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121.
Edward L. Glaeser Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto Andrei Shleifer 《Journal of Economic Growth》2007,12(2):77-99
Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism
explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic
participation, including voting and organizing. In the battle between democracy and dictatorship, democracy has a wide potential
base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders. Dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower base.
As education raises the benefits of civic engagement, it raises participation in support of a broad-based regime (democracy)
relative to that in support of a narrow-based regime (dictatorship). This increases the likelihood of successful democratic
revolutions against dictatorships, and reduces that of successful anti-democratic coups. 相似文献
122.
123.
Competition is the basic concept for both industrial organisation theory and institutional economics. Transition economies, including Russia, are natural laboratories allowing us to trace the emergence of competition, the influence of competition on the conduct of market participants, the relationship between competition and market structure and the institutional foundation of competition. This article provides a summary of the results of empirical studies in the above area. We try to explain some puzzles concerning the influence of competition on the conduct of Russian market participants and interpret the results in the framework of institutional and industrial economics. Overall, the results of empirical studies can be generalised as follows. Competition in Russian markets has been gaining momentum over the last 15 years. The results of empirical studies have confirmed the assumption that competition is an incentive for active restructuring of privatised enterprises. Many of the data collected are evidence in favour of the endogenous market structure approach. From the institutional viewpoint, the history of the evolution of Russia's transition economy shows interdependence between private property and competition: better protection of property rights is a precondition for the development of competition. At the same time, the model of corporate governance that allows the property rights of private owners to be protected in the Russian institutional environment restricts organisational diversity and therefore competition in Russian markets. 相似文献
124.
THE TAKEOVER WAVE OF THE 1980s 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
125.
A Survey of Corporate Governance 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world. 相似文献
126.
Andrei G. Shulgin 《International economic journal》2013,27(4):631-668
ABSTRACTStabilizing monetary policy in a small open economy is constrained by the open economy trilemma. In this paper, we investigate whether foreign exchange market interventions and the Central Bank’s credit rationing at the official rate (CROR) may soften this constraint and improve the results of monetary policy for different monetary regimes. We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model appropriate for analyzing the forward-looking behavior of households facing non-zero probabilities of losing access to financial market and CROR. We have found significant credit rationing in the quarterly Russian data of 2001:Q1–2014:Q2. The probability of losing access to financial market and the probability of CROR are estimated as 22% and 66%, respectively. Using Russian data of 2001:Q1–2014:Q2 we demonstrate that CROR provoked forward-looking activity in financial market, which led to more Ruble devaluation in the crises of 2008–2009. It improved poor countercyclical performance of two Russian monetary policy rules, whereas made small effect on welfare. Welfare maximization exercises reveal a tradeoff between low-inflation and high-welfare solutions and favor of a floating exchange rate regime. We found the optimal value of the probability of CROR in both exchange rate-based and Taylor rule-based models but resulting improvement in welfare is very small. 相似文献