The earliness of exporting and creeping sclerosis? The moderating effects of firm age,size and centralization

By using a sample of 644 manufacturing firms in four EU countries and five regions, we investigate the earliness/exporting relationship. Firstly, we examine the firm’s ability to retain LAN over time as it gets older and bigger. Secondly, we examine the role played by the firm’s decision-making structure. Our results reveal that exporting sclerosis does set in, as age and size of the firm significantly and negatively affect the earliness/exporting relationship. In addition, however, we find that centralization plays a role in the sclerotic effects of size (though only weakly for age), exacerbating their moderating effects on the earliness/exporting relationship. Our study claims to contribute to internationalization research by advancing the idea that LAN is not path-dependent but subject to liabilities. Beyond age and size, we add the more nuanced “liability of centralization” to boundary conditions for retaining LAN. Theoretical and managerial implications emerge.     

Measuring the cost of economic fluctuations with preferences that rationalize the equity premium

Abstract Lucas (2003) argues that the potential welfare gains from stabilizing the business cycle are small. In fact, he shows that the benefits of eliminating all economic fluctuations are small, especially when compared with the potential gains from other reforms. His estimates are obtained using standard preferences. I show that a model consistent with observed data on asset returns leads to very different conclusions. Calibrating preferences to observed asset market data raises the estimated welfare gains from completely eliminating aggregate fluctuations by approximately two orders of magnitude. Most of the gains, however, come from the elimination of low‐frequency contributions.     

Exchange Rate Determination: An Application of a Monetary Model for Brazil

The goal of this paper is to test a variant of the monetary exchange rate determination model, described by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), for the Brazilian economy in the recent period. The model starts with the Cagan (The Journal of Political Economy, 66(4):303–328, 1958) money demand, which is complemented by the hypotheses of purchase power parity (PPP) and uncovered interest parity (UIP). We used monthly data of exchange rate, GDP, interest rate for Brazil, and U.S. interest rate and inflation as proxies for international variables. We applied cointegration tests to identify a long run relationship among the variables. The estimated error correction model offers an exchange rate determination model in the short run. Due to potential endogeneity of some variables, GMM was applied to estimate a long-run model of exchange rate determination. The forecasting results of both estimatives were compared with a random walk approach. The results point to the existence of a long and short run equilibrium Real/dollar exchange rate using the structural model, which may be the achievement of this paper.     

Relational consumption and nonlinear dynamics in an overlapping generations model

In this paper, we show that incorporating the relational dimension into an otherwise standard OLG model and focusing on dynamic leisure externalities leads to dramatically different predictions. Here, we show that when the old perceive private and relational consumption as substitutable goods, a series of interesting dynamic outcomes—such as local indeterminacy, nonlinear phenomena (including chaotic dynamics) and even multiple equilibria with global indeterminacy—may arise. We also draw some welfare implications and relate them to the well-known “happiness paradox” arising within contemporary affluent societies.     

Alienation in capitalist society

In a recent paper in this journal Charles B. Saunders et al. argue that corporations have no social responsibility regarding alienation in the workplace in that there is no significant degree of alienation in the workplace, at least in white collar and management level positions in corporate America.Contrary to Saunders et al., this paper defines the concept of alienation. Having done that, it proceeds to show that the argument Saunders et al. make flounders on logical grounds. I conclude that Saunders et al. provide no evidence for the claim that alienation is lacking (in any degree) in corporate America. J. Angelo Corlett is a fellow in the Philosophy Department at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He has published papers in the Journal of Business Ethics, Business & Professional Ethics Journal, Public Affairs Quarterly and the American Psychologist. His areas of specialization are Social/Political Philosophy, Ethics and Value Theory. He is currently editing a book on Rawls and Nozick, and he is also doing research on analytical marxism. The former of these projects is funded by a research grant awarded to him by the University of California, Santa Barbara.     

Are we at the eve of a new long-term expansion induced by technological change?

Referring to the long-waves theory, the article shows that western economies now seem to be in the recovery phase of the long stagnation which started in 1974 and that, probably, a new long wave will begin in this decade. The main factor justifying this hypothesis is the technological revolution in computer and information technologies initiated in the 1970s, which reproduces the long-waves mechanism.

Two other elements corroborate the above assessment on the long-term prospects: 1) the recovery in profitability at the beginning of the 1980s, an evolution that usually characterizes the recovery phase of the long stagnation; 2) the unusual length of the prosperity phase of the business cycle in the 1980s. Of course, this aspect plays a subsidiary role with respect to the two others mentioned above. However, taken in conjunction with them, it reinforces the opinion that, underlying recent favourable performances, there is a change in the long-term trend.     

A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption

In this paper, firms are randomly matched from a continuous population to play a public contracting game (say, building a bridge). Price is given, so firms compete in quality; the higher the quality offer, the less the profit. According to the official rules of the contest, the firm bidding the highest quality wins; however, we consider the possibility that firms attempt to corrupt the public officer in charge in order to be sure to win even if bidding a lower quality (quality bids are not publicly observable). Whether or not firms attempt to corrupt depends on how rewarding corruption is w. r. t. being honest. Within a dynamic evolutionary framewark, we investigate how social conventions with or without corruption are established under various assumptions concerning the corruptability of the public officer and the possibility of an external monitoring of the officer's decisions by a super partes authority.     

Understanding multiemployer health and welfare plan financial statements

The trustees of a health and welfare plan may choose to delegate monitoring of the plan's financial operations. Still, it is important that they have a basic understanding of welfare plan financial statements.