Distributional Impact of Government Outlays on the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme in 2001–02

In recent years outlays on the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme have increased rapidly, prompting both attempts by government to reduce growth in outlays and renewed interest in the characteristics of the beneficiaries of the Scheme. This article uses a microsimulation model to analyse the distributional impact of Australian Government outlays on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, by such characteristics as family income, family type, age, sex and lifecycle group. We find that there are pronounced distributional effects by such characteristics as income, age and sex, with both older and poorer Australians receiving far greater PBS benefits than younger and more affluent Australians.     

Advantageous Comparison and Rationalization of Earnings Management

This paper proposes that psychological factors can change managers' beliefs about earnings management when they choose to engage in it. I show that, under certain circumstances, engaging in a small amount of earnings management alters a manager's beliefs about the appropriateness of the act, which may increase the likelihood of further earnings management. Specifically, I predict and find in two experiments that participants who initially choose to manage earnings are motivated to rationalize their behavior. Participants who are exposed to an egregious example of earnings management (commonly the focus of enforcement actions and press reports) have the opportunity to rationalize their behavior through a mechanism called “advantageous comparison,” where participants compare their behavior against the egregious example and conclude that what they did was relatively innocuous and appropriate. My analysis also indicates that presenting participants with an example of earnings management that is similar to the initial decision they made mitigates advantageous comparison. These results have implications for academics interested in how earnings management, and perhaps fraud, can accrete over time and for regulators and practitioners who are interested in preventing it.     

A Very Dismal Story

Book Reviewed in this article
Corporate Collapse: Regulatory, Accounting and Ethical Failure by F. L. Clarke, G. W. Dean and K. G. Oliver.     

Duration and the Risk Adjustment of Discount Rates for Capital Budgeting

Capital budgeting applications frequently necessitate the use of a discounting methodology to allow for time value of money, supplemented by payback calculation to assess liquidity risk. This paper explains how both concerns can be addressed in a single process by using duration measure in making discount rate adjustments which allow for the timing of the expected cash flows.     

Neighbors Matter: Causal Community Effects and Stock Market Participation

This paper establishes a causal relation between an individual's decision whether to own stocks and average stock market participation of the individual's community. We instrument for the average ownership of an individual's community with lagged average ownership of the states in which one's nonnative neighbors were born. Combining this instrumental variables approach with controls for individual and community fixed effects, a broad set of time-varying individual and community controls, and state-year effects rules out alternative explanations. To further establish that word-of-mouth communication drives this causal effect, we show that the results are stronger in more sociable communities.     

Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis

We apply a new bootstrap statistical technique to examine the performance of the U.S. open‐end, domestic equity mutual fund industry over the 1975 to 2002 period. A bootstrap approach is necessary because the cross section of mutual fund alphas has a complex nonnormal distribution due to heterogeneous risk‐taking by funds as well as nonnormalities in individual fund alpha distributions. Our bootstrap approach uncovers findings that differ from many past studies. Specifically, we find that a sizable minority of managers pick stocks well enough to more than cover their costs. Moreover, the superior alphas of these managers persist.