Money and production, and liquidity trap

We prove the existence of monetary equilibrium in a finite horizon economy with production. We also show that if agents expect the monetary authority to significantly decrease the supply of bank money available for short-term loans in the future, then the economy will fall into a liquidity trap today.     

Time Scales,Wavelet Realized Volatility and Jump Variation: An Empirical Investigation for India

Journal of Quantitative Economics - In this paper we empirically implement concept of wavelet realized volatility with recent advances in wavelet shrinkage literature and try to provide robust...     

Compound gamma,beta and F distributions

Summary In this paper a compound gamma distribution has been derived by compounding a gamma distribution with another gamma distribution. The resulting compound gamma distribution has been reduced to the Beta distributions of the first kind and the second kind and to theF distribution by suitable transformations. This includes theLomax distribution as a special case which enjoys a useful property. Moment estimators for two of its parameters are explicitly obtained, which tend to a bivariate normal distribution. The paper contains expressions for a bivariate probability density function, its conditional expectation, conditional variance and the product moment correlation coefficient. Finally, all the parameters of the compound gamma distribution are explicitly expressed in terms of the functions of the moments of the functions of random variables in two different ways. This note is based on a technical report prepared by the author while he was with the Procter and Gamble Company.     

Occupational Structure and Incidence of Poverty in Indian Towns of Different Sizes

This paper investigates the incidence of poverty in Indian towns and cities of various sizes of population. It also tests the hypothesis that larger towns and cities, because of their size, are capable of supporting more complex economic activities, improving labor productivity, and hence lowering the incidence of poverty. In particular, similar levels of education, ceteris paribus, have a larger impact in bigger conurbations.     

Testing a Hazard Model for the Housing Market in New Orleans

A bstract .   The article presents a search-theoretic approach to investigate the relationship between probability of a sale and market duration in the housing market. Using a hazard model to study duration dependence, the article, on the basis of data from New Orleans, provides empirical evidence that houses do exhibit duration dependence.     

On Ramsey equilibrium: capital ownership pattern and inefficiency

We provide a sufficient condition on the production function under which eventually the most patient household owns the entire capital stock in every Ramsey equilibrium, called the turnpike property. This generalizes the result in the literature which establishes the turnpike property using the capital income monotonicity condition. We then provide an example of a Ramsey equilibrium in which the most patient household reaches a no capital position infinitely often. This is a strong refutation of the turnpike property on Ramsey equilibria. We also show that the constructed Ramsey equilibrium is inefficient in terms of the aggregate consumption stream that it provides.     

The predictive power of yield spread: evidence from wavelet analysis

This paper examines whether the spread between long- and short-terminterest rates contains information about future economic activity in India. Using the yields on securities with maturities ranging from three months to ten years, we construct five different yield spreads at shorter end, longer end, and policy relevant area of the yield curve. We study the predictive power of each of these spreads for output growth within aggregate and time scale framework using wavelet methodology. We find that predictive power holds only at lower frequencies for the spreads which are constructed at shorter end and policy relevant areas of yield curve. However, spreads which are constructed at the longer end of the yield curve do not seem to have predictive information for output growth.     

Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.     

Inside and outside fiat money, gains to trade, and IS-LM

Summary. We build a one-period general equilibrium model with money. Equilibrium exists, and fiat money has positive value, as long as the ratio of outside money to inside money is less than the gains to trade available at autarky. We show that the nominal effects of government fiscal and monetary policy can be completely described by a diagram identical in form to the IS-LM curves introduced by Hicks to describe Keynes' general theory. IS-LM analysis is thus not incompatible with full market clearing, multiple commodities, and heterogeneous households. We show that as the government deficit approaches a finite threshold, hyperinflation sets in (prices converge to infinity and real trade collapses). At the other extreme, if the government surplus is too large, the economy enters a liquidity trap in which nominal GNP sinks and monetary policy is ineffectual. Received: January 2, 2002; revised version: April 8, 2002 Correspondence to: P. Dubey     

Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach

The paper investigates the conditions under which an abstractly given market game will have the property that if there is a continuum of traders then every noncooperative equilibrium is Walrasian. In orther words, we look for a general axiomatization of Cournot's well-known result. Besides some convexity, continuity, and nondegeneracy hypotheses, the crucial axioms are: anonymity (i.e., the names of traders are irrelevant to the market) and aggregation (i.e., the net trade received by a trader depends only on his own action and the mean action of all traders). It is also shown that the same axioms do not guarantee efficiency if there is only a finite number of traders. Some examples are discussed and a notion of strict noncooperative equilibrium for anonymous games is introduced.