中间选民理论在农民工市民化政策制定中的运用——基武汉市436位农民工的实证研究

The Median Voter Theory is an important theory in the neo-political economics. It can be applied to solve the collective choice paradox and analyze the policy making for the citizenization of peasant workers. Adopting the method of factor analysis, this paper makes an empirical study on peasant workers’ preference for citizenization. We find that there is a paradox of future residence preference and self-identification in peasant workers. On this basis, peasant workers are divided into 5 subgroups, and it is found that the median undecided peasant workers are the median voters. Based on the analysis of the median undecided peasant worker’s complaints and appeals, it is proposed that the country should strengthen the vocational training system, establish a social security system, expand the agricultural reform and promote educational reform to facilitate the citizenization of peasant workers. __________ Translated from Guanli Shijie 맜理世界 (Management World), 2007, (4): 40–67     

基于因子分析的我国区域研发能力差异比较研究

由于经济、科技发展水平不同,我国各地区在研发能力上存在较大的差异.为了对我国区域研发能力差异进行定量化分析,本文引入了研发投入强度、研发经费相对规模、研发人员相对规模、主要检索工具收录论文相对数量、授权专利相对数量、技术市场相对规模、新产品产值相对规模等指标,根据(2006年中国科技统计年鉴>提供的数据,通过因子分析,对我国各省区研发能力差异进行比较评价.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

浅谈精细管理在中国企业发展中的重要性

随着科技的进步、社会的发展，当前中国企业发展的关键是要进行精细管理，它已经是中国企业发展的必然前提。由于市场竞争的加剧，中国企业正逐渐从粗放型管理向精细管理转变。这是中国企业发展的一大进步。只有搞好精细管理，才能促使企业内部改革的进一步深化，保证企业更快更好的向前发展。     

基于适应性商务智能的虚拟企业合作伙伴选择模型

合作伙伴选择是虚拟企业运行中至关重要的问题。迅速而准确地找到合适的合作伙伴并实现协调运作，直接影响到虚拟企业合作绩效和整体目标的实现。文章将环境感知和适应性商务智能理论引入虚拟企业合作伙伴选择中，提出了基于适应性商务智能的虚拟企业合作伙伴选择模型，设计了模型的基本架构，分析了模型的构成模块，探讨了模型的应用机理。     

中国改革开放以后地方税制度的改革

改革开放以前，中国实行高度集中的经济、财政、税收管理体制，税收的归属随着财政、税收管理体制的变化频繁调整，没有形成完整的地方税制度。改革开放以后，中国开始解决经济、财政、税收管理体制过于集中的问题，逐步调整中央与地方的财政、税收分配关系，并从1994年起将上述分配关系初步纳入分税制的轨道，建立了由中央税、地方税、中央与地方共享税构成的分税制财政管理体制，比较完整的地方税制度由此初步形成。     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.