Modelling the spot prices of various coffee types

We investigate long-run relationships among the spot prices of four coffee types. Two cointegrating vectors emerge: one between the prices of Arabica coffee varieties, and the other one between Unwashed Arabicas and Robusta. A persistence profile analysis shows a more rapid adjustment to equilibrium for the first compared to the second vector due to the fact that the former involves the Arabica coffees, which are more homogeneous. Adjustment is relatively fast, implying that economic forces act rapidly and discrepancies in the equilibrium relationships are short-lived. We also find evidence of non-linear adjustment back to equilibrium; when prices are too high, adjustment takes place at a slower rate than when they are too low.     

Interpretation problems of the partial correlation with nonnormally distributed variables

The partial correlation is a commonly used measure for assessing the bivariate correlation of two quantitative variables after eliminating the influence of one or more other variables. The partial correlation is generally interpreted as the correlation that would result if the variables to be eliminated were fixed (not allowed to vary and influence the other variables), which is referred to in the statistical literature as conditional correlation. The present paper demonstrates, by means of theoretical derivations and practical examples, that when the assumption of multivariate normality is violated (e.g., as a result of nonlinear relationships among the variables investigated) the usual interpretation of the partial correlation coefficient will be basically incorrect. In extreme cases the value of the partial correlation coefficient may be strongly positive, close to 1, whereas the conditional correlation may have a large negative value. To solve this problem the paper suggests to partial out a certain function (in most cases the square) of the variables whose effects are to be eliminated if nonlinear relationships are likely to occur.     

Do employment subsidies work? Evidence from regionally targeted subsidies in Turkey

This paper studies the effects on registered employment and number of registered establishments of two employment subsidy schemes in Turkey. We implement a difference-in-differences methodology to construct appropriate counterfactuals for the covered provinces. Our findings suggest that both subsidy programs did lead to significant net increases in registered jobs in eligible provinces (5%–13% for the first program and 11%–15% for the second). However, the cost of the actual job creation was high because of substantial deadweight losses, particularly for the first program (47% and 78%). Because of better design features, the second subsidy program had lower, though still significant, deadweight losses (27%–46%). Although constrained by data availability, the evidence suggests that the dominant effect of subsidies was to increase social security registration of firms and workers rather than boosting total employment and economic activity. This supports the theory that in countries with weak enforcement institutions, high labor taxes on low-wage workers may lead to substantial incentives for firms and workers to operate informally.     

THE ESSENCE OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL

In a lecture in November 2008, Professor Huerta de Soto set out the key contributions of the Austrian School to economic thought.     

Production planning and inventories optimization: A backward approach in the convex storage cost case

We study the deterministic optimization problem of a profit-maximizing firm which plans its sales/production schedule. The firm controls both its production and sales rates and knows the revenue associated to a given level of sales, as well as its production and storage costs. The revenue and the production cost are assumed to be respectively concave and convex. In Chazal et al. [Chazal, M., Jouini, E., Tahraoui, R., 2003. Production planning and inventories optimization with a general storage cost function. Nonlinear Analysis 54, 1365–1395], we provide an existence result and derive some necessary conditions of optimality. Here, we further assume that the storage cost is convex. This allows us to relate the optimal planning problem to the study of a backward integro-differential equation, from which we obtain an explicit construction of the optimal plan.     

Technology Adoption with Multiple Alternative Designs and the Option to Wait

Technology adoption is one the most important elements of a firm's strategy. In this paper, we address an essential, yet largely overlooked, question: What should a firm do when faced with several alternative proprietary designs of a new technology? In our base case we assume there are two technology designs, each described by an independent stochastic process of technology evolution. We show that, in equilibrium, a buyer chooses the leading technology design as soon as the discounted payoff from doing so is positive. When the option value of waiting is very high, it is jointly optimal to delay adoption. But because sellers cannot commit not to extract all of the buyer's future rents, inefficiently early adoption takes place. Strategies that improve commitment to low future license fees, such as increasing the number of competitors or cross‐licensing, may alleviate the hold up problem. Although previous research stressed the benefit of such commitments in terms of increasing the rate of technology adoption, we present a class of cases when the benefit from commitment is efficiently to delay adoption.     

Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear–quadratic setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give rise to – through self-fulfilling expectations – dramatical political instability, i.e. Condorcet cycles of length two even for very high majority rules.