The value of information in a simple duopoly model

This paper is concerned with the evaluation of information in a duopoly model in which the cost functions are subject to uncertainty. It explores how changes in information about the costs available to either firm affects the welfare of both firms along with the welfare of consumers. By comparing the ten possible types of information structures, it is shown that information may be detrimental, that improved information for one firm may or may not benefit the other firm and/or the consumer, and that it may be more desirable for a firm to gather information about the rival's cost rather than its own. All of these “irregular” results depend on the values of the variances of the costs and their correlation coefficient.     

Knowledge sharing between academic researchers and tourism practitioners: a Japanese study of the practical value of embeddedness,trust and co-creation

Nature-based tourism (NBT) practitioners urgently need to develop more and better quality products through including the findings of tourism and other scientific researchers. However, in many cases, NBT enterprises do not have enough resources to invest in building a sustainable relationship with such researchers. This paper reports on the long-term involvement of university researchers in value co-creation – producing a new value in tourist experiences – jointly with tourism practitioners, encouraging significant and innovative NBT outcomes. It articulates how knowledge sharing was achievable between these parties in their shared practices, focusing on the importance of tacit knowledge sharing. A case study approach was complemented by long-term monitoring from 2011 to 2015; data was collected by interview and participant observation and qualitatively analysed. The results vividly depict that the key factor for effective tacit knowledge sharing and long-term co-creation is largely related to embeddedness, and also to trust, long-term partnerships, and the creation of win-win situations for all sides. Although limited to one set of actors and one socio-cultural context, one Japanese university and one enterprise, this study pioneers empirical research on the relationships between co-creation, knowledge sharing, and embeddedness in sustainable tourism that could be replicated in other situations.     

Who values the family‐friendly aspects of a job? Evidence from the Japanese labour market

Women with family responsibilities such as child‐rearing generally prefer jobs with flexible working conditions. According to the theory of compensating wage differentials, women working in such family‐friendly jobs are paid less than those working in family‐unfriendly jobs. The present paper investigates whose wages are more greatly affected by the family‐(un)friendly aspects of their jobs. Based on a longitudinal survey of Japanese women, we found that among several family‐(un)friendly attributes of a job, only commuting time requires a wage premium, and most of the premium is associated with job changes made by part‐time‐working married women.     

WELFARE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Abstract.  This paper examines the welfare effects of aid tied to technology transfer in a two-country general equilibrium model. In the recipient country, some factors of production employed in a particular industry are difficult to use in other industries because their properties are specific to that industry. Technology transfer facilitates 'factor movement' and improves the efficiency of factor markets in the recipient. We identify and interpret the conditions under which technology transfer benefits the recipient and harms the donor. We also show that technology transfer can enrich (or harm) both the donor and the recipient under certain conditions.     

Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem

A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem here is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. We provide an axiomatic framework to analyze this problem and seek normatively desirable and practical decision rules. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. We show that this rule is a unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. We then establish the nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information.     

Shared renewable resources and gains from trade under technology standards

Using a two‐country, two‐good model of international trade, we examine gains from trade and strategic interaction in resource management among countries that share renewable resources such as fishery stocks. Two goods are a resource good, which is the harvest of the shared stock, and some other good that may be thought of as manufactures. The productivity of the resource good depends on harvesting technology and the stock level. This paper focuses on technology standards (e.g., restrictions on fishing gears, vessels, areas, and time) over other methods for resource management because they are most commonly implemented in fisheries. Technology standards are modeled as a restriction on the harvesting technology; that is, under strict technology standards, firms exploit resources as if they are using inferior harvesting technology. We show that an opening up of trade may reduce the shared stock and cause steady‐state utility to decrease in a resource‐good importing country and increase in a resource‐good exporting country. Strikingly, when the shared stock is in jeopardy (a high demand for the harvest), steady‐state harvest is maximized after an opening up of trade by what we call multilateral resource management in this paper and both countries gain from trade.     

A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts

In a general one-to-many matching model with contracts, Hatfield and Milgrom (Ame Econ Rev 95:913–935, 2005) show that the doctor optimal stable rule is strategy-proof from the doctor side. We strengthen their result by showing that this rule is in fact the unique stable rule that is strategy-proof from the doctor side.