Tax Competition and Redistribution in a Two-Country Endogenous-Growth Model

This paper examines the effects of policy coordinationin a two-country world with endogenous growth and imperfect capitalmobility. Redistribution is financed by a source-based capital-incometax. Comparing the cases in which countries do and do not coordinatetheir fiscal policies, it is shown that redistribution can beinefficiently high if fiscal policies are not coordinated. Thisis because the negative effects of fiscal policy on home savingsaffect economic growth abroad by inducing a decline in foreigninvestment. This externality can dominate the well-known tax-baseexternality.     

Litigation, School Finance Reform, and Aggregate Educational Spending

In the past two decades, litigation in many U.S. stateshas triggered educational reform movements designed to reducethe inequalities in educational expenditures across school districts.This paper uses a panel data set across all the states from 1970–1990to examine the role of litigation and educational finance reformin determining the level of education funding in a flexible,dynamic setting. An important finding of our work is that litigationand reform have differential effects across the states, in somecases leading to increases while in other cases decreases inpredicted spending.     

Debt in industry equilibrium

This article shows (1) how entry and exit of firms in a competitiveindustry affect the valuation of securities and optimal capitalstructure, and (2) how, given a trade-off between tax advantagesand agency costs, a firm will optimally adjust its leveragelevel after it is set up. We derive simple pricing expressionsfor corporate debt in which the price elasticity of demand forindustry output plays a crucial role. When a firm optimallyadjusts its leverage over time, we show that total firm valuecomprises the value of discounted cash flows assuming fixedcapital structure, plus a continuum of options for marginalincreases in debt.     

Pricing mortgage-backed securities in a multifactor interest rate environment: a multivariate density estimation approach

Multivariate density estimation (MDE) suggests that mortgage-backedsecurity (MBS) prices can be well described as a function ofthe level and slope of the term structure. We analyze how thisfunction varies across MBSs with different coupons. An importantfinding is that the interest rate level proxies for the moneynessof the option, the expected level of prepayments, and the averagelife of the cash flows, while the term structure slope controlsfor the average rate at which these cash flows should be discounted.     

Why do security prices change? A transaction-level analysis of NYSE stocks

This article develops and tests a structural model of intradayprice formation that embodies public information shocks andmicrostructure effects. We use the model to analyze intradaypatterns in bid-ask spreads, price volatility, transaction costs,and return and quote auto-correlations, and to construct metricsfor price discovery and effective trading costs. Informationasymmetry and uncertainty over fundamentals decrease over theday, although transaction costs increase. The results help explainthe U-shaped pattern in intraday bid-ask spreads and volatility,and are also consistent with the intra-day decline in the varianceof ask price changes.     

Pricing and hedging power options

In this paper we study the pricing and hedging of options whose payoff is a polynomial function of the underlying price at expiration; so-called ‘power options’. Working in the well-known Black and Scholes (1973) framework we derive closed-form formulas for the prices of general power calls and puts. Parabola options are studied as a special case. Power options can be hedged by statically combining ordinary options in such a way that their payoffs form a piecewise linear function which approximates the power option's payoff. Traditional delta hedging may subsequently be used to reduce any residual risk.     

Capital mobility,wage bargaining,and social insurance policies in an economic union

In a two-country model with mobile capital we analyse decentralized social insurance policies. These policies are a compromise between the preferences of workers and capital owners. Due to wage bargaining, worker-based social insurance contributions are borne by capital owners. These contributions affect the profitability of investment, and consequently the direction and size of capital flows. Countries will take account of these effects in determining social insurance policy. Noncooperative decision making results in tax competition and an underprovision of social insurance. In addition, increasing economic integration, represented by increasing capital mobility, could imply a divergence of social insurance levels in the two countries.     

Forbearance: An empirical analysis

Several recent articles have analyzed conditions under which allowing capital-deficient banks to continue to operate may be optimal policy. This article examines the performance of banks admitted into the FDIC's Capital Forbearance Program between 1986 and 1989 and finds that, for the majority of these banks, there was no substantial improvement in their capital ratios. We use a logit regression analysis to attempt to identify those banks whose financial condition improved with forbearance and find that banks which did improve are not clearly identifiable from pre-forbearance financial data. Instead, the banks which improved did so due to infusions of new capital, extraordinary income, and improvements in the local economies, factors which are not easily identifiable ex ante by regulators. The conclusion is that, while some grants of forbearance may result in large saving to the FDIC, in the majority of cases granting forbearance to troubled banks is unlikely to reduce the expected loss to the deposit insurer.University of HoustonUniversity of HoustonCooperative Bank of Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan     

Does the cost of capital differ across countries? An agency perspective*

In this keynote speech, I ask the question: Does the cost of capital differ for firms located in different countries? I argue that there are two ways to look at the cost of capital. First, there is the neoclassical perspective, which assumes that there are no agency problems. In integrated markets, the neoclassical cost of capital is the same in every country. Second, there is the agency perspective. Agency costs increase the cost of capital understood as the expected rate of return necessary for an investment to leave the value of the firm unaffected. Adjusting the cost of capital for agency costs, I argue that it differs across countries because of differences in corporate governance. I then provide a comparison of the agency-adjusted cost of capital between Japan and the US.     

Market based price support program: an alternative approach to large scale food procurement and distribution system

In most developing countries of the world, large scale public food procurement and distribution systems (PFDS) have become too expensive for the country governments to support from their own resources. Despite high financial and administrative costs of the programs, the degree of seasonal price stabilization and price support achieved through the activities remain quite low. Using the Bangladesh PFDS as a case study, this research indicates that considerable improvements in price support can be achieved by providing credit to the farmers immediately after the harvest. If the government procurement is reduced by 50 per cent in Bangladesh, and providing 150 per cent of the cost of running PFDS as credit, Bangladesh can improve the farmers' income and achieve better stability of cereal prices at a cost less than one-third of the current costs of the PFDS.