Job growth in early transition: Comparing two paths*

Small start‐up firms are the engine of job creation in early transition. We ask about differences in their growth across two different transition economies: Estonia, which experienced rapid destruction of pre‐existing firms, and the Czech Republic, which reduced the old sector gradually. We find that the majority of job growth corresponds to within‐industry reallocation. The within‐industry growth of small start‐up firms is similar in the two countries, in line with the convergence to Western industry firm‐size distributions. We also find similar patterns in the evolution of wage differentials between start‐ups and old firms and small differences in the extent of low‐wage employment in start‐ups across the two transition paths. JEL Classifications: J2, J3, J4, L1, O1, P2.     

The Performance of Service Industries in Canada: A Real Value Analysis

The performance of service industries in Canada has been lower than that of good industries over the last four decades, with noticeable exceptions such as for railways and telecommunication carriers. Service industries were less economically (and technically) efficient in that they generated less output value (quantity) per hour worked (level and growth) or per combined unit of labour and capital (multifactor productivity growth) than good industries. The relative output price of services declined slightly over time compared with goods. At the disaggregated level, changing relative output prices were substantial and proved to be an important factor explaining the relative satisfactory economic performance of many service industries despite their low technical performance. Nevertheless, the output share of service industries increased over that period, sustained, mainly, by the growing recourse of all firms to outsourcing of services.     

Do interventions in foreign exchange markets modify investors' expectations? The experience of Japan between 1992 and 2004

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of the Bank of Japan's official interventions on the JPY/USD parity during the period 1992–2004. The novelty of our approach is to combine two recent advances of the empirical literature on foreign exchange interventions: (i) drawing on over-the-counter option prices to characterize more precisely the distribution of market expectations; (ii) redefining interventions in terms of events as they tend to come in clusters. Moreover, in order to deal with the features of the data (small sample size, non-standard distribution), we use bootstrap tests.We show that interventions have a significant impact on the mean expectation (the forward rate). The results are more ambiguous for variance. Additionally, we find that the effect of interventions on skewness is significant, robust to different definitions of skewness, and consistent with the direction of interventions. On the contrary, our results clearly show that kurtosis is not affected by interventions. We finally show that: (i) coordination increases effectiveness of interventions; (ii) results are not altered when controlling for other economic and political news.     

EFFECT OF FED POLICY ACTIONS ON THE DEFAULT LIKELIHOOD OF COMMERCIAL BANKS

Using a measure of default likelihood based on an option pricing method, we provide evidence that Fed policy actions affect the financial distress of commercial banks. When the Fed increases (decreases) interest rates, the measure of default likelihood increases (decreases). We show that when the Fed uses a tight money policy, the increase in default likelihood is more pronounced for banks that have less capital, have greater financial leverage, are smaller, have fewer growth opportunities, and have lower asset quality. Additionally, the effects on bank default likelihood are more pronounced when the Fed's policy signals less concern about economic growth, as indicated by its bias toward further tightening, and when there is a market expectation of higher short‐term market rates in the future.     

Mining and Social Movements: Struggles Over Livelihood and Rural Territorial Development in the Andes

Social movements have been viewed as vehicles through which the concerns of poor and marginalized groups are given greater visibility within civil society, lauded for being the means to achieve local empowerment and citizen activism, and seen as essential in holding the state to account and constituting a grassroots mechanism for promoting democracy. However, within development studies little attention has been paid to understanding how social movements can affect trajectories of development and rural livelihood in given spaces, and how these effects are related to movements’ internal dynamics and their interaction with the broader environment within which they operate. This paper addresses this theme for the case of social movements protesting contemporary forms of mining investment in Latin America. On the basis of cases from Peru and Ecuador, the paper argues that the presence and nature of social movements has significant influences both on forms taken by extractive industries (in this case mining) and on the effects of this extraction on rural livelihoods. In this sense, one can usefully talk about rural development as being co-produced by movements, mining companies, and other actors, in particular the state. The terms of this co-production, however, vary greatly among different locations, reflecting the distinct geographies of social mobilization and of mineral investment, as well as the varying power relationships among the different actors involved.     

The Politics of Housing Unmasked

Proposed economic reforms often neglect to take into account the interests of groups which have benefitted from establishing or maintaining the status quo. Martin Ricketts, Reader in Political Economy at the independent University of Buckingham, assesses the political pressures that have produced regulation of the housing market, and suggests reform which accommodates realistic expectations of resistance from local politicians and subsidised tenants.     

General‐to‐Specific Model Selection Procedures for Structural Vector Autoregressions*

Structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models have emerged as a dominant research strategy in empirical macroeconomics, but suffer from the large number of parameters employed and the resulting estimation uncertainty associated with their impulse responses. In this paper, we propose general‐to‐specific (Gets) model selection procedures to overcome these limitations. It is shown that single‐equation procedures are generally efficient for the reduction of recursive SVAR models. The small‐sample properties of the proposed reduction procedure (as implemented using PcGets) are evaluated in a realistic Monte Carlo experiment. The impulse responses generated by the selected SVAR are found to be more precise and accurate than those of the unrestricted VAR. The proposed reduction strategy is then applied to the US monetary system considered by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78, pp. 16–34, 1996) . The results are consistent with the Monte Carlo and question the validity of the impulse responses generated by the full system.     

Competition and structural change in Eastern Europe

Widely publicized reform programs for East Europe which emphasize rapid privatization are questioned on the grounds that structural changes to assure workable competition take precedence and will take years. A mix of deconcentrated state, cooperative, worker-owned, private, and foreignowned business can be workable. Import competition and antitrust legislation have auxiliary roles.     

Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets

The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre‐entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.