Note on the behavior of residual security returns for winner and loser portfolios

Portfolios are formed directly and exclusively upon residual return behavior in the months prior to portfolio formation. The empirical behavior of residual return in the post-formation period is then examined. Based upon the overall time period studied (1932 through 1977), the average residual return is essentially zero in the months subsequent to the portfolio formation. However, systematic (i.e., non-zero) residual behavior is observed in particular years. Moreover, the results suggest the possibility that ‘abnormal’ returns observed after certain events (e.g., earnings announcements) may at least in part reflect more general phenomena associated with being ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in terms of residual returns in the months previous to the event.     

Accruals,Cash Flows,and Equity Values

We find, as predicted, that the differential ability of accrual and cash flow components of earnings to help forecast future abnormal earnings and the persistence of the components result in the components having different valuation implications. We base our tests on Ohlson (1999) applied to fourteen industries. We find: (1) Accruals and cash flows aid in forecasting future abnormal earnings incremental to abnormal earnings and equity book value. (2) Accruals and cash flows provide explanatory power for equity market value incremental to equity book value and abnormal earnings. (3) There is evidence that accruals and cash flows valuation coefficients are consistent with the Ohlson model.     

The Persistence of IPO Mispricing and the Predictive Power of Flipping

This paper examines underwriters' pricing errors and the information content of first-day trading activity in IPOs. We show that first-day winners continue to be winners over the first year, and first-day dogs continue to be relative dogs. Exceptions are "extra-hot" IPOs, which provide the worst future performance. We also demonstrate that large, supposedly informed, traders "flip" IPOs that perform the worst in the future. IPOs with low flipping generate abnormal returns of 1.5 percentage points per month over the first six months beginning on the third day. We show that flipping is predictable and conclude that underwriters' pricing errors are intentional.     

Employer payroll taxes and money wage behaviour

In the past ten years tax incidence theory has made a number of strides. Terminology has become standardized, assumptions have been made explicit, and a two sector, two factor, I static general equilibrium model to study incidence questions has been developed and elaborated. Rather than review these developments in any detail, it is sufficient here to note a sampling of these writings, namely the works of MUSGRAVE (1959, Ch. 10), HARBERGER (1962), MIESZKOWSKI (1967), MCLURE (1971) and MEISZKOWSKI'S (1969) summary of this litera-ture. ^{1 1} The models under consideration are essentially short run in nature. For present purposes the works of KRZYZANIAK (1968, 1970) on long run incidence are not being considered. View all notes

A central theme in this literature has been to emphasize the importance of relative price changes in the determination of tax incidence. At the same time it plays down the importance of the direction of shifting (forward or backward) which had been a prominent feature of earlier partial equilibrium incidence analysis. One purpose of the present paper is to argue that in actual empirical situations it is necessary to consider the behaviour of absolute prices in determining the incidence of a specific tax, the employer payroll tax.

There are four parts to the paper. Part I reviews the general equilibrium model and its conclusions on payroll tax incidence. The implications of forward shifting, backward shifting and payment of payroll taxes by employers are discussed in Part II. Results of a test for back-ward shifting of the tax in US manufacturing are reported in Part III. Part IV contains conclusions.

Two conclusions emerge from the analysis. (I) In the general equilibrium models under consideration the employer payroll tax is borne by labour. However, care must be taken in applying this conclusion to a real world situation where transfer payments are a component of family income. (2) Empirical tests in US manufacturing do not support the idea that the I employer tax is shifted totally backward onto money wages.     

Individual Large Shareholders,Earnings Management,and Capital‐Market Consequences

Using a large hand‐collected sample of all blockholders (ownership ≥ 5%) of S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we first document significant individual blockholder effects on earnings management (accrual‐based earnings management, real earnings management, and restatements). This association is driven primarily by these large shareholders influencing rather than selecting firms’ financial reporting practices. Second, the market's reaction to earnings announcements suggests that investors recognize the heterogeneity in blockholders’ influence on earnings management. The results highlight the highly individualized effects of blockholders and a mechanism through which shareholders impact reported earnings.     

Blockholder Exit Threats and Financial Reporting Quality

Recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest that blockholders (shareholders with ownership ≥ 5 percent) exert governance through the threat of exit. Blockholders have strong incentives to gather private information and sell their shares when managers are perceived to underperform. To prevent blockholders from selling their shares and the firm from suffering a stock price decline, managers align their actions with the interests of shareholders. As a result of the greater manager‐shareholder alignment, managers' actions are more likely to be in shareholders' best interest, and consequently there is less need for managers to manipulate earnings. Consistent with these predictions from economic theory, we find evidence that as exit threat increases, firms have higher financial reporting quality. Theory also predicts that the impact of blockholders' exit threat on financial reporting quality (FRQ) should increase as the manager's wealth is tied more closely to the stock price, and this is what we find. Our study contributes to the research on the impact of shareholders on FRQ and to an emerging literature on the impact of blockholders in financial markets. Blockholders play an important role in managers' reporting outcomes through their actions as informed investors.