The Breakdown of Idiosyncratic Volatility Into Expected and Unexpected Components and Its Effects on Stock Returns in Brazil

Based on studies of idiosyncratic volatility developed in the recent literature, this study analyzes its relation with expected returns through the breakdown of idiosyncratic volatility in the Brazilian stock market and presents evidence of the importance of expected idiosyncratic volatility for asset pricing. We study the impact of the expected and unexpected components of idiosyncratic volatility on the returns of shares listed on the BOVESPA between 2004 and 2011. The results show a strong positive and significant relation between expected idiosyncratic volatility and returns. This evidence is highlighted when we use unexpected idiosyncratic volatility to control for unexpected returns. Additional robustness tests, controlling for size and momentum effects, also have positive and significant coefficients, corroborating previous findings.     

A MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION WITH PERSONAL INCOME DISPERSION

We introduce non‐homothetic preferences in the Dixit–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, and enquire about the effects of a change in income dispersion on the firms’ optimal decisions and market equilibrium. Income dispersion, modeled as a mean preserving spread, is shown to affect only the degree of product differentiation under the standard negligibility hypothesis on the firms’ decision making process, while it generates a positive co‐movement of demand and demand elasticity, when this assumption is removed and the price index effect is taken into account.     

Income Distribution and Monopoly: Price and Quantity Patterns with Intra‐ and Inter‐class Income Dispersion

We analyze the direction of the co‐movements of price and output in a monopolistic market when an expansive shock occurs. Price and quantity patterns are shown to depend on the consumers' income distribution. In particular, a low degree of income dispersion is associated with price and quantity reacting in opposite directions to demand shocks.     

Students’ opinions on teaching and services provided by the Italian Universities: a proposal for a new evaluation scheme

Quality & Quantity - In Italy, the evaluation of the internal effectiveness of academic training courses has been substantiated, for over 20 years, in periodical surveys on...     

Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay‐for‐Firm‐Performance

Whether voluntary or mandatory in nature, most recent corporate governance codes of best practice assume that board structural independence, and the application by boards of outcome‐based incentive plans, are important boundary conditions for the enforcement of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay‐for‐firm‐performance; that is, for optimal contracting between owners and executive agents. We test this logic on a large Australian sample using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to dynamic panel data estimation. We find that Australian boards exhibiting best practice structural arrangements – those chaired by non‐executives and dominated by non‐executive directors at the full board and compensation committee levels – are no more adept at enforcing CEO pay‐for‐firm‐performance than are executive‐dominated boards. These findings suggest that policy makers' faith in incentive plans and the moderating influence of structural independence per se may be misplaced. Our findings also hold significant implications for corporate governance theory. Specifically, the findings lend further support to a contingency‐based understanding of board composition, reward choice and monitoring; an approach integrating the insights afforded by behavioural approaches to Agency Theory and by social‐cognitive and institutional understandings of director outlook, decision‐making and behaviour.     

VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

The paper analyses the effects of income concentration on the behaviour of a duopoly with vertical product differentiation and uncovered market. By using a trapezoid distribution, we solve explicitly for market equilibrium as a function of a mean preserving spread of the income distribution. We show that overall more concentrated incomes imply stronger product differentiation, as the presence of a large share of middle‐income consumers stimulates a price competition, whose effects are dampened through an enlargement of the quality spread. While the high‐quality advantage and market coverage increase unambiguously in the degree of income concentration, the behaviour of prices is non‐monotone in the distribution parameter.     

Alternative Investment Market: A Way to Promote Entrepreneurship

The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between firm performance after the IPO and its entrepreneurial orientation (EO). In our work we want to test if entrepreneurial oriented firms show a better market performance signalling that investors valuate it positively. To this purpose, we focus on a particular sample of entrepreneurial firms, i.e. companies that went public on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) through IPO during the period from 1995 to 2006. Along the lines of Miller (Manage Sci 29:770–791, 1983), Covin and Slevin (Entrep Theory Pract 16:7–25, 1991) and Lumpkin and Dess (Acad Manage Rev 21:135–172, 1996), firms’ entrepreneurial orientation is measured in terms of risk taking, innovation and proactivity. Following the literature in management on investor valuation we use the percent price premium as dependent variable of our model. Our findings confirm a positive impact of entrepreneurial orientation on investors’ valuation. The results of this work underline the relevance of secondary markets, such as the AIM, as a valuable alternative to traditional financial institutions in providing capital to small and entrepreneurial companies.