note points out that Van Zwet's basic condition and its variants have a simple interpretation in terms of a well-known stochastic ordering. The results are slightly more general than Van Zwet's because the definition of unimodality used here (due to Khintchine ) requires neither the existence of a density nor the uniqueness of the mode.     

The effects of employee engagement and self-efficacy on job performance: a longitudinal field study

Abstract

Self-efficacy’s influence on individual job performance has been well documented in laboratory studies. However, there have been very few rigorous field studies of self-efficacy’s relationship with objectively measured individual job performance in organizational settings. This research history might account for the low take-up of self-efficacy within the business literature as well as within business itself. When it comes to studies of employee engagement, the same lack of rigorous individual studies applies, although several organizational-level studies link employee engagement to organizational performance, while its claimed benefits have been widely discussed in the business literature. Finally, the degree to which employee engagement and self-efficacy have independent and additive effects on individual-level job performance remains unknown. In order to address these issues, a longitudinal field study was undertaken within an Australian financial services firm. Using survey data linked to objectively measured job performance, we found the additive effects of self-efficacy and employee engagement explained 12% of appointments made and 39% of products sold over and above that explained by past performance. This finding suggests human resource management (HRM) practitioners should address both self-efficacy and employee engagement in order to boost job performance while encouraging HRM scholars to incorporate both measures when conducting job performance studies.     

Educating limited resource older adults for better choices to lower risk of food insecurity

United States (U.S.) national and North Carolina state data on older adult food insecurity in combination with associated poor nutrition‐related health outcomes point to a critical need for interventions to improve their food security. Nearly 8% of North Carolinians aged 60 and older and 11% of those aged 50–59 are food insecure, placing North Carolina in the top ten states in the U.S. for food insecurity for both age groups. Therefore, the Better Choices intervention was designed to educate limited‐income older adults in ways to manage their meager resources to purchase more and healthier foods. The purpose of this study was to determine the effectiveness of the Better Choices intervention in improving the knowledge, attitude, and behavior of participants concerning their food money resource management. Older adults (n = 453) with ages ranging from 59 to over 90 years participated in 8 weeks of educational programming delivered by educators in 15 participating North Carolina counties. In a cross‐over program design participating counties were randomly assigned to two groups, to create a control for the food money resource management treatment. A three‐points‐in‐time survey supported longitudinal measurement. Independent samples t‐tests showed no significant differences between groups at baseline. Paired sample t‐test results show the intervention was effective with statistically significant improvement of participants' knowledge regarding preparing a healthy meal on a budget, beans as a low‐cost alternative to meat, and the use of unit pricing to compare products to identify the best value. Participant‐developed action plans reflected planned behavior change. Study results show this group of older adults were capable of and willing to adopt new behaviors for a healthier lifestyle. While not a representative sample, the broad applicability of adult learning and planned behavior theories underpinning the program lead us to conclude that the methods and theories applied in this intervention should be of use to educators and practitioners serving limited‐resource older adult populations.     

Can we improve the perceived quality of economic forecasts?

A number of topics are discussed concerning how economic forecasts can be improved in quality or at least in presentation. These include the following: using 50% uncertainty intervals rather than 95%; noting that even though forecasters use many different techniques, they are all occasionally incorrect in the same direction; that there is a tendency to underestimate changes; that some expectations and recently available data are used insufficiently; lagged forecasts errors can help compensate for structural breaks; series that are more forecastable could be emphasized and that present methods of evaluating forecasts do not capture the useful properties of some methods compared to alternatives.     

Opaque Financial Contracting and Toxic Term Sheets in Venture Capital

In a recent article in this journal, the authors documented the growing tendency of emerging growth companies to raise substantial equity while remaining privately held through private IPOs, or PIPOs. PIPO financing has created scores of “unicorn” firms—private enterprises with imputed market values of $1.0 billion or more—while allowing them to avoid the challenges of being publicly traded. But as has also been noted, the PIPO process, with its multiple financing rounds and increasingly complex terms, has almost certainly result in some inflated market valuations. Along with inflated values, the contracting process and many of the provisions that result from it often have economic consequences that are poorly understood by at least some of the participants, including the potential for significant wealth transfer between stakeholders as well as overall destruction of enterprise value. And the term sheets containing such provisions appear to become even more “opaque” and more “toxic” with each round of financing. More specifically, the liquidation preferences and ratchets often provided new investors in the later rounds of PIPOs can greatly affect the allocation of the risks and the ownership shares and, in so doing, transfer significant wealth from the entrepreneurs and other older owners. Using a numerical analysis of a representative term sheet, the authors discuss the process of financial contracting for early‐stage companies, providing examples of how negotiations can go wrong and showing exactly when and where the agreed‐upon conditions start to turn toxic for some of the stakeholders. The article closes with the authors’ assessment of the disincentives for entrepreneurs and early‐stage investors created by this often confusing and dilutive venture capital contracting and funding process.     

Seven Ways to Deal with a Financial Crisis: Cross‐Country Experience and Policy Implications1

This article presents a taxonomy of financial restructuring strategies that have been used by national policy makers to manage financial crises in the past. The goals of financial restructuring are to preserve or, if necessary, restore the debtor‐creditor relationships on which the economy depends for efficient allocation of capital, and to do so at minimal cost. Costs include not only the direct costs to taxpayers of financial assistance, but also—and likely more important—the indirect costs to the economy that stem from misallocations of capital and incentive problems resulting from the restructuring. Countries typically apply a combination of tools, including decentralized, market‐based mechanisms as well as government‐managed programs. Market‐based strategies generally aim to strengthen the capital base of financial institutions and borrowers using some mix of debt forgiveness and capital infusions. Government‐led restructuring strategies include the establishment of entities to which non‐performing loans are transferred as well as government‐assisted sales of domestic financial institutions, often to foreign entrants. Market‐based mechanisms can provide low‐cost ways of resolving the coordination problems faced by countries in the wake of massive debtor and creditor insolvency, particularly when those mechanisms are effective in achieving the desirable objective of selectivity—that is, devoting taxpayer resources only to those borrowers and banks that, with temporary assistance, will be capable of sustaining themselves in the future. But limiting their range of application mainly to developed economies, such market‐based mechanisms also depend on an efficient judicial system, a credible supervisory framework and authority with sufficient enforcement capacity, and lack of corruption in implementation. Although government‐managed programs may not seem to depend as heavily on well‐functioning legal and regulatory institutions, such approaches—especially the transfer of assets to government‐owned asset management companies—also rely to some extent on such institutions. Asset management companies are less likely to achieve their goal of resolving the overhang of debt at reasonable cost when legal and political institutions are weak and ownership of domestic creditors and debtors is highly concentrated. Especially in such cases, complexity and failure to consider incentive problems when designing specific rules governing financial assistance can aggravate moral hazard problems, unnecessarily raising the costs of resolution. Resolution mechanisms tend to be most successful when—like across‐the‐board debt forgiveness programs implemented through redenominations of debt—they are simple in design and afford quick resolution of outstanding debts, offering little discretion to governments while providing incentives for the private sector to work down the remaining debt overhang.