Income taxation when markets are incomplete

We investigate the welfare effects of proportional income taxation in a standard general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI). Formally, our analysis is on the allocative effects of state-contingent income tax reforms. Tax reforms are restricted to be anonymous, publicly and truthfully announced before markets open, and they are required to result in an ex-post constrained efficient allocation. Our main result is to show that there do typically exist contingent tax reforms that are Pareto improving. These reforms, acting directly on the asset span, modify private risk-sharing opportunities. Thus, unlike most of the GEI literature, the type of policy transmission mechanism considered does not rely on second-order, relative spot price effects. Yet, the key welfare effects of our tax reforms are substantially equivalent to those induced through changes in relative spot prices, as, for example, in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), Geanakoplos et al. (1990), or in Citanna et al. (2001). Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 58E17, 46N10, 93B29 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D52, H21, H24, H25     

Some general results for moments in bivariate distributions

The purpose of this paper is to present a closed formula to compute the moments of a general function from the knowledge of its bivariate survival function. The result is derived by utilizing an integration by parts formula for two variables, which is not readily available in the literature. Many of the existing results are obtained as special cases. Finally, two examples are presented to illustrate the results. In both the examples, mixed moments as well as moments for the series system and parallel system are obtained. The integration by parts formula in two variables, derived here, is of interest in its own right and we hope that it will be useful in other investigations. The integration by parts formula in two variables is derived as a special case of a general formula in n variables.     

Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism

We study school choice markets where the non-strategy-proof Boston mechanism is used to assign students to schools. Inspired by previous field and experimental evidence, we analyze a type of behavior called priority-driven: students have a common ranking over the schools and then give a bonus in their submitted preferences to those schools for which they have high priority. We first prove that under this behavior, there is a unique stable and efficient matching, which is the outcome of the Boston mechanism. Second, we show that the three most prominent mechanisms on school choice (Boston, deferred acceptance, and top trading cycles) coincide when students’ submitted preferences are priority-driven. Finally, we run some computational simulations to show that the assumption of priority-driven preferences can be relaxed by introducing an idiosyncratic preference component, and our qualitative results carry over to a more general model of preferences.     

Learning by fund-raising

From experience, fund-raisers become more efficient solicitors. This paper offers a full characterization of the optimal solicitation strategy when there are learning economies. The characterization is recursive, and does not require equilibrium computations. Our main results are that (1) the fund-raiser may now solicit a “ net free-rider”—a donor whose contribution falls below the marginal solicitation cost; (2) the number of solicitations is non-monotonic in the learning rate; and (3) a solicitation technology with high overhead but low marginal costs is likely to be optimal if income distribution in the population is relatively homogenous. The complementary case with a decreasing returns to scale technology is also considered.     

Economic freedom and public,non-market institutions: evidence from criminal prosecution

Economic freedom, which measures the protection of property and freedom to contract, is generally argued to capture the quality of a state’s institutions regarding market activity. As to be expected, numerous studies have found that economic freedom is associated with good economic outcomes. Additionally, much effort in public economics has worked to identify the features of quality non-market public institutions. No effort has been made to connect institutions that influence market activity and institutions that govern non-market activities. We take a first step. We employ a linear programming method for measuring relative efficiencies known as Data Envelopment Analysis. We apply this technique to information on the use of inputs to the production of the prosecution of crime across the thousands of local prosecutor offices in the U.S. We then compare state-level measurements of prosecution productivity with data on state-level economic freedom from the Economic Freedom of North America index. We show that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the two. Those states that develop institutions respecting economic freedom also tend to be the states that develop efficient publicly-provided services. The results are extended to complementary economic freedom measurements.     

Local fiscal policy after a bailout: austerity or soft budget constraints?

Do higher-level governments enforce austerity after bailing out indebted subnational governments or are bailouts a free lunch for the recipients? Analyzing this question empirically is difficult because bailouts are not granted randomly. This paper suggests a method to evaluate the fiscal consequences of subnational bailouts that does not rely on institutional details to obtain quasi-exogenous variation. The main idea is to combine matching and difference-in-differences designs. In a second step, I apply this method to study how bailouts affect the fiscal policy of recipient municipalities in the German federal state of Hesse. Combining disaggregated budget data with data on bailout payments over more than a decade, I find that municipalities consolidate their budgets after they receive a bailout from the state government. While this finding is specific to the German federal context, the proposed methodology can be used, due to its flexibility, to study the fiscal consequences of bailouts in various other settings.     

Why Unions in the United States will Die: American Labor Organizations in the Age of Trump

This essay analyzes the effects of Donald Trump’s election as President on organized labor in the United States and, more specifically, on the demographic of workers responsible for his electoral college victory. The argument is that culture rather than economics explains Trump’s success in capturing key industrial states. His support depended on white middle-aged male voters without college degrees, the same cohort that makes up the backbone of unions in the United States. The likelihood is that Trump’s policies will further immiserate the American working class rather than reinvigorate it. In three key areas, Trump’s presidency will result in lower union membership density and higher inequality of wealth. The cultural orientation of Trump’s supporters outweighed politics, policy, and competence in selecting a national leader.