Policies for economic growth

Summary The old growth theory of the 1950s led to certain conclusions about the sorts of economic policies that would promote economic growth, and also about their limitations. The new growth theory of the 1980s makes much stronger assumptions and leads to correspondingly stronger conclusions about the scope of growth-promoting policy. This article argues that: (1) empirical work so far has neither confirmed nor denied the strong assumptions underlying the new theory; (2) the theory is worth pursuing because of its intrinsic interest and the possibilities it opens up; (3) whatever the final verdict on the new theory, both theory and evidence support the belief that significant long-run gains, even if not permanent changes in the growth rate, can be achieved by increased investment in the broadest sense, including human capital, technological knowledge, and industrial plant and equipment.Fifth Tinbergen Lecture delivered on October 4, 1991, in Amersfoort for the Royal Netherlands Economic Association     

Markovian equilibrium in a class of stochastic games: existence theorems for discounted and undiscounted models

Summary We study a strategic version of the neoclassical growth model under possible production uncertainty. For a general specification of the problem, we establish (i) the existence of stationary Markov equilibria in pure strategies for the discounted game, and (ii) the convergence, under a boundedness condition, of discounted equilibrium strategies to a pure strategy stationary Markovian equilibrium of the undiscounted game as the discount factor tends to unity. The same techniques can be used to prove that such convergence also obtains in all finitestate, finite-action stochastic games satisfying a certain full communicability condition. These results are of special interest since there are well known examples in the literature in which the limit of discounted equilibria fails to be an equilibrium of the undiscounted game.We are grateful to Marcus Berliant, M. Ali Khan, Mukul Majumdar, and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions, and to Bonnie Huck for technical assistance. The first author acknowledges research support from the Columbia University Council for the Social Sciences.     

Small firm mutual funds: Additional evidence on the small firm effect

Returns generated with small firm mutual fund data are used to examine the extent to which identification of a small firm effect is due to the difficulty in measuring the direct and indirect transaction costs involved in investing in the common shares of small capitalization stocks. Little if any evidence of the excess risk-adjusted returns is obtained for either of the period 1978–1983, when the small firm effect was observed, or the period 1984–1989, when it was not. The small firm effect may therefore be attributed to (1) higher direct transaction costs including bid-ask spread and broker fees and (2) higher indirect transaction costs including portfolio management expenses and market impact costs.The authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and Brett Salazar for valuable assistance in data collection. Errors remain our own.     

Can we afford international human rights?

In a recent important book,The Ethics of International Business, Tom Donaldson argues that multinational corporations (as well as individuals and nationstates) must, at a minimum, respect international human rights. For a purported right to be such a fundamental right it must satisfy three conditions. Donaldson calls the third condition the fairness-affordability condition. The affordability part of this condition holds that moral agents must be capable of paying for the burdens and responsibilities that a proposed human right would impose. If this is impossible, then the purported right is not an international human right.I argue that Donaldson's affordability condition is subject to four objections which reveal its untenability as one of the conditions upon which identification of international human rights must rest. I offer another way of treating problems of affordability and capability when it comes to such rights that all moral agents must respect.George G. Brenkert is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee/Knoxville. He has recently completed a book,Political Freedom, to be published by Routledge. His current research focuses on issues in business ethics.     

Umpire and batsman: Is it cricket to be both?

The paper is a response to Richard De George's essay, Theological Ethics and Business Ethics. It defends the possibility of theologically oriented approaches to business ethics by pointing out certain deficiencies in business ethics narrowly based on the premisses of analytic moral philosophy. In particular it argues, in a manner consistent with Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981), that such a program of business ethics is insufficiently critical of its own roots in the social fiction of bureaucratic rationality. After showing how this ideology governs De George's negative judgments on theological approaches to business ethics, the author outlines a program of critical reflection that would draw from the intellectual traditions of both theology and philosophy in order to facilitate a dialogue in business ethics that no longer is captive in the Iron Cage of bureaucratic rationality. Dennis P. McCann is an Associate Professor of Religious Studies at De Paul University. He has served on the faculties of Reed College and Lewis and Clark College. He is the author of Christian Realism and Liberation Theology (1981) and a co-author of Polity and Praxis: A Program for American Practical Theology (1985).     

Corporate Strategy and ethics

Corporate Strategy has emerged as a central metaphor for private-sector enterprise. Given inherent imperfections in markets, one important question to consider is how well the practice of Corporate Strategy contributes to social welfare. An account of the implicit morality of free markets is developed as a standard against which two particular, second best solutions to market imperfections — namely, American federal antitrust policy and Corporate Strategy — are compared. Corporate Strategy is subsequently evaluated in terms of the fundamental principles of Rawls' theory of justice. In both analyses, Corporate Strategy is found to depart significantly and systematically from the standards of social justice. An alternative principle, grounded in the concept of duty, is introduced as a means for reconceptualizing Corporate Strategy.Daniel R. Gilbert, Jr. is a doctoral student in the Strategic Management and Organization program, School of Management, University of Minnesota, and also serves as an Instructor in Strategic Management and a Research Associate in the Strategic Management Research Center.