Pro-poor trade policy in Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper examines the presence of a pro-poor bias in the existing structure of protection of six Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, and Madagascar. We build on a simple agricultural household production model and we propose an extension to include adjustments in labor income. Our approach, which can be implemented without repeated cross-sections of household level data, suits well the data constraints in SSA. It also allows us to capture the heterogeneity in trade protection at the tariff line level. The pro-poor bias indicators suggest that SSA's trade policies tend to be biased in favor of poor households, as these policies redistribute income from rich to poor households. This is because protection increases the agricultural prices of goods that are sold by African households and this effect dominates both the impacts of higher consumption prices and the strong Stolper–Samuelson effects that benefit skilled over unskilled workers.     

Political competition and policy choices: the evidence from agricultural protection

This article investigates whether political competition plays an important role in determining the level of agricultural protection. In order to do so, we exploit variation in political and economic data from 74 developing and developed countries for the post‐war period. We use two measures of political competition: one that captures the extent to which political power can be freely contested regardless of election results and one based on vote share at last parliamentary elections. Our results, based on static and dynamic panel estimators, show unambiguously that the higher the level of political competitions is, the higher the agricultural protection.     

Competition Effects of Supermarket Services

This article investigates the competition effects of supermarket services using fluid milk as a case study. A simultaneous equation model for services and price competition is estimated with scanner data from fifteen supermarket chains using two alternative measures of services, namely store size and principal components of in-store services. Empirical results show that increasing services results in economies of scope, greater supermarket chain-level demand, lower price elasticity of demand, and enhanced market power, leading to higher milk prices and quantity sold. We conclude that, as result of service competition, supermarkets differentiate themselves from competitors and successfully attract less price-sensitive consumers.     

User Charges as Redistributive Devices

In this model, a mix of public and private provision of private goods arises naturally in the economy. We characterize the social optimum in the presence of a linear tax/public expenditure system and show how a user charge can be welfare- or Pareto-improving, when the users are the poor. The charge discourages the rich from opting into the public program and allows the policymaker to restructure the tax/expenditure system in a way that is beneficial for the poor. If the ensuing welfare gain is large enough to outweigh the loss for the remaining users, a charge is desirable.     

Measuring Restrictiveness of Bilateral Trade Policies: A Comparison between Developed and Developing Countries

This paper compares the degree of openness to trade of three developed countries markets—the European Union, Japan, the United States—with that of three middle-income countries, namely Brazil, India, and China. A theoretically consistent protection measure—the Mercantilistic Trade Restrictiveness Index (MTRI)—is employed to average tariffs at different levels of aggregation. The computation relies on a comparative static applied general equilibrium model (Global Trade Analysis Project—GTAP) featuring imperfect competition as well as on the bilateral applied tariffs included in the most recent version of the GTAP database. Results provide a different picture from what could have been expected given the widely publicized diffusion of preferential schemes supposedly favoring developing countries exports. JEL no.  F17, C68, Q17     

Equilibrium Determinacy under Monetary and Fiscal Policies in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper studies the issue of equilibrium determinacy under monetary and fiscal policy feedback rules in an optimizing general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and flexible prices. It is shown that equilibria may be determinate also when monetary and fiscal policies are both 'passive'. In particular, under passive monetary rules, equilibrium uniqueness is more likely to be verified when fiscal policies are less committed to public debt stabilization.     

VRP revisited: The impact of behavioural costs in balancing standardisation and variety

The objective of this paper is to bring a new element to the academic (and industrial) debate concerning the optimum level of variety in component design in mass production companies. Many authors have explored the trade-off between functional and variety costs, and this could be considered as a well-acknowledged management issue, at least from an engineering perspective. Nevertheless, while defining the theoretically optimal level of component variety, there are other elements, more related to operators’ attitude or to operative conditions, which may intervene and prevent effective exploitation of the existing variety. These elements have been given scant attention in literature, while they may play a relevant role in real organisations.In this paper, we will present a case study and an analytic model for these “behavioural costs” in manufacturing environments, so as to show how the theoretically optimal amount of variety changes if one takes into account these aspects. Researchers (and practitioners) might leverage on this contribution in order to rejuvenate the Variety Reduction paradigm, and to increase their awareness in designing and managing mass production manufacturing processes.     

Deposit guarantee evaluation and incentives analysis in a mutual guarantee system

This paper analyzes how the deposit guarantee value affects the risk incentives in a mutual guarantee system. We liken the guarantee’s value to that of a European-style contingent claims portfolio. The main feature emerging from our model is that a mutual guarantee system would give banks an adverse incentive to increase riskiness. To mitigate this incentive, we introduce a regulatory provision modelled using a path-dependent contingent claim. By comparing the mutual guarantee system with a non-mutual one, we show that the former is less expensive, but implies higher adverse incentives for the banks, especially for undercapitalized institutions.