The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences

We analyze voting behavior in a large electorate in which voters have adversarial state-contingent preferences with incomplete information about the state of the world. We show that one type of voter can suffer from the swing voter's curse à la Feddersen and Pesendorfer [The swing voter's curse, Amer. Econ. Rev. 86 (1996) 408-424], and go on to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of this model under different parameter values. We prove that unlike settings with nonadversarial preferences, there are equilibria in which in one state of the world, a minority-preferred candidate almost surely wins the election and thus the election may fail to correctly aggregate information. Indeed, we show that the fraction of the electorate dissatisfied with the result can be as large as .     

Hedge fund ownership and voluntary disclosure

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Using 13F filings from 1996 to 2011, we document that hedge fund holdings are negatively associated with the subsequent frequency of portfolio...     

Are college education and job experience complements or substitutes? Evidence from hedge fund portfolio performance

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine, for various educational characteristics of hedge fund managers, the performance profile of hedge fund portfolios along their...     

Nonlinearity between Trade Openness and Economic Development

This paper utilizes the instrumental variable threshold regressions approach to reassess the trade–development link. It finds evidence that trade openness contributes to uneven development. Greater trade openness tends to have beneficial effects on real development of high‐income countries. For low‐income ones, however, trade openness appears to influence real income in a significant and negative way. The data also reveal that greater trade openness has a positive effect on capital accumulation, productivity growth, and financial development in high‐income countries, but a negative impact in low‐income ones.     

Market Instability and Revision Error in Risk Premium

This paper provides a theory and evidence that the risk premium puzzle is viewed as a phenomenon pertaining to the unstable foreign exchange market. In an unstable market, revision error uncompensated by an initial risk premium accrues due to consumer expectation revision about the ex ante uncertainty of the exchange rate. The risk premium widely deviates from its initial level, depending on the frequency of the consumer expectation revision and the degree of risk aversion. Subsequent evidence shows the existence of the revision errors for the risk premium during the Asian currency crisis and the recent financial crisis periods.     

Stochastic convergence of the catch-up rate and multiple structural breaks in Asian countries

Allowing for multiple structural breaks and cross-section dependence, we re-investigate the hypothesis that the catch-up rates stochastically converge for 13 Asian countries from 1960 to 2007. Non-rejection of stationarity provides evidence for stochastic convergence, implying that following shocks to the catch-up rate, it will eventually revert to its long-run level.     

Negative externalities on property values resulting from water impairment: The case of the Pigeon River Watershed

The objective of this research was to determine whether willingness to bear the negative externality from water quality impairment differs between those who do and those who do not receive economic benefit from the impairment source. Differences were tested using a hedonic analysis of ambient water quality in two discrete housing markets in the Pigeon River Watershed, which have been polluted by the operation of a paper mill. The results suggest that North Carolina residents residing in subwatersheds with impaired portions of the Pigeon River, who experience economic benefit from the paper mill in addition to its harmful effects on water quality, do perceive the pollution as a negative externality. In contrast, the effects of both the degraded river and its contributing streams on property values are perceived as negative externalities by watershed residents in Tennessee who experience only harmful effects from the pollution. Differences in willingness to bear the water-impairment externality were not indicated by variables representing view of and proximity to impaired water bodies. The results suggest that the perception of water quality to which property owners implicitly apply value should be considered when establishing water-quality regulations.     

Evolution of Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy

We study the stochastic stability of a dynamic trading process in an exchange economy. We use a simplified version of a trading model à la Shapley and Shubik (J Polit Econ 85:937–968, 1977). Two types of agents equipped with Leontief preferences trade goods in markets by offering endowments, and actual trades occur at market clearing prices. Better behavior tends to spread through the same type of agents by imitation, and agents also make mistakes occasionally. We provide a sufficient condition for the perturbed dynamic process to have a unique stochastically stable state that is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation. In this sense, we give a rationale for Walrasian behavior.     

Compensating for unforeseeable damages in torts

The doctrine regarding unforeseeable damages in a contract was established in the well known case of Hadley vs. Baxendale. According to the judgement, a plaintiff cannot be compensated for unforeseeable damages in an incomplete contract unless he informs the defendant of the possible unforeseen contingency beforehand. In this paper, I extend the argument to the tort case in which it is hardly possible to communicate between a plaintiff and a defendant before an accident occurs. In the case of the sequential bilateral accident in which the victim’s care level is observable to the injurer, the victim’s care level can be a signal of the unforeseen contingency. I mainly discuss the implementability of the social optimum by the contributory negligence with dual standard of care enabling the communication between the parties.     

Greening transportation fleets: Insights from a two-stage game theoretic model

The greening of organizational transportation fleets, especially trucks and automobiles, has gained increasing attention by companies in a variety of industrial sectors. The reasons for this concern and attention are due to regulatory and competitive pressures, but also increasing costs of fossil-fuels. Surprisingly the amount of research and modeling for fleet management overall has been rather limited, with the focus on managing green vehicle investments virtually non-existent. In this study we develop a two-stage game theoretic model that helps evaluate, from both policy and organizational perspectives, the implications of greening of transportation fleets. Various parameters are evaluated including factors such as innovations in green vehicle technology, levels of service differences, cost of fuel, adjusting tax policy, regulatory compliance requirements, and adaptation costs. This evaluation provides practical insights into actions that could be considered by regulators and organizations to encourage environmental investments.