Statistical Discrimination with Peer Effects: Can Integration Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?

We introduce peer effects in the costs of human capital acquisition into a model of statistical discrimination in labour markets. This creates a link between the level of segregation in social networks and racial disparities in job assignment and wages. We show that this relationship is characterized by discontinuities: there is a threshold level of segregation below which negative stereotypes become unsustainable, and steady-state skill levels can change dramatically. This change can work in either direction: skill levels may either rise or fall in both groups. Which of these outcomes arises depends on the population share of the disadvantaged group and on the distribution of the costs of human capital investments. We also examine the effects of affirmative action policies in the presence of peer effects and provide conditions under which such policies eliminate negative stereotypes.     

Consumer Knowledge of the Costs of Open-end Credit

A 1977 mail survey of 1,330 Minnesota households found that few respondents had knowledge of the annual percentage rate (APR) of interest on open-end credit accounts or knowledge of the actual dollar finance charge. Knowledge of APR and knowledge of actual dollar costs were, however, found to be closely associated with more realistic assessments of “reasonable” credit costs. Economic theory predicts that those who misperceive credit costs will not use an optimum amount of credit given their preferences and resources, 2nd will, therefore, incur some economic loss. This study found that those respondents most likely to have incurred such losses were from households characterized by low levels of income and education.     

MID‐DAY MEAL PROGRAM AND INCIDENCE OF CHILD LABOUR IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY

The present paper purports to examine the consequence of a mid‐day meal program and/or cash stipend scheme on the incidence of child labour in a developing economy using a three‐sector general equilibrium model. It has been found that the policy may be counterproductive as it lowers both the initial incomes of the working families and the return on education. Direct cash payments to the working families instead of a mid‐day meal program are likely to be effective in eradicating the problem of child labour.     

A Dynamic Incentive‐Based Argument for Conditional Transfers*

We compare the long‐run effects of replacing unconditional transfers to the poor by transfers conditional on the education of children. Unlike Mirrlees’ income taxation model, the distribution of skill evolves endogenously. Human capital accumulation follows the Freeman–Ljungqvist–Mookherjee–Ray OLG model with missing capital markets and dynastic bequest motives. Conditional transfers (funded by taxes on earnings of the skilled) are shown to induce higher long‐run output per capita and (both utilitarian and Rawlsian) welfare, owing to their superior effect on skill accumulation incentives. The result is established both with two skill levels, and a continuum of occupations.     

SHARECROPPING,LAND EXPLOITATION AND LAND‐IMPROVING INVESTMENTS*

This paper analyses the tenancy problem in a dynamic setup and addresses two long‐standing issues: inefficiency and lack of investment. It considers the problems that the tenant, with a shorter‐term interest in the farm than the landlord, might overexploit the land to maximize immediate returns even at the cost of future damages, and under‐supply long‐run productivity improving investments in land. I show that the efficient (first‐best) levels of input use and investment can be achieved (both in the steady state and in transition) by a suitable share contract which, by dampening incentives to maximize current returns, addresses the land exploitation problem, and by an appropriate cost allocation rule which can address the investment problem.     

Learning in Elections and Voter Turnout

Voter turnout in game theoretic models of voting has typically been difficult to predict because of the problem of multiple Nash equilibria ( Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983, 1985 ). Many of these equilibria require an extreme precision of beliefs among voters that is unlikely to be reached in real elections. At the same time, mechanisms like pre‐election polls exist to shape the beliefs of voters about expected turnout. We combine these two features in a model of voter learning in elections and characterize the asymptotically stable equilibria of both complete and incomplete information games in a simple symmetric setting with two candidates. We also show how the model can be used to qualitatively explain several phenomena observed in reality: increases in costs of voting affect turnout adversely but there may be persistence of turnout levels between elections even though costs and other parameters change. Increase in uncertainty increases turnout while increases in the size of the electorate decrease it, in line with intuition.     

FOREIGN TAKEOVERS AND NEW INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

This study is unique in several respects. First, it reviews the characteristics of the top 10 industries targeted for foreign direct investment (FDI) activity in the United States between 1979 and 1987. It analyzes both overall FDI activity and new plant and expansion FDI activity. The study summarizes and tests alternative hypotheses regarding the determinants of FDI in the United States by all countries, by the United Kingdom, by the European Community, by Japan, and by Canada.
Large and growing product markets in an expanding economy have attracted FDI in the United States. Exchange rate movements have prompted opportunistic decisions to invest in U.S. production facilities. Investors' superior management skills appear to have prompted takeovers, while efforts to realize technological advantages of new physical capital and of relatively large operating plants have fostered plant and expansion investments.
Evidence exists that a desire to circumvent current—but not potential—trade restrictions has motivated foreign direct investment. FDI activities are not associated with concentrated or heavily unionized industries. Highly protected industries have attracted heavier equity FDI by Japan and heavier new plant FDI by all sources and Canada. No evidence exists that FDI in the United States by Japan or anyone else is targeted to undercut union-dominated firms or to arrest the spread of protectionist trade policies.