Post‐Cameralist Governance: Towards a Robust Political Economy of Bureaucracy

I develop a robust political economy of bureaucracy by highlighting the conditions necessary for hierarchical administrative bodies to govern protectively and productively, but not predatorily. These conditions are residual claimancy and jurisdictional competition. I make this argument by exploring a post‐cameralist interpretation of governance. Cameralism arose as a governance philosophy in the fractured principalities of seventeenth‐century Germany following the Thirty Years' War. Post‐cameralism focuses not on particular cameralist governance strategies but on a paradigm which sees governance as an activity provided within a larger exchange order, rather than imposing itself on that order as in more conventional treatments of public economics. While a post‐cameralist conception of governance comes with its own challenges, such as tensions with normative visions that promote self‐governance, it nonetheless presents an intriguing synthesis of monocentric and polycentric insights.     

OPTIONS TO THE REALM: A COST NEUTRAL PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE POLITICAL INCENTIVES

In this article, we draw on the literature on political property rights, political accountability, and strategic management and entrepreneurship to propose a cost neutral reform aimed at promoting long‐run economic prosperity. We propose replacing politicians' defined benefit pensions with a financial contract that is tied to economic performance. In particular, we propose a contract that pays out a lump sum to a politician 30 years after their election if real gross domestic product per capita is above some preset benchmark. Furthermore, we show that the contract can be priced such that it is cost neutral in terms of present value with a defined‐benefit pension. We argue that this contract provides a net benefit to society. (JEL D70, D72)     

Wealth inequality and collective action

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.     

DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY: ROBUST RULES IN MONETARY POLICY

We argue that in seeking to insure against model uncertainty, monetary policy makers are often ready to trade ex post performance for greater certainty in the outcome. They thus look for rules that although not optimal ex post, have certain properties that qualify them as robust. We apply first, Gul's approach of ‘disappointment’ aversion to describe policy makers' aversion to uncertainty and then define the properties the notion of ‘robustness’ entails. With these two tools we then link the desirability of such robust rules to the degree of policy makers' aversion to uncertainty. We thus show that provided such robust rules exist, a larger degree of disappointment aversion leads to a greater emphasis on robustness in policy implementation.     

Gross substitutes and complements: A simple generalization

We extend the gross substitutes and complements framework (Sun and Yang, 2006). Competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods exists under significantly weaker, intuitive and interpretable conditions. A generalized dynamic double-track procedure (Sun and Yang, 2008, 2009) finds the competitive equilibrium outcome.     

Sabotaging Another: Priming Competition Increases Cheating Behavior in Tournaments

Trophy. Goal. Dominated . Does priming individuals with competitive concepts such as these influence the temptation to cheat? We utilize a standard laboratory cheating task in a tournament setting and test whether nonconscious priming impacts the nature of cheating behavior. The results demonstrate an asymmetry in a winner‐take‐all setting: a competitive prime does not increase cheating to improve one's own outcome, but does significantly increase the willingness of an individual to sabotage a competitor.     

A simple macro model of Original Sin based on optimal price setting under incomplete information

This paper analyses the consequences of “original sin” (the fact that the currency of an emerging market economy usually cannot be used to borrow abroad) for macroeconomic stability. The approach is based on third-generation models of currency crises, but differs from alternative versions by explicitly modeling the price setting behavior of firms if prices are sticky and there is incomplete information about the future exchange rate. It is shown that a small depreciation is beneficial, but a large one is detrimental.     

The transfer of Tax Increment Financing (TIF) as an urban policy for spatially targeted economic development

Urban policy transfer between the US and UK has long been of interest to researchers and practitioners. Given the recent wider context of reduced direct funding and the absence of a coherent regeneration policy, this paper considers the introduction of Tax Increment Financing (TIF) to the UK as a method of stimulating spatially targeted economic development initiatives. The paper explores whether TIF could be considered a form of policy transfer, and in doing so uncovers whether the transfer of TIF could – (a) be successful and unsuccessful under certain circumstances; (b) require the actions of certain stakeholders; and (c) be enabled via prescribed frameworks and negotiation. The results are evidenced using qualitative approaches and find that TIF is more of a modified policy ‘idea’ rather than transfer. Further discussion argues that TIF can be successful, if it considers flexible but local elements and has the capacity to balance stakeholders for development brokerage.     

Challenges for land system science

While considerable progress has been made in understanding land use change, land system science continues to face a number of grand challenges. This paper discusses these challenges with a focus on empirical land system studies, land system modelling and the analysis of future visions of land system change. Contemporary landscapes are contingent outcomes of past and present patterns, processes and decisions. Thus, empirical analysis of past and present land-use change has an important role in providing insights into the socio-economic and ecological processes that shape land use transitions. This is especially important with respect to gradual versus rapid land system dynamics and in understanding changes in land use intensity. Combining the strengths of empirical analysis with multi-scale modelling will lead to new insights into the processes driving land system change. New modelling methods that combine complex systems thinking at a local level with macro-level economic analysis of the land system would reconcile the multi-scale dynamics currently encapsulated in bottom-up and top-down modelling approaches. Developments in land use futures analysis could focus on integrating explorative scenarios that reflect possible outcomes with normative visions that identify desired outcomes. Such an approach would benefit from the broad and in-depth involvement of stakeholders in order to link scientific findings to political and societal decision-making culminating in a set of key choices and consequences. Land system models have an important role in supporting future land use policy, but model outputs require scientific interpretation rather than being presented as predictions. The future of land system science is strongly dependent on the research community's capacity to bring together the elements of research discussed in the paper, via empirical data collection and analysis of observed processes, computer simulation across scale levels and futures analysis of alternative, normative visions through stakeholder engagement.