An end to boom and bust - can the Chancellor deliver?

In his Mansion House speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer emphasised his desire to avoid the boom and bust cycle that has characterised the UK economy in recent years. The objective of a more stable economy is one with which it is hard to disagree. It strikes a chord with all those who have to take long-term decisions in the business community. But can the Chancellor deliver? In this article, we argue that despite the changes to the government's economic policy framework in recent years, many of the causes of the past instability of the UK economy remain. And while the Chancellor seeks to retain short-term control of interest rate decisions, there is always the risk that political pressures on monetary policy will be an added source of volatility.     

Using the Life Course Paradigm to Explain Mechanisms That Link Family Disruptions to Compulsive Buying

This research examines compulsive buying as an impulse‐control disorder, a form of maladaptive behavior believed to have its roots in early‐in‐life experiences of family adversities. Unlike previous research that has typically studied only the effects of family divorce on compulsive buying, this study examines the effects of disruptive family events within the broader multitheoretical life course framework. A sample of 327 young adults is used to test the hypothesized relationships derived from the main life course perspectives. The results show alternate paths leading to compulsive buying, beyond those uncovered in previous studies. By offering a broader overarching framework, the article shows how previous efforts to study compulsive buying can be improved, pointing to the value of the multitheoretical life course approach in understanding consumption phenomena .     

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.