The impact of formal processes for market information acquisition and utilization on the performance of Chinese new ventures

The authors examine the performance impact of formal market information processes. Specifically, a theoretical model is developed that hypothesizes that formal processes for market information acquisition and utilization have direct and positive main effects on new venture success and is then tested using a sample of 222 new ventures located in China. Findings indicate that new venture success is positively correlated with the use of formal processes for market information acquisition and use. Moreover, the relative importance of formal processes to the acquisition and use of market information depends on whether the new venture serves an emerging or established market. In particular, the impact of formal processes for information acquisition is higher among new ventures that serve emerging markets. In contrast, the impact of formal processes for information use is higher among new ventures that serve established markets. We present managerial implications of our results. For example, a new venture with a strong market orientation can respond quickly to emerging marketplace needs, and can even seize the advantage from incumbents. If it is in an emerging market, however, the new venture management team should strive to excel at information acquisition; in an established market, it is important for the management team to excel at information utilization.     

Bias in estimates of discrimination and default in mortgage lending: The effects of simultaneity and self-selection

The common practices of estimating single-equation models of mortgage rejection to test for discrimination in mortgage markets or single-equation ex ante mortgage default equations to validate underwriting criteria produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. This is due to problems of simultaneous equations bias which arise because, in a world of imperfect information, mortgage terms are not exogenous to the rejection or default decision. In addition, mortgage default estimates are also subject to selection bias. Monte Carlo experiments are used to study the nature and extent of likely bias in single-equation estimation results. We find that rejection equation estimates indicate discrimination when none exists and that estimated coefficients of mortgage terms, such as the loan-to-value ratio, are also subject to significant bias in both rejection and default equations.     

State lotteries and externalities to their participants

The degree of participation in state lotteries can either increase or decrease expected returns. It is theoretically possible for unfair bets to become more than fair as participation in lotteries changes. In addition, the purchase of every combination of numbers can be more than a fair bet and such a purchase may increase the expected return to other lottery players.