Perception and attitude of Hong Kong hotel guest‐contact employees towards tourists from Mainland China

In recent years, the majority of arrivals to Hong Kong, which were once dominated by the Western and Japanese markets, were replaced by arrivals from Mainland China. The number of tourists from Mainland China has overtaken others to become the largest single market for the territory. With its increasing significance, providing quality service to these visitors becomes crucial to the success of the tourism industry and of the hotel industry in particular. Unfortunately, the satisfaction rating of the Mainland visitors on hotel services in Hong Kong is reported to be relatively low when compared to those given by other major markets. It is suspected that the perception and attitudes of the service staff may influence their behaviour in serving customers. As such, this study conducted a survey questionnaire with 228 guest‐contact employees of hotels in Hong Kong. Results indicate that most respondents have a fairly positive perception towards the Mainland tourists in relation to the economic and financial benefits that they bring to Hong Kong. However, a majority of the respondents express negative perception and attitudes towards these tourists in respect to their appearance, personalities and behaviour. Despite some respondents indicating that they exhibit different service behaviour towards visitors from Mainland China and other countries, no major significant differences in their perception and attitudes were found in this study. It is recommended that various types of cross‐cultural training, such as sensitivity training and role playing, would be helpful to guest‐contact employees in enhancing their ability to be more objective and more tolerant of other people's behaviour. This study concludes that hotel employees, especially those who work as front‐line staff, must remain aware of their subjective judgments when dealing with guests and be more accepting of others. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preference for output price uncertainty by the non-renewable resource extracting firm

We establish a general preference for price uncertainty by the price-taking, risk-neutral, non-renewable resource extracting firm with orthodox convex extraction costs. We prove that the relevant value function for profits over an interval is convex in output price.     

Stock price crash risk and internal control weakness: presence vs. disclosure effect

This study examines the stock price crash risk for a sample of firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). We find that in the year prior to the initial disclosures, ICW firms are more crash‐prone than firms with effective internal controls. This positive relation is more pronounced when weakness problems are associated with a firm's financial reporting process. More importantly, we find that stock price crash risk reduces significantly after the disclosures of ICWs, despite the disclosure itself signalling bad news. The above results hold after controlling for various firm‐specific determinants of crash risk and ICWs. Using an ICW disclosure as a natural experiment, our study attempts to isolate the presence effect of undisclosed ICWs from the initial disclosure effect of internal control weakness on stock price crash risk. In so doing, we provide more direct evidence on the causal relation between the quality of financial reporting and stock price crash risk.     

Market uncertainty,market sentiment,and the post-earnings announcement drift

Post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) which was first identified over 40 years ago seems to be as much alive today as it ever was. Numerous attempts have been made to explain its continued existence. In this paper we provide evidence to support a new explanation: that the PEAD is a reflection of the level of market uncertainty and sentiment that prevails during the post-announcement period. The overriding conclusion from our analysis is that both uncertainty and sentiment play a central role in determining investor behaviour and it is this behaviour that ultimately determines the pricing that is observed in financial markets.     

How do investors react under uncertainty?

It has long been accepted that risk plays an important role in determining valuation where risk reflects that investors are unsure of future returns but are able to express their prior expectations by a probability distribution of these returns. Knight (1921) introduced the concept of uncertainty where investors possess incomplete knowledge about this distribution and so are unable to formulate priors over all possible outcomes. One common approach for making uncertainty tractable is to assume that investors faced with uncertainty will base their decisions on the worst case scenario (i.e. follow maxmin expected utility). As a consequence it is postulated that investors will become more pessimistic as uncertainty increases, upgrading bad news and downgrading good news. Using Australian data, we find evidence that investors react to bad news at times of high market uncertainty but largely ignore good news which is consistent with them taking on a pessimistic bias. However, we also find evidence of the reverse when market uncertainty is low with investors taking on an optimistic stance by ignoring bad news but reacting to good news. We also find that the impact that market uncertainty has on the reaction of investors to new information is modified by the prevailing market sentiment at the time of the announcement. Besides throwing light on the question of how uncertainty impacts on investor behaviour, our findings seriously challenge the common assumption made that investors consistently deal with uncertainty by applying maxmin expected utility.     

The effect of own-firm and other-firm experience on foreign direct investment survival in the United States, 1987–92

We argue that foreign firms operating in a host country generate information spillovers that have potential value for later foreign direct investment. We test two predictions. First, we expect foreign direct investments by firms with experience in a host country to be more likely to survive than investments made by first-time entrants. Second, foreign direct investments will be more likely to survive the greater the foreign presence in the target industry at the time of investment, subject to two contingencies. The first contingency is that the relationship will be weak or nonexistent among firms with no experience in the host country, because these firms have difficulty evaluating and taking advantage of the information spillovers. The second contingency is that the presence of other foreign firms will not affect investment survival among firms that already have a presence in the target industry and undertake expansion. These firms already possess general information about the target industries and are unlikely to gain additional benefit from information spillovers. We find supportive evidence based on the survival to 1992 among 354 U.S. investments undertaken by foreign firms in manufacturing industries during 1987. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The right speed and its value

Slow investments cause substantial revenue losses, yet acceleration increases costs. This tradeoff implies that an optimal investment speed usually exists; it is faster the higher a firm's intrinsic speed capability. We hypothesize that it is a firm's intrinsic speed capability, rather than its speed relative to industry competitors per se, that boosts firm value. Using data on oil and gas facilities (1996–2005), we find that intrinsic speed capabilities augment firm value in a varied way: their value is larger with better corporate governance, lower cost of capital, and higher ability to draw value from R&D investment. Our work elevates the discussion of speed from a project‐level consideration to a firm‐level competitive advantage issue and raises the need to further explore its strategic value. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of technical expertise in firm governance structure: evidence from chief financial officer contractual incentives

We provide evidence that the presence of technical expertise in firm governance structure reduces reliance on contractual incentives to control the potential agency problem for executives whose responsibilities require specialized knowledge. Specifically, we find that firms with financial expertise in the form of a board finance committee, or a chief executive officer with a financial background, tend to use lower levels of incentive‐based compensation for their chief financial officers. Our findings suggest financial experts provide stronger oversight and/or direction with regard to firm financial policies and strategies, thereby allowing firms to reduce reliance on incentive compensation. Our study provides insight into the role of technical expertise and board committees in firm governance, and into the benefits of common functional expertise within top management teams. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.