Risk sensitivity in distribution channel partnerships: implications for manufacturer return policies

The manufacturer return policy is widely regarded as a means for channel partners to share risk. However, existing studies of this popular institutional practice use frameworks that assume risk-neutrality of all parties.This report analyzes how sensitivity to risk affects both sides of the manufacturer-retailer relationship under various scenarios of strategic power, and how these dynamics are altered by a return policy. A key finding is that the penalty for ignoring risk sensitivity can be substantial. This will suggest an informational motive affecting the use of return policies, a consequence of the potential difficulty of inferring another party’s risk sensitivity and the positive incentive for deception.     

Influences on Trade Union Organizing Effectiveness in Britain

Do British trade unions vary in their effectiveness in maintaining organization and membership in workplaces where they have an established bargaining presence? Do highly developed national union recruitment strategies and innovation in recruitment strategy boost consolidatory organizing and recruitment effectiveness (CORE)? Results suggest that (1) there is some variation in internal organising effectiveness between unions, and (2) national union innovation in recruitment policy is positively associated with internal organizing effectiveness where unions organize blue‐collar workers, but negatively associated with internal organizing effectiveness where unions organize white‐collar workers.     

A statistical treatment of the problem of division

The problem of division is one of the most important problems in the emergence of probability. It has been long considered solved from a probabilistic viewpoint. However, we do not find the solution satisfactory. In this study, the problem is recasted as a statistical problem. The outcomes of matches of the game are considered as an infinitely exchangeable random sequence and predictors/estimators are constructed in light of de Finetti representation theorem. Bounds of the estimators are derived over wide classes of priors (mixing distributions). We find that, although conservative, the classical solutions are justifiable by our analysis while the plug-in estimates are too optimistic for the winning player.Acknowledgement. The authors would like to thank the referees for the insightful and informative suggestions and, particularly, for referring us to important references.Supported by NSC-88-2118-M-259-009.Supported in part by NSC 89-2118-M-259-012.Received August 2002     

The Structure and Management of Alliances: Syndication in the Venture Capital Industry*

abstract Syndicates are a form of inter‐firm alliance in which two or more venture capital firms co‐invest in an investee firm and share a joint pay‐off. Syndication is a significant part of the venture capital market yet little research has been conducted into the process of structuring syndicate deals and the management of syndicates following deal completion. This paper analyses the neglected issues concerning the structuring and management of syndicated venture capital investments from the perspectives of both lead and non‐lead syndicate members using two surveys of venture capital firms and examination of syndication documents. Lead investors typically have larger equity stakes and the syndicated investment agreement is a document that enshrines the rights of participants rather than specifying behaviour. Contractual arrangements typically serve as a back drop to relationships as non‐legal sanctions are important and decisions are typically reached following discussion and consensus, but lead venture capital investors’ residual and specific powers are important in ensuring timely decision‐making. The findings extend previous work on alliances by emphasizing the importance of non‐legal sanctions, especially reputation effects, in mitigating opportunistic behaviour by dominant equity holders. The paper also adds to the limited research on the dynamics of alliances by highlighting the role of repeat syndicates.     

Do Foreign and Domestic Venture Capital Firms Differ in Their Monitoring of Investees?

This paper addresses an important omission in the venture capital literature by comparing the monitoring behavior of foreign and domestic venture capital firms (VCs). Evidence from 31 VCs in India (84% response) shows foreign VCs were significantly more likely than domestic VCs to be involved at the strategic level while domestic VCs were significantly more active at the operational level. Foreign VCs placed significantly more emphasis on restrictions on additional borrowings. Domestic VCs placed significantly more emphasis on specifying certain accounting policies while foreign VCs placed significantly more emphasis on monthly management accounts. Domestic VCs place significantly more emphasis on industry specialist board membership.