The Value of Financial Flexibility

We develop a model that endogenizes dynamic financing, investment, and cash retention/payout policies in order to analyze the effect of financial flexibility on firm value. We show that the value of financing flexibility depends on the costs of external financing, the level of corporate and personal tax rates that determine the effective cost of holding cash, the firm's growth potential and maturity, and the reversibility of capital. Through simulations, we demonstrate that firms facing financing frictions should simultaneously borrow and lend, and we examine the nature of dynamic debt and liquidity policies and the value associated with corporate liquidity.     

Heterogeneous Beliefs, Speculation, and the Equity Premium

Agents with heterogeneous beliefs about fundamental growth do not share risks perfectly but instead speculate with each other on the relative accuracy of their models' predictions. They face the risk that market prices move more in line with the trading models of competing agents than with their own. Less risk‐averse agents speculate more aggressively and demand higher risk premiums. My calibrated model generates countercyclical consumption volatility, earnings forecast dispersion, and cross‐sectional consumption dispersion. With a risk aversion coefficient less than one, agents' speculation causes half the observed equity premium and lowers the riskless rate by about 1%.     

Relative Significance of Journals,Authors, and Articles Cited in Financial Research

We evaluate journals based on their relative contributions to top-level finance research in a recent period. Journals are ranked according to the number of citations found in articles published in Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, and Review of Financial Studies. The analysis controls for both the average number of articles and average number of words published annually in each cited journal. We identify the fifty most frequently cited journals during this period. We also list the fifty most frequently cited authors and articles and note topical trends in the research.     

Can Managers Successfully Time the Maturity Structure of Their Debt Issues?

This paper provides a rational explanation for the apparent ability of managers to successfully time the maturity of their debt issues. We show that a structural break in excess bond returns during the early 1980s generates a spurious correlation between the fraction of long‐term debt in total debt issues and future excess bond returns. Contrary to Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) , we show that the presence of structural breaks can lead to nonsense regressions, whether or not there is any small sample bias. Tests using firm‐level data further confirm that managers are unable to time the debt market successfully.     

Did children's education matter? Family migration as a mechanism of human capital investment: evidence from nineteenth‐century Bohemia

This article analyses the rural–urban migration of families in the Bohemian region of Pilsen in 1900. Using a new 1,300‐family dataset from the 1900 population census, the role of children's education in rural–urban migration is examined. The findings indicate that families migrated to the city such that the educational attainment of their children would be maximized, and that there is a positive correlation between family migration and children being apprentices in urban areas. The results suggest that rural–urban migration was powered not only by the exploitation of rural–urban wage gaps but also by aspirations to engage in human capital investment.     

SALARY CAP REGULATION IN PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS

This paper analyzes the effects of a percentage‐of‐revenue salary cap in a team sports league with win‐maximizing clubs and flexible talent supply. It shows that a percentage‐of‐revenue cap produces a more balanced league and decreases aggregate salary payments. Taking into account the idiosyncrasies of European football, our paper further highlights the potential conflicts between the league and society. From the perspective of a league governing body, a percentage‐of‐revenue cap always enhances financial stability of win‐maximizing clubs. A social planner, however, will not permit the introduction of such a cap if fans and players unduly suffer. This paper shows under which conditions the social planner accepts (rejects) a salary cap proposed by the league regulator. (JEL D02, D60, L83)     

RELATIONSHIPS,COMPETITION AND THE STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT BANKING MARKETS*

It is well known that competition can destroy incentives to invest in firm‐specific relationships. This paper examines how the tension between relationships and competition is resolved in the investment banking market, which for decades has been characterized by both relationships and competition. The model studies the impact on relationships of four different dimensions of competition: non‐exclusive relationships, competition from arm's‐length intermediaries, non‐price competition, and endogenous entry. The analysis shows how market equilibrium adjusts so that relationships are sustained in the face of such competition. Banks are shown to establish relationships without either local or aggregate monopoly power. The model rationalizes two distinct empirical regularities of market structure: the invariance of market concentration to market size; and a pyramidal market structure with an oligopoly comprising similar‐sized players at the top and a large number of small banks at the bottom. The analysis may also shed light on the industrial organization of other professional service industries.     

Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?

To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In‐depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing.