Stock prices in Japan rise at night

Examining daily data of the Nikkei Average from 23 October 1986 to 20 January 1998, I find that although the mean of the rate of change during the trading hours (RT) is negative, the mean during non-trading hours (RNT) is significantly positive. I also find that (1) RT has a stable relationship with Japanese economic fundamentals while RNT does not, (2) RNT reflects US economic fundamentals, though weakly, and (3) if the previous trading hours reflected bearish trading, then the bearish sentiment is not taken over to opening time, as opposed to when the previous trading hours reflect a more bullish attitude. A possible cause of the positive RNT is optimism of Japanese investors, especially that of securities companies.     

Directed Credit? The Loan Market in High‐Growth Japan

Observers routinely claim that the Japanese government of the high-growth 1960s and 1970s rationed and ultimately directed credit. It barred domestic competitors to banks, insulated the domestic capital market from international competitive pressure, and capped loan interest rates. In the resulting credit shortage, it promoted industrial policy by rationing credit.
As much as the government purported to ration and to direct credit, it apparently accomplished nothing of the sort. It did not block domestic rivals to banks successfully, did not insulate the market from international forces, and did not set maximum interest rates that bound. Using evidence on loans to all 1,000-odd firms listed on Section 1 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 1968 to 1982, we find that observed interest rates reflected borrower risk and mortgageable assets and that banks did not use low-interest deposits to circumvent any interest caps. Instead, the loan market seems to have cleared at the nominal rates.
We follow our empirical inquiry with a case study of the industry to which the government tried hardest to direct credit: ocean shipping. We find no evidence of credit rationing. Despite the government programs to allocate capital, nonconformist firms funded their projects readily outside authorized avenues. Indeed, they funded them so readily that the nonconformists grew with spectacular speed and earned their investors enormous returns.     

Who Appoints Them,What Do They Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan

Although reformers often claim Japanese firms appoint inefficiently few outside directors, the logic of market competition suggests otherwise. Given the competitive product, service, and capital markets in Japan, the firms that survive should disproportionately be firms that tend to appoint boards approaching their firm‐specifically optimal structure. The resulting debate thus suggests a test: do firms with more outsiders do better? If Japanese firms do maintain suboptimal numbers of outsiders, then those with more outsiders should outperform those with fewer; if market constraints instead drive them toward their firm‐specific optimum, then firm characteristics may determine board structure, but firm performance should show no observable relation to that structure. We explore the issue with data on the 1000 largest exchange‐listed Japanese firms from 1986 to 1994. We first ask which firms tend to appoint which outsiders to their boards. We find the appointments decidedly nonrandom. Firms appoint directors from the banking industry when they borrow heavily, when they have fewer mortgageable assets, or when they are themselves in the service and finance industry. They appoint retired government bureaucrats when they are in construction and sell a large fraction of their output to government agencies, and they appoint other retired business executives when they have a dominant parent corporation or when they are in the construction industry and sell heavily to the private sector. Coupling OLS regressions with two‐stage estimates on a subset of the data, we then ask whether the firms with more outside directors outperform those with fewer, and find that they do not. Instead, the regressions suggest—exactly as the logic of market competition predicts—that firms choose boards appropriate to them.