Inflation, investment and economic performance: The role of internal financing

This paper studies a link between inflation and economic activity that is built on two hypotheses. First, firms mitigate informational frictions in financial markets by accumulating retained earnings over a period of time. Second, firms allocate earnings among three competing uses - dividends, current investment, and the accumulation of internal funds - and inflation directly distorts this allocation decision as well as the real value of accumulated internal funds. The model predicts that the level of inflation - both unanticipated and expected inflation - as well as the variability of inflation distort firms’ internal financing decisions, increases frictions in financial markets, reduces the level and efficiency of investment, and reduces aggregate output. The marginal effects of inflation are increasing in the inflation rate.     

The impact of product diversification strategy on the corporate performance of large Spanish firms

We analyze the impact of product diversification on performance. This topic has been discussed in the literature, and there is no consensus so far as to the significance or the direction of the impact. Performance is measured using Tobin's q for a sample of 103 large, non-financial Spanish firms (1992–1995). Diversification is measured by means of a categorical variable, as suggested by Varadarajan. The principal results indicate that the firms with intermediate levels of product diversification have the highest performance, while the firms with low and high levels of diversification show significantly lower performance, which performance is not significantly different between them.     

Regulating an Externality-Generating Utility Environmental Taxes Under Limited Information

Global warming is currently an important item on most nationalenvironmental agendas. In many countries, coal-fired electricity generatingstations represent an important source of greenhouse gases. We examinehow regulations to curb emissions affect public utility pricing regulationwhen regulators act non-cooperatively. We show that, when there is limitedinformation on fixed abatement costs, an environmental regulator prefersan emission tax over an output tax or a lump sum environmental tax. Thepublic utility regulator prefers the lump sum tax regime.     

Conditions for Asymmetric Information Solutions when Alliances Provide Acquisition Options and Due Diligence

One main problem with both acquisitions and alliances is separating the attractive partners from the rest. An additional problem with alliances is getting each partner to provide its best assets and efforts. One solution offered for the acquisition adverse selection problem is due diligence through a pre-acquisition alliance; however, none of the papers recommending such an approach analyze the alliance adverse selection and moral hazard problems. This paper presents the first formal model of joint venturing as acquisition due diligence, detailing how the joint solution works and under what conditions.revised version received October 20, 2003     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.     

International capital and nontraded goods in the long run

The present paper develops the comparative static properties of a small open economy which produces both traded goods and nontraded goods, and is a price taker in the international market for productive capital. Assumptions of full employment, competitive markets, and international mobility of productive cap ital input capture a long run horizon. Comparative static results associated with the wage, labor, and the price of the nontraded good are independent of factor intensity, factor substitution, and demand for the nontraded good. A tax on the traded good and a capital subsidy together raise national income and the real wage.     

Trends and cycles in Colombia's real GDP and fiscal deficit

The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is methodological. We review the Beveridge-Nelson technique for decomposing economic time series, and illustrate its usefulness for examining the cyclical and secular movements in real GDP in Colombia. Second, we examine government expenditures and revenues in order to assess the extent to which the sharp increase in the fiscal deficit in the early 1980s should be viewed as a cyclical rather than a secular phenomenon.     

Regulating an externality-generating public utility: A multi-dimensional screening approach

In this paper, I present a monopoly screening model in which a firm holds private information on fixed abatement costs. Because of the nature of the optimal contracts, bunching is never optimal even with ‘n’ distinct types. A characterization of full and limited information solutions is offered and it is shown that the design standards alone determine the value of an information rent. The variable charge is completely free of any marginal information costs. This allows the variable charge to track marginal damages and thereby ensures that marginal social costs are covered. A fixed charge implements the optimal solution.     

DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: EFFECT OF INCLUDING PENSION RIGHTS,AND ANALYSIS BY AGE-GROUP*

This article on the distribution of wealth among individuals in the United Kingdom presents recent work on the effects of including pension rights and the significance of sex, age and marital status. It describes the rationale for including the accrued rights in occupational and State pension schemes (funded or unfunded) and the methods of estimation used. For funded schemes the rights are valued as the accrued liability of the schemes to their members, and for unfunded schemes similar liabilities are hypothecated; these estimates of the value of accrued pension rights involve assumptions about future earnings and interest rates. The trend in average marketable wealth with age is upwards until advanced years when it slows down or slightly reverses. Adding occupational pension rights only slightly raises the trend for females but has a bigger effect for males. Adding State pension rights raises these upward trends until the age of 60 after which there is a decline. For marketable wealth on the average males are wealthier than females but less wealthy if single, divorced or widowed. Adding occupational pension rights improves the relative position of males; adding State pension rights cancels this out. The effect of marital status rises with both age and sex and therefore a detailed three-way analysis is made. For females widows are on average the wealthiest; for young males the married; for older males the single. Using Theil's coefficient of entropy for comparing the inequality of wealth, the addition of pension rights reduces inequality by two-thirds. Age accounts for only 6 percent of inequality for marketable wealth but for 31 percent if pension rights are included.