How well do children insure parents against low retirement income? An analysis using survey data from urban China

As population aging becomes more pronounced in the developing world, the uneven implementation of social safety nets raises important questions as to how well traditional family-based mechanisms insure elderly incomes when pension systems fail. Using a unique dataset from a recent household survey conducted in urban China, we find evidence that private transfers respond to low household income of retired workers when income falls below the poverty line. This finding is consistent with an altruistic motive for transfers at low levels of household income. At the same time, however, the transfer response to elderly pre-transfer income is not sufficient to fully cover shortfalls that arise with severe pension arrears and low retirement income.     

On the Inconsistency of Instrumental Variables Estimators for the Coefficients of Certain Dummy Variables

In this paper we consider the asymptotic properties of the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator of the parameters in a linear regression model with some random regressors, and other regressors that are dummy variables. The latter have the special property that the number of non-zero values is fixed, and does not increase with the sample size. We prove that the IV estimator of the coefficient vector for the dummy variables is inconsistent, while that for the other regressors is weakly consistent under standard assumptions. However, the usual estimator for the asymptotic covariance matrix of the I.V. estimator for all of the coefficients retains its usual consistency. The t-test statistics for the dummy variable coefficients are still asymptotically standard normal, despite the inconsistency of the associated IV coefficient estimator. These results extend the earlier results of Hendry and Santos (Oxf Bull Econ Stat 67:571–595, 2005), which relate to a fixed-regressor model, in which the dummy variables are non-zero for just a single observation, and OLS estimation is used.

     

Party Politics and the Political Economy of Ghana’s Oil

Ghana’s status as a new oil producer raises questions about the developmental effects of resources, and the role of political institutions in these processes. The conundrum this paper addresses is the rather limited impact of oil exploitation in Ghana despite the country’s strong democratic record and internationally acclaimed oil governance legislation. The reasons for this lie in the nature of elite-based political coalitions and we root our analysis of Ghana’s hydrocarbons in the political settlements literature, which moves us beyond the ‘good governance’ approaches so often linked to ‘resource curse’ thinking. We also move beyond the instrumentalism of political settlements theory to examine the role political ideas play in shaping resource governance. We argue that inter-coalitional rivalry has generally undermined the benefits of Ghana’s oil but that a crude interests-based interpretation is insufficient to explain differences between these coalitions.