Risk Attitudes of Children and Adults: Choices Over Small and Large Probability Gains and Losses

In this paper we examine how risk attitudes change with age. We present participants from age 5 to 64 with choices between simple gambles and the expected value of the gambles. The gambles are over both gains and losses, and vary in the probability of the non-zero payoff. Surprisingly, we find that many participants are risk seeking when faced with high-probability prospects over gains and risk averse when faced with small-probability prospects. Over losses we find the exact opposite. Children's choices are consistent with the underweighting of low-probability events and the overweighting of high-probability ones. This tendency diminishes with age, and on average adults appear to use the objective probability when evaluating risky prospects.     

Inflation dynamics with search frictions: A structural econometric analysis

The New Keynesian Phillips curve explains inflation dynamics as being driven by current and expected future real marginal costs. In competitive labor markets, the labor share can serve as a proxy for the latter. In this paper, we study the role of real marginal cost components implied by search frictions in the labor market. We construct a measure of real marginal costs by using newly available labor market data on worker finding rates. Over the business cycle, the measure is highly correlated with the labor share. Estimates of the Phillips curve using generalized method of moments reveal that the marginal cost measure remains significant, and that inflation dynamics are mainly driven by the forward-looking component. Bayesian estimation of the full New Keynesian model with search frictions helps us disentangle which shocks are driving the economy to generate the observed unit labor cost dynamics. We find that mark-up shocks are the dominant force in labor market fluctuations.     

Under the microscope: An experimental look at board transparency and director monitoring behavior

Research Summary: It is well known in corporate governance scholarship that independent directors differ in the vigilance with which they monitor corporate insiders. This difference depends largely on whether independent directors are concerned more with their public reputation or with their prospects in the director labor market. The explanation for this difference depends on an assumption of information asymmetry, however. In the present study, we relax the assumption of information asymmetry to examine how boardroom transparency affects directors’ monitoring behavior. Using a randomized experimental study of actual independent directors, we find that boardroom transparency amplifies the effect of directors’ inclinations toward either active or passive monitoring, with directors inclined toward vigilant monitoring becoming even more vigilant, and directors inclined toward passive monitoring becoming even more passive. Managerial Summary: In most advanced economies, the board's internal decision processes are either undisclosed or disclosed only to a very limited extent. It remains unknown, then, whether directors would behave differently if their behaviors were made public. We find that when their actions are disclosed to the public, directors concerned with their public reputations become more vigilant, whereas those concerned with their prospects for additional board seats become more passive in monitoring corporate insiders. Whereas regulatory bodies and corporate governance watchdogs have recently advocated for greater disclosure of the boardroom decision‐making process, our study suggests that such mandatory disclosure requirements can exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the problem of passive director monitoring.     

Towards a theory of ecosystems

Research Summary: The recent surge of interest in “ecosystems” in strategy research and practice has mainly focused on what ecosystems are and how they operate. We complement this literature by considering when and why ecosystems emerge, and what makes them distinct from other governance forms. We argue that modularity enables ecosystem emergence as it allows a set of distinct yet interdependent organizations to coordinate without full hierarchical fiat. We show how ecosystems address multilateral dependences based on various types of complementarities—supermodular or unique, unidirectional or bidirectional—which determine the ecosystem's value‐add. We argue that at the core of ecosystems lie nongeneric complementarities, and the creation of sets of roles that face similar rules. We conclude with implications for mainstream strategy and suggestions for future research. Managerial Summary: We consider what makes ecosystems different from other business constellations, including markets, alliances, or hierarchically managed supply chains. Ecosystems, we posit, are interacting organizations, enabled by modularity, not hierarchically managed, bound together by the nonredeployability of their collective investment elsewhere. Ecosystems add value as they allow managers to coordinate their multilateral dependence through sets of roles that face similar rules, thus obviating the need to enter into customized contractual agreements with each partner. We explain how different types of complementarities (unique or supermodular, generic or specific, uni‐ or bi‐directional) shape ecosystems and offer a “theory of ecosystems” that can explain what they are, when they emerge, and why alignment occurs. Finally, we outline the critical factors affecting ecosystem emergence, evolution, and success—or failure.     

Being the CEO's boss: An examination of board chair orientations

Research summary: Scholars have traditionally conceptualized board leadership as a dichotomous construct. A combined CEO and board chair position is interpreted as reflecting a more collaborative approach to corporate governance, whereas separate positions are interpreted as ensuring greater board control. I challenge this conceptualization and posit that a separate board chair can be oriented toward collaboration as well as—or in place of—control. I analyze newly available data from corporate proxy statements to identify these two board chair orientations and test competing perspectives on how they impact profitability growth in a sample of S&P 500 firms. The results indicate that board leadership is a more nuanced phenomenon than the extant literature would suggest . Managerial summary: What is the role of the board chair when not the CEO ? Corporate governance experts assert the board chair's role is to monitor and control the CEO . Yet, board chairs often play another, more collaborative role. Board chairs frequently provide advice and guidance to CEOs and relieve CEOs of board leadership burdens, enabling the CEOs to focus on their primary responsibilities. In this study, I examine the effect of board chair orientations on financial performance and find that, as with separating or joining the CEO and board chair positions, the profitability implications of the selected orientation are far from universal. Board chairs must consider their firm's performance context in order to get the most out of a particular approach to being the CEO 's boss . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Questionnaire based mortality assessment: an exploratory analysis of NHANES III

The need for speed and efficiency in life insurance underwriting has never been greater. With increasing acquisition costs, the need for timeliness to complete the sales process, and the need for accurate mortality prediction a great deal of resources have been devoted to the development of non-traditional underwriting processes and criteria in hopes of streamlining the process. In this paper, we describe an exploratory analysis of mortality linked data from the US NHANES III study. Our goal for this analysis was to identify mortality predictors that would be good candidates for further investigation in insurance applicants, especially in the context of simplified issue products which focus on younger age applicants. We identified aerobic exercise, dental health, alcohol beverage type and quantity, and dietary components and patterns as factors that may hold promise as mortality predictors in persons age 17-65. Though the limitations of this analysis preclude the immediate use of these factors as underwriting criteria, it does appear that several of these hold promise, and should be tested in an insurance application context. Focus groups, market testing, or even insertion as non-actionable questions in a subset of applications may be ways to collect further data on them.     

Determining the optimal market structure using near-zero intelligence traders

We evaluate an agent-based model featuring near-zero-intelligence traders operating in a call market with a wide range of trading rules governing the determination of prices, which orders are executed as well as a range of parameters regarding market intervention by specialists and the presence of informed traders. We optimize these trading rules using a population-based incremental learning algorithm seeking to maximize the trading volume. Our results suggest markets should choose a large tick size and ensure only a small fraction of traders are informed about the order book. The effect of trading rules regarding the determination of prices, priority rules, and specialist intervention, we find to have an ambiguous effect on the outcome.