Aid effectiveness and limited enforceable conditionality

This paper analyzes optimal foreign aid policy in a neoclassical growth framework with a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient government. Aid conditionality is modeled as a limited enforceable dynamic contract. We define the contract to be self-enforcing if, at any point in time, the conditions imposed on aid funds are supportable by the threat of a permanent aid cutoff from then onward. Quantitative results show that optimal self-enforcing conditional aid strongly stimulates the developing economy and substantially increases welfare. However, aid effectiveness comes at a high cost: to ensure enforceability, less benevolent political regimes receive permanently larger aid funds in return for a less intense conditionality.     

Level-Scheduling bei Variantenfließfertigung: Klassifikation, Literaturüberblick und Modellkritik

Manufacturers of consumer goods nowadays have to cope with an enormous product variety, which is to be produced on their assembly systems. Car manufacturer BMW for example, offers its automobiles in 10³² theoretically possible variations. A sophisticated production planning is essential, so that the market benefits of a diversified product portfolio are not spoiled by inefficient production processes. A critical issue in this context is the short-term sequencing, determining the order in which models are processed on the assembly system. As part of the “Toyota Production System” the so called level-scheduling has established, which aims at evenly smoothing the material requirements induced by the production sequence over time, so that a just-in-time supply of material is enabled and inventories are minimized. This paper provides a systematic overview on the wide range of publications on level scheduling and controversially discusses its appropriateness for practical applications.     

Siegfried Weischenberg 60 Jahre

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