IMF surveillance as a signal to attract foreign investment

Poor governance and endemic corruption hamper the efforts of some developing countries to attract foreign investment. Incentive schemes based on verifiable signals of varying costs and quality can be helpful in encouraging their governments to intensify corruption-control efforts. This paper ranks alternative signals, including surveillance by the IMF and other IFIs (International Financial Institutions), as catalysts for private foreign investments. We demonstrate that the ranking crucially depends on the bargaining strength of governments relative to foreign investors. If foreign lenders control the bargain, IFI signals are the first choice. If governments are in control, IFI signals become the choice of last resort.     

On the determinants of household debt maturity choice

This article jointly analyses a behavioural and a cultural concept to explain household debt portfolio choice. The behavioural approach explores the role of time preferences on household debt maturity in a theoretical model and a numerical analysis. We derive a positive relationship between the long-term discount factor δ and the optimal maturity of household loans. The cultural approach examines whether national culture is a reasonable predictor for household debt maturity. We show that culture is an important factor for households’ borrowing decisions and has even more predictive power than time preferences. Countries with higher scores on the Hofstede dimension of long-term orientation tend to have shorter household debt maturity. Time preferences incur a primarily mediating role, because the effect of national culture on the borrowing decision is reduced, as the long-term discount factor δ increases.     

Whom to send to Doha? The shortsighted ones!

Analyses of the effects of trade policies focus on comparisons of two different steady states, restricting the investigation to the long run. In order to account for the adjustments and to capture the relevant transmission mechanisms of changes in trade costs, such as market size, entry and exit, as well as productivity changes of firms, we base our trade policy analysis on a dynamic new trade theory model. This approach has two advantages. (i) It allows us to take account of the transitional process after a change in tariffs. (ii) It allows us to take account of the shortsightedness of policy makers. We show that Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a dynamic trade model are lower than Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a static model. We also show that shortsighted politicians tend to set lower tariffs than politicians with a longer planning horizon.     

How large are wage differentials in Austria?

The OECD has repeatedly recommended that wage bargaining in Austria be decentralised to allow wage diferentials to widen. But the status quo itself is in question. While studies of aggregate industry data indicate a high degree of wage dispersion, research based on data from household surveys seems suggest that income inequality in Austria is as small as in the Scandinavian countries. This paper seeks to reconcile these opposing views. It shows that data from the household surveys underestimate the size of inter-industry wage differentials. An analysis of the structure of contractual wage rates supports the view that wage inequality is very pronounced in Austria and that a narrowing of the wage gap would lead both to an increase in productive efficiency and an increase in income equality.     

Changes in the Austrian structure of wages, 1996–2002: evidence from linked employer-employee data

Analyzing data from the Structure of Earnings Surveys we find that wage dispersion in Austria increased only marginally between 1996 and 2002. There was an increase in the returns to education which accrued only to male workers. The positive effects of tenure and especially of experience on wages decreased over time. We adopt the Machado–Mata (J Appl Econ 20:445–465, 2005) counterfactual decomposition technique which allows to attribute changes in each wage decile to changes in worker and workplace characteristics and into changes in returns to these characteristics. Behind the small net increase in inequality we document a number of interesting gross effects that influence the change in the wage distribution. We find that both composition effects due to gender, education and age and market-driven effects such as changes in returns and changing workplace characteristics contributed to a higher dispersion of wages.     

Capitalizing Research & Development: Signaling or Earnings Management?

This paper analyzes the capitalization of Research & Development (R&D) expenditures under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Discretionary R&D capitalization can be exercised by managers to signal private information on future economic benefits to the market. It can, however, also serve as opportunistic earnings management. We analyze a unique, hand-collected sample of highly R&D intensive German IFRS firms during 1998–2012. We find that market values are not associated with capitalized R&D for the overall sample, indicating that earnings management may be a concern. We identify firm-years for which R&D capitalization is possibly used for pushing their earnings above a specific threshold (e.g. analysts' forecasted earnings, prior year's earnings). Our results show that both the decision to capitalize and how much to capitalize are strongly associated with benchmark beating. Consistently, we find that market values are negatively associated with capitalized R&D for firms who are likely to use capitalization for benchmark beating (about one third of the overall sample). On the other hand, the market values R&D capitalization positively for well-performing firms, for which capitalizing does not matter to beat an earnings benchmark (about half of the overall sample). This finding is robust to controls for endogeneity, various deflators, and different measures for earnings management.     

Portfolio optimization in a defaultable market under incomplete information

We consider the problem of maximization of expected utility from terminal wealth in a market model that is driven by a possibly not fully observable factor process and that takes explicitly into account the possibility of default for the individual assets as well as contagion (direct and information induced) among them. It is a multinomial model in discrete time that allows for an explicit solution. We discuss the solution within our defaultable and partial information setup, in particular we study its robustness. Numerical results are derived in the case of a log-utility function, and they can be analogously obtained for a power utility function.     

How to control a chaotic economy?

An economic system which exhibits chaotic behaviour has been stabilized on various periodic orbits by use of the Ott-Grebogi-Yorke method. This procedure has been recently applied to controlling chaotic phenomena in physical, chemical and biological systems. We adopt this method successfully for Feichtinger's generic model of two competing firms with asymmetrical investment strategies. We show that the application of this control method to the particular economic process considered brings a substantial advantage: one can easily switch from a chaotic trajectory to a regular periodic orbit and simultaneously improve the system's economic properties. Numerical simulations are presented in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the whole procedure.The work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung and by the Polish National Council (KBN) Grant No 2 P302 038 04.