Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of “petty corruption” by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic “tracks,” and the information among the participants. Entrepreneurs apply, in sequence, to a “track” of two or more bureaucrats in a prescribed order for approval of their projects. Our first result establishes that in a one-shot situation no project ever gets approved. This result leads us to consider a repeated interaction setting. In that context we characterize in more detail the trigger-strategy equilibria that minimize the social loss due to the system of bribes, and those that maximize the expected total bribe income of the bureaucrats. The results are used to shed some light on two much advocated anti-corruption policies: the single window policy and rotation of bureaucrats.     

Paragons of virtue? Competitor entry and the strategies of incumbents in the U.S. local telecommunications industry

We investigate whether the presence of new competitors has influenced the behaviour of U.S. incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) with respect to pricing, advertising and the extent of diversification that they engage in. This issue is explored empirically, using data for the major local exchange carriers for the years 1994 to 1998. The period straddles periods of both absence and presence of competition in the industry, since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has opened hitherto closed markets to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). While a recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) report on local competition documents vigorous entry during the past years, the market share of the entrants is insubstantial. Our results indicate that the threat provided by market entrants has notably influenced the strategic behaviour of ILECs. The findings show that the incumbent U.S. local operators, particularly the larger ILECs, aggressively protect their profit streams from traditional business. The evidence demonstrates that the ILECs have responded to the Telecommunications Act 1996, and to the threat of market entry it has created, through entry deterrence. This strategic behaviour has been successful in providing ILECs with protection of their monopolistic markets so far.     

Scale efficiencies in US telecommunications: An empirical investigation

In this paper we evaluate scale efficiency patterns of local operating companies in the US telecommunications industry. Scale efficiency is defined as the ability of each company to operate as close to its most productive scale size as possible, and is calculated using data envelopment analysis. The analysis of scale efficiencies is conducted for a set of 39 local operating companies, over six time periods: 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990. During these time periods, several technical and institutional changes took place in the industry which are likely to have had an impact on the abilities of the companies to exploit feasible scale efficiencies, and we find that scale efficiencies have steadily increased over these time periods. We also establish that the Bell operating companies are no different from the independent companies in their ability to be scale efficient; single-state firms are relatively more scale efficient; line digitization, during the periods studied, has not significantly impacted scale efficiency; and firms belonging to multi-company parents are more scale efficient. Additionally, policy regime changes, such as the introduction of intra-LATA toll market competition and incentive regulation schemes, have positively impacted firms' abilities to attain scale efficiency, while micro-segment competition in local markets have, so far, not had the expected impact.     

A case study of the industrial organization theory of direct foreign investment

Conclusion This paper examines the industrial organization theory of DFI by means of a case study of the electronic calculator industry. The investigation is done by examining the relevant product, firm and industry characteristics. We began by focusing on and identifying the technological advances in electronic calculators and the firms responsible for those advances, to determine whether DFI coincided with technological superiority. The evidence presented shows that U.S. foreign investment in electronic calculators became significant during the third phase, when the U.S. firms gained technological leadership in electronic calculator production. The firms which enjoyed this technological leadership are the ones that initiated DFI. Foreign investment activities in electronic calculators were facilitated by a gradual trend toward a concentration of the industry structure in favor of the investors. In some cases, investors were large international firms to begin with. Thus, we can conclude that the industrial organization theory of DFI is supported by the experience of the electronic calculator industry. The fact that the investors themselves generally de-emphasized the cost consideration and emphasized the market potential as motivating factors in initiating DFI ventures provides further credence to this finding. Since the investors had something unique to offer and enjoyed sufficient market power to assume the risk of initiating foreign production to exploit this unique advantage in a potentially large market, they were least concerned about the cost of production. However, the cost factor played an important role behind the DFI in developing countries.     

THE PRICING OF JOB CHARACTERISTICS WHEN MARKETS DO NOT CLEAR: THEORY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS*

This article examines nonsequential search when jobs vary with respect to nonpecuniary characteristics. In the presence of frictions in the labor market, the equilibrium job distribution need not show evidence of compensating wage differentials. The model also generates several pervasive features of labor markets: unemployment and vacancies, apparent discrimination, and market segmentation. When workers are homogeneous, restrictions on the range of job offers decrease welfare and cannot reduce unemployment. However, when workers have heterogeneous preferences, such restrictions may lower unemployment, and can even lead to a Pareto improvement in welfare. We consider the impact of policies banning discrimination and regulating working conditions.     

Periodic and chaotic programs of optimal intertemporal allocation in an aggregative model with wealth effects

Summary We examine a discrete-time aggregative model of discounted dynamic optimization where the felicity function depends on both consumption and capital stock. The need for studying such models has been stressed in the theory of optimal growth and also in the economics of natural resources. We identify conditions under which the optimal program is monotone. In our framework, the optimal program can exhibit cyclic behavior for all discount factors close to one. We also present an example to show that our model can exhibit optimal behavior which is chaotic in both topological and ergodic senses.We would like to thank V. Bala, J. Benhabib, P. Dasgupta, R. Day, L. W. McKenzie, K. Nishimura, S. Roy, and a referee of this journal for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Research support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Profitability, productivity and price recovery patterns in the U.S. telecommunications industry

We undertake a study where we examine changes in the profitability, productivity and price recovery of firms in the U.S. telecommunications industry over a sixteen-year period. We assess the performance of thirty-three major companies in the local-exchange sector over six time periods 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990, using a performance analysis model which disaggregates the profitability measure into two components: productivity and price recovery. We demonstrate the computation of performance using this technique. Our study indicates that the opening up of markets has had a significant impact on different dimensions of performance in the telecommunications industry, also validating a number of theoretical assumptions about the impact that industry changes are expected to have on firms.