Capital Investment under Alternative Marketing Scenarios in the Hog Industry: A Real Option Approach

This paper uses a real option approach to analyze the impact of alternative marketing contracts on the decision to invest in a cooperatively owned hog facility. For the numerical analysis of the impact, this paper uses a simulation method that incorporates early exercise, multiple‐state variables, multi‐choice decisions and temporal optimality. The results show that the option values that stem from the value of waiting to invest and choosing between alternative marketing methods amounts to 20–36% of the initial investment. Further, having an option to choose an alternative marketing method with different risk structure does add to the value of waiting to invest. Having an option to enter a 15‐year marketing contract increases the value of waiting by as much as $117,097 for the pork production example in this paper. Finally, the value of the option to wait is unilaterally lower under a risk‐reducing contract scenario than under a spot market alternative. This could explain the explosion in hog production facility investment during the 1990s when prevalence of contract production increased. Les auteurs ont recouru à l'approche du choix véritable pour analyser l'impact d'autres solutions de mise en marché sur la capacité d'investir ou pas dans un élevage de porcs exploitéà la manière d'une coopérative. Aux fins de l'analyse, on s'est servi d'une méthode de simulation intégrant une brève campagne, de multiples variables d'État, des décisions à choix multiple et des conditions optimales dans le temps. Les résultats indiquent que l'existence d'un choix réel permettant à l'exploitant d'attendre avant d'investir et de sélectionner entre plusieurs méthodes de mise en marché représente 20 à 36 pour cent de l'investissement initial. Par ailleurs, le fait d'avoir accès à une autre méthode de mise en marché, à structure de risque différente, ne donne pas plus de valeur à la capacité d'attendre avant de procéder aux investissements. La possibilité de signer une entente de commercialisation de quinze ans accroît la valeur de l'attente de jusqu'à 117,097 $ pour le type d'élevage porcin retenu comme exemple. Enfin, l'existence d'une entente de commercialisation atténuant les risques réduit unilatéralement la valeur de l'option « attente », comparativement à ce qui se produit quand l'éleveur n'a d'autre choix qu'écouler ses bêtes sur le marché au comptant. Ces résultats pourraient expliquer l'explosion des investissements observée dans le secteur du porc au cours des années 90, où la production sous contrat avait sensiblement augmenté.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Komplexität erfolgreich steuern — 27. Österreichischer Controllertag in Wien

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.