失败学习对企业绩效的影响机制研究

已有文献认为失败学习对企业绩效具有重要作用，但失败学习通过何种途径促进企业绩效提升的研究并不完善。基于失败学习理论，引入资源拼凑和机会识别作为中介变量，构建失败学习影响企业绩效的多路径模型，探索失败学习对企业绩效的驱动路径及内在机理。实证结果表明：失败学习对企业绩效具有显著积极作用，资源拼凑和机会识别分别在失败学习与企业绩效之间起中介作用，资源拼凑和机会识别在失败学习对企业绩效驱动过程中存在链式中介作用，战略柔性能够强化资源拼凑与企业绩效之间的关系，并正向调节资源拼凑的中介作用。研究结论拓展了失败学习对企业绩效的影响路径，对企业复苏和成长具有重要启示。     

Structural estimation of behavioral heterogeneity

We develop a behavioral asset pricing model in which agents trade in a market with information friction. Profit‐maximizing agents switch between trading strategies in response to dynamic market conditions. Owing to noisy private information about the fundamental value, the agents form different evaluations about heterogeneous strategies. We exploit a thin set—a small sub‐population—to point identify this nonlinear model, and estimate the structural parameters using extended method of moments. Based on the estimated parameters, the model produces return time series that emulate the moments of the real data. These results are robust across different sample periods and estimation methods.     

Stochastic Payments per Claim Incurred

We propose a Bayesian model to quantify the uncertainty associated with the payments per claim incurred (PPCI) algorithm. Based on the PPCI algorithm, two submodels are proposed for the number of reported claims run-off triangle and the PPCI run-off triangle, respectively. The model for the claims amount is then derived from the two submodels under the assumption of independence between the number of incurred claims and the PPCI. The joint likelihood of the number of reported claims and claims amount is derived. The posterior distribution of parameters is estimated via the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) sampling approach. The Bayesian estimator, the process variance, the estimation variance, and the predictive distribution of unpaid claims are also studied. The proposed model and the HMC inference engine are applied to to an empirical claims dataset of the WorkSafe Victoria to estimate the unpaid claims of the doctor benefit. The Bayesian modeling procedure is further refined by including a preliminary generalized linear model analysis. The results are compared with those in a PwC report. An alternative model is compared with the proposed model based on various information criteria.     

企业上市、专利突击与经营绩效——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据

以2009-2018年中国创业板公司为样本,考察公司上市前的专利突击现象,检验专利突击行为对专利质量和经营业绩的影响.研究发现:第一,创业板上市公司IPO前存在明显的专利突击现象,具体表现为专利申请数量在上市前激增,在上市后增长停滞;第二,创业板公司专利突击行为降低了专利质量和上市后的长期经营业绩;第三,相较于发明专利,非发明专利的上市前突击现象更明显;第四,2014年证监会关于创业板上市公司在招股说明书中对专利信息披露的有关规定改变了公司专利申请策略,申请时间前移,上市前已申请但未授权的专利占比降低.最后,企业突击申请专利会使投资者高估公司价值,从而损害投资者利益.研究结论有利于理解我国"专利泡沫"现象的制度诱因,对完善创业板制度和实现注册制转型具有借鉴意义.     

Personal Income Tax Reform in China in 2018 and Its Impact on Income Distribution

In the context of personal income tax (PIT) reform in China in 2018, this paper examines some of the major issues of concern regarding the reform and income distribution. Using the China Personal Income Tax Micro‐simulation model, the paper compares the differences between the 2011 and 2018 PIT systems, and finds that residents relying on different income sources may face a large degree of real tax rate change. Once the tax system is altered to PIT 2018, the coverage of PIT for wage earners will decrease from 46.9 to 23.4 percent, the income redistributive effect will drop from 1.95 to 1.22 percent and the PIT's role in fiscal revenue will also be negatively affected. Nevertheless, if individual income continues to grow, the share of PIT in fiscal revenue is expected to return to the 2018 level in 2022, but its income redistribution function is difficult to recover in the short term. The paper finds that the effect of PIT on income distribution depends on the tax structure. Gradual transition to an “entirely comprehensive” tax system when conditions are appropriate will achieve better income redistribution results at a lower average tax rate.     

中国高端装备制造业自主技术创新效率稳定性及影响因素研究

在全面实施创新驱动发展战略的时代背景下，揭示中国高端装备制造业自主技术创新效率稳定性，测度相关因素的影响强度与方向，对揭示中国高端装备制造业自主技术创新规律，制定其发展策略具有重要指导意义。聚焦中国高端装备制造业自主技术创新效率稳定性及影响因素，采用DEA-Malmquist指数方法和Tobit回归模型进行实证研究，结果表明，中国高端装备制造业自主技术创新效率存在一定波动性，且各细分行业技术创新效率内部稳定性较差，产业自主技术创新效率整体稳定性不高；自主技术创新投入因素和环境影响因素对产业自主技术创新效率的影响具有较高的异质性，其中创新资金投入和人力资源投入对自主技术创新综合效率、纯技术效率及规模效率具有正向影响，而新产品开发投入和企业规模对自主技术创新综合效率、纯技术效率和规模效率的影响具有异质性，政策因素与市场因素分别具有显著和非显著负向影响，外源性创新因素具有显著正向影响，且影响强度较大。在此基础上，提出调整政府对高端装备制造业创新支持模式、加强外源性创新与智力引进等策略建议。     

Unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing

Labor unemployment insurance reduces unemployment concerns. We argue that these benefits moderate incentives to smooth earnings to reduce employees’ concerns about unemployment risk. Using exogenous variations in unemployment insurance benefits, we find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the link between unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing is stronger when there is higher unemployment risk and when the firm is likely to employ more low-wage workers, who find unemployment insurance benefits especially useful. Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that public policy decisions such as unemployment insurance have significant, albeit probably unintended, externalities on corporate financial reporting.     

铬渣的无害化处理和综合利用

铬渣产量大、毒性剧烈,是严重污染生态环境和危害人类健康的危险废物.本文介绍了铬渣各种无害化处理方法的解毒机理、工艺过程和应用实践,阐述了对铬渣进行综合利用的途径,并就铬渣的防治措施提出了建议.     

关于网络环境下工业工程应用研究的思考

分析传统IE应用现状 ,探讨国内企业与发达国家企业相比在传统IE应用方面存在差距的原因 ,提出缩小差距的解决方略 ,阐明网络环境下IE应用研究重点等。     

A MODEL OF BUREAUCRACY AND CORRUPTION*

We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and “lemons.” Exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes. Bureaucracy is modeled as a group of agents who enjoy centralized production and consumption. Transaction patterns between the bureaucracy and the private sector are fully endogenous. Centralized production and consumption in the bureaucracy give rise to low power incentives for the individual bureaucrats. As a result, private agents might bribe bureaucrats, whereas they do not bribe each other. An equilibrium with corruption and an equilibrium without corruption can coexist. We discuss some welfare implications of the model.