Riskiness of Real Estate Development: A Perspective from Urban Economics and Option Value Theory

In this article, we define a new construct for urban economic and investment analysis, which revisits the conventional wisdom that investment in real estate development is riskier than investment in stabilized property assets. This new construct, referred as a “development asset value index” (DAVI), is a value index for newly developed properties (only) in a given geographical property market. It tracks longitudinal changes in the highest and best use (HBU) value of locations, and it reveals developer and landowner behavior taking advantage of the optionality inherent in land ownership. In particular, the DAVI reflects developers' use of flexibility in the exercise of the call option to (re)develop the property to any legal use and density. We empirically estimate a DAVI for commercial property (i.e., central locations) and compare it with a corresponding traditional transaction‐price‐based property asset price index (PAPI) corrected for depreciation. We believe that the difference primarily reflects the realized value of flexibility in land development. We find that the DAVIs display greater value growth and are smoother over time and less cyclical than their corresponding PAPIs for the same locations. This suggests that developers successfully use flexibility, and that development may be riskier than stabilized property investment due primarily only to leverage effects (construction costs). Practical implications are also discussed.     

The Impact of Second Loans on Subprime Mortgage Defaults

An estimated 12.6% of primary mortgage loans were simultaneously originated with a second loan from 2004 until 2008, although relatively little is known about how the presence of such subordinate loans affects the default decisions of borrowers. We use a novel data series of loan servicing records from 2002 until 2010 to identify such borrowers and find evidence that the default behavior of these borrowers significantly differs from borrowers without second loans. Estimating a discrete‐time proportional odds hazard model, we find borrowers with a second loan were 62.7% more likely to default each month on their primary loan when conditioning alone on the attributes of the primary loan. However, borrowers of second loans were 58.3% less likely to default on their primary loan as compared to single‐loan borrowers with equivalent current combined attributes (i.e., loan‐to‐value, balance and interest rate). We hypothesize and provide empirical evidence that this occurs because borrowers with second loans have the option to sequentially default on each loan since subordinate lenders will not pursue foreclosure if borrowers have insufficient equity. Lenders of defaulted subordinate debt may revisit their decision to foreclose in the future after housing markets start to recover, thus prompting a new round of foreclosures.     

Joint oligopsony-oligopoly in the U.S. leaf tobacco market, 1924–39

The leaf tobacco marketplace is highly organized. Prior to 1940, the few large tobacco companies controlled that organization explicitly. The question is whether this organization set oligopsonistic leaf prices or minimized production and transaction costs. A model of joint oligopsonyoligopoly shows that pricing of cigarettes and leaf tobacco was unified: oligopolistic cigarette pricing was sufficient to curtail both cigarette production and leaf purchases. The companies could just bid in the market for the leaf necessary for that cigarette production rate.Prima facie, the organization was not for oligopsony coordination. The implied econometric model of pricing fits observed behavior well.Malcolm Boyd, Dennis Carlton, John Garen, Stephen Karlson, Li Way Lee, An-loh Lin, Robert Miller, Stephen Spurr and the referee have given me thoughtful, perceptive and useful comments. I am pleased to acknowledge their involvement without implicating them in whatever errors remain.     

Family,Place and the Intergenerational Transmission of Union Membership

This article examines the importance of family, gender and place to the intergenerational transmission of trade union membership. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey, we show that union membership among parents influences the union joining behaviour of young workers. These effects are particularly apparent among daughters and where both parents are members of unions. The effects of parental membership are also stronger among those born in areas characterized by relatively high levels of union density. Parental effects are therefore important to our understanding of the persistence of regional variations in levels of trade union membership.     

Large‐Scale Buy‐to‐Rent Investors in the Single‐Family Housing Market: The Emergence of a New Asset Class

In 2012, several large firms began purchasing single‐family homes, creating large portfolios of rental property, and securitizing these investments in capital markets. We present the first systematic evidence on this new investor activity in order to shed light on the factors that have supported its emergence. Three key factors were the ample supply of property for sale, tight mortgage financing and a decrease in acquisition and managerial costs brought about by technological advances. In addition, we show that buy‐to‐rent investors appear to have supported house prices in the neighborhoods where they concentrated.