Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms

We develop a model that examines the capital structure and investment decisions of regulated firms in a setting that incorporates two key institutional features of the public utilities sector in many countries: firms are partially owned by the state and regulators are not necessarily independent. Among other things, we show that regulated firms issue more debt, invest more, and enjoy higher regulated prices when they face more independent regulators, are more privatized, and when regulators are more pro‐firm. Moreover, regulatory independence, higher degree of privatization, and pro‐firm regulatory climate are associated with higher social welfare.     

“Business and Government” Then and Now

Socio-environmental conflicts are widespread, and global economic growth will likely increase them in the coming decades. While political ecology, the analysis of common pool resources, and ecological economics, among others, have provided praiseworthy insights into such conflicts, institutional approaches to these phenomena are still scarce. Classical institutional economics has occasionally been put to work on environmental issues, but proposed frameworks remain relatively underdeveloped. We wish to contribute to institutional research on environmental issues by building upon Bruno Théret’s interpretation of John R. Commons’s transactional model and applying the framework to a case of socio-environmental conflicts. First, we briefly sketch the landscape of institutional contributions (especially those that follow the classical institutionalist tradition) to the analysis of environmental issues. We explain why Commons has largely been ignored on these issues. Then, we analyze some of the key concepts of Commonsian economics that are of particular interest to our theoretical elaboration. Following this, we depict Commons’s transactional scheme and propose an application to a case of socioenvironmental mining conflict in Peru. Our framework could complement existing ones and shed light on the institutional dynamics of natural-resource management through conflict.     

Traditional space vs. cyberspace: The changing role of geography in current international politics

In the post‐Cold War world, the competition and restraint of the bipolar Cold War are both gone, giving rise to two opposing forces: the unifying force of globalisation and the fragmenting impact of nationalism and geographic conflict. In the current international system, these two forces are confronted in different ways by three types of states, each with its own priorities and place for geography. For high technology, or twenty‐first century states, the focus is on globalisation and disputes cannot be solved by territorial acquisition. For nationalistic, or nineteenth century states, nationalist hostilities still predominate and gaining land is often still more important than wealth. Transitional, or twentieth century states, are caught in a vice between their advanced technological potential and their economic and social crises. Any accurate depiction of the current system must include all three types of states, as well as how their interaction affects the goals and behaviour of each type.     

Takeoffs

This paper identifies factors associated with takeoff—a sustained period of high growth following a period of stagnation. Countries that experience takeoffs average 2.3% annual growth following their stagnation episodes, while those that do not average 0%. Using probit, we find that de jure trade openness is positively and significantly associated with takeoffs. A one‐standard‐deviation increase in de jure trade openness is associated with a 55% increase in the probability of a takeoff in our default specification. Capital account openness encourages takeoff responses, but measures of de facto trade openness are found to be poor predictors of takeoffs. We also examine the determinants of nations achieving “sustained” takeoffs; i.e. those lasting eight years or longer. Takeoffs in countries with more commodity‐intensive output bundles are less likely to be sustained, suggesting that adverse terms‐of‐trade shocks may play a role in ending long‐term high growth episodes.     

Is Asia Decoupling from the United States (Again)?

The recovery from the recent global financial crisis exhibited a decline in the synchronization of Asian output with the rest of the world. However, a simple model based on output gaps demonstrates that the decline in business cycle synchronization during the recovery from the global financial crisis was exceptionally steep by historical standards. We posit two potential reasons for this exceptionally steep decline. First, financial markets during this recovery improved from particularly distressed conditions relative to previous downturns. Second, monetary policy during the recovery from the crisis was constrained in developed economies by the zero bound, but less so in Asia. To test these potential explanations, we examine the implications of an increase in corporate bond spreads similar to that which took place during the recent European financial crisis in a three‐region open‐economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Our results confirm that global business cycle synchronization is reduced when zero‐bound constraints across the world differ. However, we find that the impact of reduced financial contagion actually goes modestly against our predictions.     

The optimum size of the labor-managed firm

Ward's [1958] main result is that an increase in the output price of the labor-managed firm (LMF) decreases its output and members. However, Ward and his followers have not addressed two important elements: the benefit of sharing a public good among LMF members and the increased coordination costs among these members. This paper incorporates these elements to derive the LMF's optimal size and suggests conditions which may alter Ward's perverse result. The example of the Israeli Kibbutzim concerning both incorporating the public goods as well as coordination costs serves as a motivation to the model developed in this paper.     

A Theory of the Distribution of Underpriced Initial Public Offers by Investment Banks

It is well documented that a firm may choose to offer underpriced securities in an initial public offer. An open question is why investment banks do not retain underpriced offers in their portfolio. We argue that the distribution of underpriced securities allows banks of high qualify to signal their value to their customers, promoting in this way their other product lines. We show that the total dollar value of underpriced securities distributed (rather than the percentage value) acts as the signal. We also find that, all else equal, larger customers and those with more elastic demand functions receive n larger total dollar value of underpricing.     

Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Broadband pcs Spectrum

The House and Senate of the United States Congress recently passed legislation that directs the FCC to establish a system for using auctions to allocate the use of radio spectrum for personal communications services. There is a unique and unprecedented set of issues that arise in this context, which are of interest to economists, industry analysts, regulators, and policymakers. We discuss these issues and evaluate their likely impact on the outcome of the spectrum auctions. In addition, we argue that there may be pitfalls in the auction procedure adopted by the FCC, and we discuss possible alternative procedures.