Virtuous capital: what foundations can learn from venture capitalists

U.S. foundations and nonprofits work diligently on behalf of society's most needy and yet report that progress is slow and social problems persist. How can they learn to be more effective with their limited resources? Foundations should consider expanding their mission from investing only in program innovation to investing in the organizational needs of nonprofit organizations as well. Their overemphasis on program design has meant deteriorating organizational capacity at many nonprofits. If foundations are to help nonprofits be assured of making payroll, paying the rent, or buying a much-needed computer, they must develop hands-on partnering skills. Venture capital firms offer a helpful benchmark. In addition to putting up capital, they closely monitor the companies in which they have invested, provide management support and stay involved long enough to see the company become strong. If foundation officers familiarize themselves with such practices, they can begin to build organizational capacity in the nonprofit sector. Foundations can hire organizational experts to assist grantees; they can lengthen grant terms to allow nonprofits to build up organization strengths; and they can create new classes of grants that allow for organizational effectiveness. Nonprofits in turn should articulate their organizational needs when applying for grants; they should apply to foundations known for longer-term grants; and they should create plans that justify long-term support from foundations.     

Power, growth, and the voracity effect

Why is it that resource-rich countries tend to have lower growth rates than resource-poor countries? And why is it that many countries that enjoy terms-of-trade windfalls end up with lower growth rates? To explain these puzzles, we extend the neoclassical growth model by replacing the representative agent with multiple powerful groups and by introducing a new concept, the voracity effect—a more than proportional increase in redistribution in response to an increase in the raw rate of return. We show that, in an economy with powerful groups and weak institutions, the voracity effect operates if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is high enough. That is, there exists a negative relationship between the growth rate and the raw rate of return, which is positively related to the terms of trade. We provide some empirical evidence in support of the mechanism we propose.     

Outsourcing in a Global Economy

We study the determinants of the location of subcontracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade. We model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship-specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts. The extent of international outsourcing depends inter alia on the thickness of the domestic and foreign market for input suppliers, the relative cost of searching in each market, the relative cost of customizing inputs and the nature of the contracting environment in each country.     

Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games

We conduct double-anonymous dictator experiments to explore the role of altruism in motivating subjects' behavior. We vary the extent to which an anonymous recipient is deserving of aid and investigate its effect on the allocation of a fixed pie by student subjects. This is accomplished by including as treatments: (1) an anonymous student subject and (2) an established charity. We find that a significant increase in donations occurs when we increase the extent to which a donation goes to a recipient generally agreed to be “deserving.” We conclude that subjects are rational in the way they incorporate fairness into their decisions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: A13, C91, D64.     

A CULTURAL THEORY OF INFORMATION BIAS IN ORGANIZATIONS

Organizations show an essential cultural pluralism. Taking this into account, we aim at developing a cultural theory of organizations. A central role in this theory is played by information rejection, which can follow any of four different styles: risk absorption, networking, paradigm protection, or expulsion. These can be related to different types of organizational cultures, in particular to markets, hierarchies, and sects. Different kinds of information bias institutionalize different kinds of leadership.     

Episodes of Exuberance in Housing Markets: In Search of the Smoking Gun

In this paper, we examine changes in the time series properties of three widely used housing market indicators (real house prices, price-to-income ratios, and price-to-rent ratios) for a large set of countries to detect episodes of explosive dynamics. Dating such episodes of exuberance in housing markets provides a timeline as well as empirical content to the narrative connecting housing exuberance to the global 2008 ?09 recession. For our empirical analysis, we employ two recursive univariate unit root tests recently developed by Phillips and Yu (International Economic Review 52(1):201–226, 2011) and Phillips et al. (2015). We also propose a novel extension of the test developed by Phillips et al. (2015) to a panel setting in order to exploit the large cross-sectional dimension of our international dataset. Statistically significant periods of exuberance are found in most countries. Moreover, we find strong evidence of the emergence of an unprecedented period of exuberance in the early 2000s that eventually collapsed around 2006 ?07, preceding the 2008 ?09 global recession. We examine whether macro and financial variables help to predict (in-sample) episodes of exuberance in housing markets. Long-term interest rates, credit growth and global economic conditions are found to be among the best predictors. We conclude that global factors (partly) explain the synchronization of exuberance episodes that we detect in the data in the 2000s.     

Do ratings of firms converge? Implications for managers,investors and strategy researchers

Research summary : Raters of firms play an important role in assessing domains ranging from sustainability to corporate governance to best places to work. Managers, investors, and scholars increasingly rely on these ratings to make strategic decisions, invest trillions of dollars in capital, and study corporate social responsibility (CSR), guided by the implicit assumption that the ratings are valid. We document the surprising lack of agreement across social ratings from six well‐established raters. These differences remain even when we adjust for explicit differences in the definition of CSR held by different raters, implying the ratings have low validity. Our results suggest that users of social ratings should exercise caution in interpreting their connection to actual CSR and that raters should conduct regular evaluations of their ratings. Managerial summary : Ratings of corporate social responsibility (CSR) guide trillions of dollars of investment, but managers, investors, and researchers know little about whether these ratings accurately measure CSR. In practice, there are examples of highly rated firms becoming embroiled in scandals and the same firm receiving sharply different ratings from different rating agencies. We evaluate six of the leading raters and find little overlap in their assessments of CSR. This lack of consensus suggests that social responsibility is challenging to measure reliably and that users of these ratings should be cautious in drawing conclusions about firms based on this data. We encourage the rating agencies to regularly validate their data in an effort to improve the measurement of CSR. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.