State competition in higher education: A race to the top,or a race to the bottom?

How does competition affect higher education? This paper explores this question for public and private universities. Theory indicates that competition can push higher education policy in one of two different directions. On the one hand, competition may increase spending. For states, this would occur if states treat higher education as developmental; for private universities this would occur if they view spending as a means to attract students and prestige. On the other hand, competition may decrease spending if states treat higher education spending as redistributive, and competition may decrease spending by private schools if lower spending enhances their ability to attract students with low tuition. To determine which of these perspectives is most valid, we examine higher education policy choices in the 1980s and 1990s. We find that states appear to act as if higher education funding is redistributive while private schools appear to compete more on the basis of tuition than spending. These results demonstrate the important effects competition and governance structure have on higher education.Received: August 2001, Accepted: May 2002, JEL Classification: I2, I22, H72, I3     

Commitment to a friend,a service provider,or a service company—are they distinctions worth making?

In two studies, the authors examine three targets of commitment in service provider–consumer relationships and their effects on customer loyalty. The results indicate that service consumers distinguish between commitment to a service company, commitment to an individual in the role of service employee, and commitment to an individual outside of the role of service employee (e.g., a personal commitment such as a friendship). In addition, these three targets of commitment are hierarchically related and have differential effects on various customer responses. The results have implications for both customer relationship managers and researchers studying such relationships.

International trade and finance: Complementaries in the United Kingdom 1870-1913 and the United States 1920-1930

Do international trade and finance flow together? In a variety of theoretical models, trade and finance can be shown to have the potential to be substitutes or complements, so the matter must be resolved empirically. We study trade and financial flows from the United Kingdom from 1870 to 1913 and the United States in the interwar years. These were the two major capital exporters and key financial centers in each era. We find that trade and finance were robustly correlated for each case. We consider simultaneity issues. We also discuss evidence from the British Empire which casts doubt on the idea that trade is a punishment device in the event of a default.     

How important are semi-annual earnings announcements? An information event perspective

Using a method that avoids the need to specify earnings expectations, we demonstrate that the period surrounding the semi-annual announcement of Australian firms' earnings is, on average, an important source of information. Although there is substantial year-to-year variation, we observe no evidence of any significant time trend, and also conclude that a shift from Australian domestic generally accepted accounting principle to International Financial Reporting Standards did not impact the association between earnings announcement windows and stock returns. We also find no evidence that the informativeness of earnings announcements varies systematically with firm size, analyst following or economic news (i.e., positive vs. negative stock returns, profits vs. losses), although we do observe significant variation across industries. Our conclusion is further supported by contrasting the earnings release date with the days immediately prior to release, or high information days other than earnings announcement windows. Using a more precise event window relative to prior studies (i.e., 3 h vs. 3 days), we confirm that earnings announcements contain significant new information about fundamentals.     

A Simple Model of Insurance Market Dynamics

Abstract

This paper constructs and studies a simple but realistic model of an insurance market. The model has a minimalist construction in the sense that the number of parameters defining it is strictly limited and the elimination of any one of them would destroy its realism. There are 11 essential parameters. Each of the parameters has a physical interpretation. Some determine competitive effects within the market, some barriers to entry, and so on. The effect of each on various aspects of the market is examined in the presence of simulated loss experience. The aspects of the market considered include stability of premium rates, profitability, and market concentration. Some of the parameters are capable of use as regulatory controls. Two parameters, in addition to the original 11, are explicit price controls. Despite its simplicity, the model displays considerably complex behavior. Some results are intuitive, but some are not. For this reason, regulatory controls need to be applied with great caution lest they induce perverse effects, possibly even the reverse of those intended. The effect of the parameters on market behavior is first studied in the absence of catastrophic events from the loss experience. Subsequently, the effect of a single such event is studied.