Optimal Local Exchange Carrier Size

Optimal firm size and patterns of returns to scaleamong the local exchange companies in the U.S.telecommunications industry are estimated for theyears: 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990. Theindependent companies display increasing returns toscale, while the Baby Bells display constant ordecreasing returns to scale. The independentcompanies operate at a scale smaller than optimalsize, while the Baby Bells operate at a scale greaterthan optimal size. Efficiencies can be gained byindustry restructuring, by allowing independents toexpand their size while the Baby Bells can bedownsized to create smaller units.     

On the determinants of non-market strategy: The separations mechanism and cost shifting in the telecommunications industry

This study examines the relationship between performance levels and the levels of cross-subsidy attained by local exchange carriers in the United States telecommunications industry. These cross-subsidies have been obtained by firms via their engagement in a separations mechanism, based on a cost allocation process, which telecommunications sector regulatory authorities use. Non-market strategies have assumed primacy in the activities of several sectors world-wide. Thus, understanding non-market strategic choices is important in the analysis of firms’ behavior and performance. Active engagement in the separations process is an important non-market strategy in the telecommunications industry, as a firm relatively successful in this activity can gain large cross-subsidies. The analysis establishes that less profitable firms obtain greater cross-subsidies. Once the profitability variable is decomposed into its two main components, which are productivity and price recovery, the impact of the profitability variable reduces. Firms which are relatively unproductive, as well as those unable to recover higher output prices, obtain relatively greater cross-subsidies. These results are inconsistent with the postulates of the strategic cost-allocation and behavior literatures but are consistent with x-inefficiency and rent-seeking perspectives of firms’ strategic actions.     

The Role of Current Account Balance in Forecasting the US Equity Premium: Evidence From a Quantile Predictive Regression Approach

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the current account balance can help in forecasting the quarterly S&P500-based equity premium out-of-sample. We consider an out-of-sample period of 1970:Q3 to 2014:Q4, with a corresponding in-sample period of 1947:Q2 to 1970:Q2. We employ a quantile predictive regression model. The quantile-based approach is more informative relative to any linear model, as it investigates the ability of the current account to forecast the entire conditional distribution of the equity premium, rather than being restricted to just the conditional-mean. In addition, we employ a recursive estimation of both the conditional-mean and quantile predictive regression models over the out-of-sample period which allows for time-varying parameters in the forecast evaluation part of the sample for both of these models. Our results indicate that unlike as suggested by the linear (mean-based) predictive regression model, the quantile regression model shows that the (changes in the) real current account balance contains significant out-of-sample information when the stock market is performing poorly (below the quantile value of 0.3), but not when the market is in normal to bullish modes (quantile value above 0.3). This result seems to be intuitive in the sense that, when the markets are performing average to well, that is performing around the median and above of the conditional distribution of the equity premium, the excess return is inherently a random-walk and hence, no information, from a predictor (changes in the real current account balance) is able to predict the equity premium.     

INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISM DESIGN AND FIRM GROWTH: EXPERIENCES FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR REGULATION

ABSTRACT**: This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on firm growth among the population of local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications industry between 1988 and 2001. The results show that the rate of return method and other intermediate incentive schemes have had a negative impact on firm growth. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes had a positive and significant impact on firms’ growth. These results highlight the importance of proper and appropriate incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to strive for superior performance.     

PATTERNS OF TRADE AND GROWTH UNDER INCREASING RETURNS: ESCAPE FROM THE POVERTY TRAP*

We consider a two-sector model of intertemporal resource allocation in which the investment good sector exhibits an initial phase of increasing returns in production. The economy maximizes a discounted sum of one period utilities derived from the consumption good. If it is autarkic, it may face a poverty trap from which it cannot escape even if it follows an optimal policy. If it engages in trade with the outside world as a price taker, it may escape from the trap. The optimal patterns of production and trade are analysed for such an economy.     

Estimating the stationary distribution of a Markov chain

Summary. Let be a Markov chain with a unique stationary distribution . Let h be a bounded measurable function. Write and . This paper explores conditions for the consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimate of of assuming the existence of a solution to the Poisson equation . Our framework covers the case of nonirreducible Markov chains arising in many growth models in economics. Received: October 8, 2001; revised version: April 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Thanks are due to Professors Rabi Bhattacharya, Nicholas Kiefer and Timothy Vogelsang on an earlier draft for helpful conversations, and a referee for insightful comments. Correspondence to: M.Majumdar     

Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary

This note reports part of a larger study of “petty corruption“ by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are “socially efficient”, and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrats’ bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.     

Chaotic tatonnement

Summary Debreu's theorem on excess demand functions is used to demonstrate the possibilities of ergodic and topological chaos in a discrete-time tatonnement process with only two goods. The result is in sharp contrast with the well-known result of Arrow and Hurwicz on system stability in a continuous time model of price adjustment with two commodities.We would like to thank Professors Jess Benhabib, Richard Day, John Guckenheimer, Philip Holmes, Nicholas Kiefer and Tapan Mitra.     

Corporate borrowing and profitability in India

This paper examines effects of different types of corporate borrowing on firm profitability in India. We show that in contrast to the conventional thinking on the importance of monitored debt in determining firm performance, what matters more is arm's‐length lending in the form of fixed deposits in influencing firm profitability. We argue that the strategic implications of fixed deposits can be mainly attributed to the fact that they are both unsecured and privately held, which make the creditors associated with this type of debt the most likely to monitor firms' performance. The results suggest that debt structure matters, and it is important to take into account institutional differences and the heterogeneity of debt in the analysis of capital structure on firm performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.