Mobile Termination: What is the “Right” Charge?*

The regulation of fixed-to-mobile (F2M) termination charges has become increasingly important in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand under the Calling Party Pays principle. In the absence of any regulation, mobile operators have an incentive to set F2M termination charges “too high”. We show that the setting of the optimal F2M termination charges depends on the significance of network externalities, the intensity of competition in the mobile sector, and the distribution of customer preferences. We also discuss the merits of possible remedies which are not very intrusive. Tommaso Valletti has advised the European Commission and the UK regulator (OFCOM) on mobile termination and Frontier Economics has acted as advisor to a number of mobile operators on the same issue. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone. We thank Carlo Cambini, Yulia Kossykh, participants to the 15th Biennial International Telecommunications Society Conference, the 3rd International Conference on Applied Infrastructure Research in Berlin, for their comments. We also thank the editor Michael Crew and two anonymous referees for many suggestions that have greatly improved the paper.     

Market forces and competition in university systems: theoretical reflections and empirical evidence from Italy

This paper deals with the reforming processes in higher education (HE) from centralised systems towards more competitive ones. In particular, I discuss these issues referring to the Italian case, and the market‐like mechanisms introduced in it during 1990s and early 2000s. The focus of the paper is in analysing the effects of the increasing competition on teaching performance of universities. For this purpose, I develop a theoretical model, moving from the framework of yardstick competition (YC), to describe the functioning of a competition model based on comparing performance of institutions. Then, I apply this model using data from the Italian university system. The results suggest that an increasingly competitive environment effectively improves the universities’ performance, which is also influenced by other factors, namely the characteristics of the institutions themselves and of their students, and by the resources available. As the exploratory nature of the study, these findings must be validated through future research.     

New Keynesian models, durable goods, and collateral constraints

Econometric evidence suggests that, in response to monetary policy shocks, durable and non-durable spending co-move positively, and durable spending exhibits a much larger sensitivity to the shocks. A standard two-sector New Keynesian model with perfect financial markets is at odds with these facts. The introduction of a borrowing constraint, where durables play the role of collateral assets, helps in reconciling the model with the empirical evidence.     

Exploring the Relationships Between Product Development and Environmental Turbulence: The Case of Mobile TLC Services*

Managing innovation in turbulent environments (e.g., in environments with extreme uncertainty and complexity in market needs and technological opportunities) is a major challenge. A recent stream of studies in the management literature has suggested that when facing turbulent environments, firms should deploy more flexible development processes. This paper approaches this issue by looking at the Italian mobile telecommunications (TLC) industry. Nine in‐depth case studies were conducted in five different companies. Data analysis showed some important results. First of all environmental turbulence should be considered to be project specific rather than company or industry specific. Moreover, it can come from both shift in the market needs and in the technology. Nevertheless, it seems clear that having rapid changes is not enough to have environmental turbulence. If rapid changes can be somehow foreseen, there is no turbulence at all. Hence, when approaching projects in potentially turbulent environments, managers should assess both rapidity and unpredictability of the environment. Finally, looking at the in‐depth cases, the paper points out what of the main practices to increase flexibility that are described in literature are actually adopted by companies. In case of turbulence (both in the market and/or in the technology) companies delay concept freezing point. Moreover, in the case of technological turbulence, they also leverage on rapid project iterations, whereas in case of market turbulence they more likely adopt early experiments involving customers, formal and cross‐functional project teams, and flat organizational structures.     

Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy

We lay out a small open economy version of the Calvo sticky price model, and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap. We use the resulting framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rule-based policy regimes for the small open economy: domestic inflation and CPI-based Taylor rules, and an exchange rate peg. We show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail. We also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy, and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules.     

Calling circles: network competition with nonuniform calling patterns

We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with nonuniform calling patterns, accounting for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small set of similar people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is affected by the concentration of calling patterns. Contrary to previous predictions, jointly profit‐maximizing access charges are set above termination cost in order to dampen competition if calling patterns are sufficiently concentrated. We discuss implications for regulating access charges as well as on‐ and off‐net price discrimination.     

Managing Organizational Culture for Effective Internal Control. From Practice to Theory

Previous studies (see, for example, Carslaw, 1988; Thomas, 1989; Niskanen and Keloharju, 2000; Kinnunen and Koskela, 2002; Van Caneghem, 2002) clearly suggest that public companies' managers tend to round up the first digit of reported earnings (i.e. for companies reporting profits). Based on a sample of listed UK companies and employing earnings rounding-up behaviour (henceforth ERUB) as an indication of earnings management, I attempt to determine the impact of differences in audit quality on earnings management. When I rely on the very popular brand-name proxy (i.e. BigFive versus non-BigFive auditors) to capture differences in audit quality, findings are inconsistent with BigFive auditors constraining earnings management practices (i.e. findings suggest ERUB for both BigFive and non-BigFive clients). Employing an alternative proxy (i.e. based on auditors' industry expertise), findings are only weakly consistent with specialist BigFive auditors constraining earnings management (i.e. ERUB) practices.     

On the many accounts of public happiness

Economists of the HEIRS association for Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations promote a better understanding of the fundamental importance of sociality for people’s happiness. The 2013 conference on “Public Happiness” did justice to this goal and provided an overview of stimulating new developments in the study of people’s well-being. The special issue focuses on the one hand on social comparison processes that most naturally emerge if people form interpersonal connections. On the other hand, it contributes to the conceptualization of the many different accounts of public happiness.     

What money buys: clients of street sex workers in the US

The article presents a review of current theoretical and empirical approaches to sex work, followed by the presentation of an original theoretical framework (Della Giusta et al., 2006), which is tested with an econometric model of the characteristics of demand for sex services by a sample of clients of street sex workers in the US. We present findings in relation to stigma and the relationship between paid and unpaid sex that corroborate our model's hypotheses and are in line with findings from other empirical studies. Furthermore, we identify in our sample two diametrically opposite profiles: one for clients whom we label ‘experimenters’, and one for more experienced ones that we name ‘regulars’, we also estimate attitudes toward risk, and draw implications in terms of both policy and future theoretical and empirical research.