The competition for deposits and the impact of monetary policy

Financial intermediation in Britain can be said to have reached maturity before the war, since when the growth of banks has been critically a question of market share. Until the shift in monetary policy away from direct restriction of bank lending that began about nine years ago, credit restriction added to other factors, like taxation and the bank cartel, limiting the ability of the banks to compete. The author argues that an open-market policy directed toward money supply control need not discriminate against banks. However, the re-introduction of bank lending restrictions through the use of Special Deposits and, even more so, through the use of Supplementary Special Deposits has worked to favour non-bank deposit intermediaries. The distortions caused by the Supplementary Special Deposits not only discriminate against the banks; they are also likely to undermine the use of monetary policy itself. What are required are government policies, especially with regard to the size of the public sector borrowing requi rement, that make possible the goal of a non-discriminatory open-market policy, without the need for direct controls on lending by financial institutions.     

THE EARNINGS-PRICE AND STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED EARNINGS EFFECTS: ONE ANOMALY OR TWO?

In this paper prior work on earnings-price (E/P) and standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) anomalies is re-examined and extended. A relation between excess returns and E/P is tested controlling for SUE. Results suggest that both anomalies are still present in the data, and that the E/P effect exists independently of the most recent earnings surprise.     

Option Pricing With V. G. Martingale Components1

European call options are priced when the uncertainty driving the stock price follows the V. G. stochastic process (Madan and Seneta 1990). the incomplete markets equilibrium change of measure is approximated and identified using the log return mean, variance, and kurtosis. an exact equilibrium interpretation is also provided, allowing inference about relative risk aversion coefficients from option prices. Relative to Black-Scholes, V. G. option values are higher, particularly so for out of the money options with long maturity on stocks with high means, low variances, and high kurtosis.     

Who Trades Around Earnings Announcements? Evidence from TORQ Data

Abstract:  Using TORQ database we investigate the intra-day trading volume reactions to earnings announcements of five trader groups, individuals, institutions, exchange members, program traders, and specialists. The results of this study indicate that institutions are most active in the immediate aftermath of an announcement. Individual investors are slow at the beginning but accumulate heavy volume afterwards and exceed institutional trading volume. We find support for Harris and Raviv (1993) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , who respectively argue that divergence of opinion about a public information and portfolio rebalancing cause surges in pre- and post-announcement trading volume. Further we find evidence of swift and aggressive trading by informed and sophisticated institutions in the immediate aftermath of the announcement, and delayed, aggressive trading volume 'overreaction' by 'slow' and 'overconfident' individual investors as documented by Barber and Odean (2000 and 2002) and Daniel et al. (1998) . NYSE specialists provide the bulk of the liquidity needs around earnings announcements.