How Do Firms Respond to Political Uncertainty? Evidence from U.S. Gubernatorial Elections

We examine the joint response to political uncertainty along two margins: changes in real activity and voluntary disclosure. We focus on within-firm variation in exposure to ex ante competitive U.S. gubernatorial elections using data on preelection poll margins and firms’ state exposures. Despite real activity falling in the years leading up to a close election, we find that voluntary disclosure increases both in frequency and content, including mentions of risk in filings that reference states holding elections. Our tests use a decomposition of 8-K filings into real activity and voluntary disclosure to address the endogenous complementarity between these two responses. These results hold when using alternative ex ante measures of political uncertainty based on term-limited incumbents, historically competitive offices, or state legislature gridlock. Both effects of political uncertainty are stronger for firms in highly regulated industries and weaker for those least exposed to the local market, linking the real activity and disclosure responses to uncertainty.     

The Term Structure of Real Rates and Expected Inflation

Changes in nominal interest rates must be due to either movements in real interest rates, expected inflation, or the inflation risk premium. We develop a term structure model with regime switches, time‐varying prices of risk, and inflation to identify these components of the nominal yield curve. We find that the unconditional real rate curve in the United States is fairly flat around 1.3%. In one real rate regime, the real term structure is steeply downward sloping. An inflation risk premium that increases with maturity fully accounts for the generally upward sloping nominal term structure.     

Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion

This paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate: lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing. To isolate the coordination channel from lenders' joint reaction to new information, we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers. We show that lenders, while learning nothing new about the firm, reduce credit in anticipation of other lenders' reaction to the negative news about the firm. The results show that public information exacerbates lender coordination and increases the incidence of firm financial distress.     

The Joy of Giving or Assisted Living? Using Strategic Surveys to Separate Public Care Aversion from Bequest Motives

The “annuity puzzle,” conveying the apparently low interest of retirees in longevity insurance, is central to household finance. Two possible explanations are “public care aversion” (PCA), retiree aversion to simultaneously running out of wealth and being in need of long‐term care, and an intentional bequest motive. To disentangle the relative importance of PCA and bequest motive, we estimate a structural model of the retirement phase using a novel survey instrument that includes hypothetical questions. We identify PCA as very significant and find bequest motives that spread deep into the middle class. Our results highlight potential interest in annuities that make allowance for long‐term care expenses.     

Determinants of Mortgage Default and Consumer Credit Use: The Effects of Foreclosure Laws and Foreclosure Delays

The mortgage default decision is part of a complex household credit management problem. We examine how factors affecting mortgage default spill over to other credit markets. As home equity turns negative, homeowners default on mortgages and home equity lines of credit at higher rates, whereas they prioritize repaying credit cards and auto loans. Larger unused credit card limits intensify the preservation of credit cards over housing debt. Although mortgage nonrecourse statutes increase default on all types of housing debt, they reduce credit card defaults. Foreclosure delays increase default rates for housing and nonhousing debts. Our analysis highlights the interconnectedness of debt repayment decisions.     

Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-listing Decision

This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to cross-list in the United States because of constraints on the consumption of private benefits resulting from such listings. Using several proxies for private benefits related to the control and cash flow ownership rights of controlling shareholders, we find support for this hypothesis with a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries.     

Reinforcement Learning and Savings Behavior

We show that individual investors over‐extrapolate from their personal experience when making savings decisions. Investors who experience particularly rewarding outcomes from 401(k) saving—a high average and/or low variance return—increase their 401(k) savings rate more than investors who have less rewarding experiences. This finding is not driven by aggregate time‐series shocks, income effects, rational learning about investing skill, investor fixed effects, or time‐varying investor‐level heterogeneity that is correlated with portfolio allocations to stock, bond, and cash asset classes. We discuss implications for the equity premium puzzle and interventions aimed at improving household financial outcomes.     

Savings and the Budget

The fall in the personal sector savings ratio to a record low last year has been a major factor behind the rapid growth of domestic demand in the past two years and the associated deterioration in the current account. It is also a major uncertainty in the Chancellor's Budget judgement. Existing econometric relationships for the consumption function have failed to predict the fall in personal savings over the past few years. Possible explanations include statistical error, the effects of financial deregulation, the housing boom, expectations of higher growth in incomes, and demographic influences. In this Viewpoint, we report on a new consumption function that successfully explains the decline in savings. It provides evidence of a major demographic influence resulting from the decline in the proportion of the population in the 45–64 age cohort, the main savers in society. Subsidiary effects arise from the boom in house prices, and statistical mis-measurement. The equation predicts an appreciable revival of savings over the next few years as the 45–64 age cohort grows again. These shifts in demographic structure reflect the after-effects of the Second World War. This new evidence suggests that the Chancellor has done quite enough to ensure a slowdown in consumption, and that he would be ill-advised to heed calls for special measures to boost savings. By contrast, well conceived tax changes that remove microeconomic distortions in the tax system (perhaps moving in the direction of an expenditure tax) would improve the tax structure, and may well increase the scope for tax cuts in future budgets. Our new consumption function also lends weight to the Chancellor's argument that the current account deficit is not a source of concern, insofar as it arises from a shift in savings associated with demographic changes that will be reversed in due course.     

The Integration of Insurance and Taxes in Corporate Pension Strategy

This paper examines the implications of the joint effects of insurance and taxes for the optimal corporate pension strategy. It is shown that neither the “mini-max” nor the “maxi-min” strategy advocated by previous authors is necessarily best in corporate pension management. In the presence of capital market imperfections, the analysis via a single-period contingent-claims model indicates that optimal corporate pension strategy in both asset-allocation and funding decisions can be a noncorner interior solution.