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1.
Eirik G. Furubotn 《Metroeconomica》2009,60(1):1-23
It has been suggested that the theory of the firm can be modified and improved by shifting to a (non‐maximizing) heuristic approach that is able to explain how relatively efficient outcomes can be brought about by the use of ‘fast and frugal’ decision rules. The paper argues, however, that certain heuristic mechanisms, which may have great appeal to entrepreneurs in practice, tend to lead firms to worse solutions than those that could be achieved in a neoinstitutional system with the use of other methods. Moreover, competition cannot be relied upon to eliminate such misallocation, and may even serve to promote the problem. 相似文献
2.
The initial objective of the paper is to describe the way in which the term ‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE) emerged in the literature and became the designation for a new field concerned with the study of various analytical techniques designed for the exploration of institutional phenomena. It is then shown how some of the more important of these techniques, transaction‐cost economics, property‐rights analysis and contract theory, have been applied in two central lines of neoinstitutional thought – the Williamsonian and the Northian. Criticisms of these two disparate theoretical positions on the NIE are considered and assessed. Next, a brief review of some of the empirical literature is undertaken so that the explanatory powers of NIE themes can be gauged. Finally, the paper offers a few general remarks on the present state of the NIE and its possible influence on the further development of economics. 相似文献
3.
Eirik S. Amundsen 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1992,2(5):469-489
We characterize optimal time profiles of risk-reducing expenditures and wreck probabilities for petroleum platforms. The input to our analysis is the development of wreck cost, direct and imputed. Particular attention is paid to the question of how private companies deviating from socially optimal standards may be induced to comply with such standards by means of a) a time-variant penalty, b) a no-wreck bonus and c) a time-invariant penalty. 相似文献
4.
Eirik S. Amundsen 《Regional Science and Urban Economics》1985,15(4):573-583
This paper considers the role of moving costs in long-term optimal moving strategies from a theoretical microeconomic point of view. Using a model of intertemporal utility maximization, we arrive at conditions for (i) the optimal number of moves, (ii) the optimal moving dates, and (iii) the optimal consumption of housing services and other goods in the periods between moves. Also, comparative static results are obtained. 相似文献
5.
Eirik Gaard Kristiansen 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》1996,14(6):769-784
This paper studies the consequences of network externalities on R&D rivalry between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. In the model, all differences between the R&D projects chosen in market equilibrium and the socially best projects are solely due to network externalities. From a welfare perspective, the incumbent chooses a too risky and the entrant a too certain R&D project. Rothschild and Stiglitz's mean preserving spread criterion is used as a measure of risk. Adoption of a new standard is more likely in equilibrium than in the social optimum. 相似文献
6.
Richard Gilbert Eirik Gaard Kristiansen 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2018,27(2):297-314
Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We model contract enforcement as a game with perfect information but probabilistic enforcement and explore the implications of weak enforcement on the design of licensing contracts, the conduct of firms, and market performance. An upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed fee and a per‐unit royalty. Strictly positive per‐unit royalties maximize the licensor's profit if competition among licensees limits joint profits. With imperfect enforcement, the licensor lowers variable royalties to avoid cheating. Although imperfect contract enforcement reduces the profits of the licensor, weak enforcement lowers prices, increases downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare. 相似文献
7.
Robert Plotnick 《Journal of public economics》1982,17(3):373-391
This paper discusses the concept of horizontal equity and presents three formal principles as a basis for making comparisons of the extent of horizontal inequity produced by different redistributions. A condition analogous to the Lorenz criterion used for inequality comparisons is established under which the horizontal inequities of redistributions can be ranked without recourse to a cardinal measure of inequity. Ordinal comparisons are not possible in many cases. The three principles suggest three properties that ‘reasonable’ measures of horizontal inequity should possess. A class of measures which satisfies the properties is proposed. Most other existing measures are found not to satisfy them. 相似文献
8.
Eirik G Furubotn 《Journal of Comparative Economics》1980,4(2):184-191
Under a labor-managed system of the Yugoslav type of 1965–1971, the process of capital formation is subject to special difficulties, linked to the structure of property rights. Workers possess neither permanent nor transferable claims on capital assets but are, nevertheless, required by law to maintain the value of the firm's initial capital stock and of any additions to it. The law is intended to protect the nation's capital stock but is ill designed for this purpose. Its immediate effect is to reduce the collective's willingness to undertake bank-financed investment, and thus it promotes inefficient intertemporal allocation. 相似文献
9.
Eirik G. Furubotn 《Metroeconomica》2014,65(4):548-570
It has been argued that understanding of entrepreneurship and firm behavior can be advanced by generalizing the static theory of the neoclassical firm so that it can deal with conditions in a dynamic economy. The paper rejects generalization and explains why such a shift causes the nature of the allocation process to change from the neoclassical pattern. Under generalization, critical information becomes prohibitively costly to obtain and entrepreneurial judgment rather than the Pareto rules decides allocation. Thus, the non‐optimizing firm becomes dominant. 相似文献
10.
Eugene Smolensky Robert Plotnick Eirik Evenhouse Siobhan Reilly 《Review of Income and Wealth》1994,40(2):217-222
Economic growth had less impact on poverty rates in the 1980s than in the 1960s. Could this be explained by Locke Anderson's observation that the higher median income, the greater the amount of growth needed to achieve a percentage point fall in the poverty rate? No, higher poverty rates are due instead to the rise in income inequality. With higher inequality, however, trickle down could be as effective in the 1990s as it was in the late 1960s. More generally, assessments of anti-poverty policy must recognize that inequality is as vital to changes in the poverty rate as growth in mean income. 相似文献