Diffusion of integrated reporting,insights and potential avenues for future research

This study reviews the diffusion of integrated reporting (IR) research. The systematic literature review method is used to review the effects of IR at the organisational level, determinants of IR adoption and integrated report quality (IRQ), assurance on IR, economic consequences of IR/IRQ, and research design issues to set agendas for future research. The review covers 119 peer-reviewed IR articles published in 36 journals between 2012 and 2021. It finds that the IR literature is dominated by organisational-level studies, but there is limited research on the economic consequences of IR/IRQ, and the findings are inconclusive to date. Further, the factors that determine IR adoption/IRQ are not conclusive, and there is scarce research on IR assurance. This review contributes to the emerging IR literature and provides valuable insights to the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) in establishing the IR framework as a global reporting norm in practice.     

The Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market: An Intraday Analysis

Using a unique dataset based on daily and hourly high-yieldbond transaction prices, we find the informational efficiencyof corporate bond prices is similar to that of the underlyingstocks. We find that stocks do not lead bonds in reflectingfirm-specific information. We further examine price behavioraround earnings news and find that information is quickly incorporatedinto both bond and stock prices, even at short return horizons.Finally, we find that measures of market quality are no poorerfor the bonds in our sample than for the underlying stocks.     

Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements

Using a large sample of private credit agreements between U.S. publicly traded firms and financial institutions, we show that over 90% of long-term debt contracts are renegotiated prior to their stated maturity. Renegotiations result in large changes to the amount, maturity, and pricing of the contract, occur relatively early in the life of the contract, and are rarely a consequence of distress or default. The accrual of new information concerning the credit quality, investment opportunities, and collateral of the borrower, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations in credit and equity market conditions, are the primary determinants of renegotiation and its outcomes. The terms of the initial contract (e.g., contingencies) also play an important role in renegotiations; by altering the structure of the contract in a state contingent manner, renegotiation is partially controlled by the contractual assignment of bargaining power.     

Monitoring in Multiagent Organizations*

This paper studies how to assign “monitors” to productive agents in order to generate signals about the agents' performance that are most useful from a contracting perspective. We show that if signals generated by the same monitor are negatively (positively) correlated, then the optimal monitoring assignment will be “focused” (“dispersed”). This holds because dispersed monitoring allows the firm to better utilize relative performance evaluation. On the other hand, if each monitor communicates only an aggregated signal to the principal, then focused monitoring is always optimal since aggregation undermines relative performance evaluation. We also study team‐based compensation and randomized monitoring assignments. In particular, we show that the firm can gain from randomizing the monitoring assignment, compared with the optimal linear deterministic contract. Furthermore, under randomization, the conditional expected utility for the agent is higher when the agent is not monitored compared with the case where the agent is monitored. That is, the chance of being monitored serves as a “stick” rather than a “carrot”.     

The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations

We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in the United States and model bankruptcy as a strategic decision. We analyze a firm's choice between liquidation under Chapter 7, renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Our premise is that a financially distressed firm chooses its action in order to minimize the loss in value caused by the well-known over- and under-investment problems. We show that the firm initiates a workout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter 11 when it faces over-investment. Some of the results are: (i) in default, total firm value and equity value increase upon the announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcement of Chapter 11; (ii) firms with shorter maturity of debt are more likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firms that renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firms entering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industries than for firms in growth industries.     

The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations

We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in theUnited States and model bankruptcy as a strategic decision.We analyze a firm's choice between liquidation under Chapter7, renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganizationunder Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Our premise is thata financially distressed firm chooses its action in order tominimize the loss in value caused by the well-known over- andunder-investment problems. We show that the firm initiates aworkout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter11 when it faces over-investment. Some of the results are: (i)in default, total firm value and equity value increase uponthe announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcementof Chapter 11; (ii) firms with shorter maturity of debt aremore likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firmsthat renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firmsentering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industriesthan for firms in growth industries.     

Auditor selection within a business group: evidence from Taiwan

Although auditor selection is well documented in the literature, it is unclear whether group characteristics affect firms’ auditor selection decisions. Generally, a business group is the result of diversification by the core firm. Major decisions of the business group, such as auditor selection, are made by the core firm and influenced by the business group’s characteristics. Using operational and ownership linkages perspectives, this study investigates the determinants of a business group’s member firm engaging the same auditor as its core firm. We employ the input–output relationship of products along a supply chain to construct product vertical relatedness measures between member firms and the core firm, and establish logistic regression models to test our hypotheses. Using a sample of publicly listed business groups in Taiwan from 2000 to 2010, our results suggest that a member firm is more likely to engage the same auditor as its core firm when (1) the core firm engages a Big N auditor, (2) the core firm’s auditor is an industry specialist for both the core firm and its member firm, (3) the degree of vertical relatedness increases, or (4) the controlling shareholders’ deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights increases (hereafter deviation). On the other hand, the likelihood of a member firm engaging the same auditor as its core firm when induced by higher deviation could be offset by the influence of stronger business vertical linkages.     

Comparing different explanations of the volatility trend

We analyze the puzzling behavior of the volatility of individual stock returns over the past few decades. The literature has provided many different explanations to the trend in volatility and this paper tests the viability of the different explanations. Virtually all current theoretical arguments that are provided for the trend in the average level of volatility over time lend themselves to explanations about the difference in volatility levels between firms in the cross-section. We therefore focus separately on the cross-sectional and time-series explanatory power of the different proxies. We fail to find a proxy that is able to explain both dimensions well. In particular, we find that Cao et al. [Cao, C., Simin, T.T., Zhao, J., 2008. Can growth options explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk? Review of Financial Studies 21, 2599-2633] market-to-book ratio tracks average volatility levels well, but has no cross-sectional explanatory power. On the other hand, the low-price proxy suggested by Brandt et al. [Brandt, M.W., Brav, A., Graham, J.R., Kumar, A., 2010. The idiosyncratic volatility puzzle: time trend or speculative episodes. Review of Financial Studies 23, 863-899] has much cross-sectional explanatory power, but has virtually no time-series explanatory power. We also find that the different proxies do not explain the trend in volatility in the period prior to 1995 (R-squared of virtually zero), but explain rather well the trend in volatility at the turn of the Millennium (1995-2005).