To What Extent Does the Financial Reporting Process Curb Earnings Surprise Games?

Managers play earnings surprise games to avoid negative earnings surprises by managing earnings upward or by managing analysts' earnings expectations downward. We investigate the effectiveness of the financial reporting process at restraining earnings surprise games. Because the annual reporting process is subject to an independent audit and more rigorous expense recognition rules than interim reporting, it provides managers with fewer opportunities to manage earnings upward. We document that, relative to interim reporting, annual reporting reduces the likelihood of income‐increasing earnings management and, to a lesser extent, of negative surprise avoidance, but increases the magnitude of downward expectations management. Our findings suggest that regulatory attempts to monitor corporations' internal checks and balances are likely to be more effective at curbing upward earnings management than at mitigating negative surprise avoidance.     

Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment

How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior? We show—in a laboratory credit market—that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third‐party enforceable and lending is dominated by one‐shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships.     

Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

Building Stable Mortgage Markets: Lessons from Canada's Experience

The global financial crisis illustrated the high costs of boom–bust cycles in housing and mortgage markets and the importance of implementing policy frameworks that mitigate the risk of these events. This article discusses elements of Canada's policy framework that contributed to the relatively good performance of its mortgage market in recent years, including supervisory practices and mortgage underwriting standards. Lender recourse and the nondeductibility of mortgage interest payments played a complementary role. Ongoing policy challenges are also identified, including the need for monitoring to ensure the current prolonged period of low interest rates does not lead to levels of debt and house prices that create future instability in housing and mortgage markets.     

A Test of the Reliability of Current Cost Disclosures

Using data from corporate acquisitions recorded under the purchase method, this research tests the reliability (representational faithfulness) of current cost disclosures. The fair value of property, plant, and equipment recorded by the acquiring company following the acquisition is found to be significantly related to the current cost disclosures made by the acquired company prior to the acquisition. When the data are segmented according to reporting regime, the significant relationship pertains to the SFAS 33 disclosures but not to ASR 190 disclosures of current cost. The study also finds that the results pertain primarily to current cost disclosures made shortly before the acquisition date. Overall, the results support current initiatives for increased departure from historical-cost approaches to accounting, especially if these measures are made along the lines of SFAS 33 techniques rather than ASR 190 techniques.