Population, consumption and resources: ethical issues.

This article offers several models that test concepts of optimum population and consumption: classical or utilitarian models, contractual models, and generation-relative ethical models. This article is based on a lecture presented in August 1995, at a conference organized by the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences. It is posited that classical utilitarianism casts the optimum population and consumption problem as a Genesis Problem. The authors argue that the Genesis problem is the wrong problem to study because there are no actual people. The Genesis problem asks how many people there ought to be ideally at what living standards. The unborn are not a class of people, just as mud on a river bank is not a mud hut. Actual persons and potential persons are categorically different. Actual persons have a claim that potential persons do not have. An overall ethical ordering over alternatives can only be conceived for each generation of actual people. The ethical point of view inevitably changes over time. For example, a generation in the first period consumes what they are given to consume by the older generation. In the second period, the younger generation is now the older generation who decide how many children to have and how to share nonstorable, all purpose consumption goods among themselves and future generations. Procreation is a means of making one's values durable. Human development is unfair. Those who live later benefit from the labor of their predecessors without paying the same price. Procreation and ecological preservation are a matter of ethics.     

A “matching auction” for targets with heterogeneous bidders

When potential bidders for a target firm are heterogeneous, standard auction methods for selling the firm are not optimal, as they treat the bidders symmetrically. In a two-bidder contest, one way to discriminate against the stronger bidder is to impose an order of moves. A simple “matching auction” can achieve this objective, in which the “strong” bidder is asked to make a first and final offer, and the other bidder is asked to match this bid. We consider two sources of bidder heterogeneity in a common-value setting: differences in initial toeholds, and asymmetric effects of the bidders' private signals on value. The matching auction results in a higher expected selling price than the standard auctions when the asymmetry is sufficiently large. Other properties of the matching auction are discussed.     

Are People Ashamed of Paying with Food Stamps?

We evaluate the claim that marginal ‘welfare stigma’causes a dollar of food to provide less utility if bought with food stamps rather than cash, and that this explains why, in the United States, the marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamps is larger than that out of income. This hypothesis has been advanced to explain the so‐called ‘cash‐out puzzle’: the empirical observation that the marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamps is much higher than that out of income, even for households who spend some cash income on food. We develop a theoretical model to identify the restrictions imposed by the hypothesis that the puzzle is indeed caused by such stigma. Using data from San Diego County, we find that two of the three predictions of the marginal stigma model are violated. These results cast serious doubt on the marginal stigma hypothesis.     

Feasibility Criteria in Monetary Trade

Consider the problem of how agents in a pure exchange competitive framework acquire their desired bundles of goods through a process of decentralized trade, i.e., in the absence of an auctioneer. Since the agents' wants are not mutually coincident, a medium of exchange is necessary to conduct trade. One relevant question to ask in this context is what property a commodity should possess in order for it to be eligible as a medium of exchange? This note discovers one such attribute, that the good be included in the final consumption vector of each agent. The condition is an improvement over an earlier one due to Ostroy and Starr (1974) which requires each agent to have large quantities of the medium of exchange in her/his initial endowment of commodities. JEL Classification Numbers: D50, E42.     

Lindahl Pricing, Nonrival Infrastructure, and Endogenous Growth

The paper constructs a model of endogenous growth where infrastructure is an accumulable stock generating a nonrival input service. A typical market economy cannot attain the socially optimum steady state path, since nonrivalry precludes competitive pricing of infrastructure. However, there exist agent specific prices for the infrastructural service, a price for the infrastructural stock, a rate of interest, and a subsidy for the representative household that can sustain the optimal path as a dynamic Lindahl equilibrium. The rates of return from physical and infrastructural capital equal the rate of interest. Investment programs are socially optimum. The government's budget is balanced.     

Sampling-based Randomised Designs for Causal Inference under the Potential Outcomes Framework

We establish the inferential properties of the mean-difference estimator for the average treatment effect in randomised experiments where each unit in a population is randomised to one of two treatments and then units within treatment groups are randomly sampled. The properties of this estimator are well understood in the experimental design scenario where first units are randomly sampled and then treatment is randomly assigned but not for the aforementioned scenario where the sampling and treatment assignment stages are reversed. We find that the inferential properties of the mean-difference estimator under this experimental design scenario are identical to those under the more common sample-first-randomise-second design. This finding will bring some clarifications about sampling-based randomised designs for causal inference, particularly for settings where there is a finite super-population. Finally, we explore to what extent pre-treatment measurements can be used to improve upon the mean-difference estimator for this randomise-first-sample-second design. Unfortunately, we find that pre-treatment measurements are often unhelpful in improving the precision of average treatment effect estimators under this design, unless a large number of pre-treatment measurements that are highly associative with the post-treatment measurements can be obtained. We confirm these results using a simulation study based on a real experiment in nanomaterials.     

Measuring technical efficiency and shadow price of water pollutants for the leather industry in India: a directional distance function approach

Journal of Regulatory Economics - This paper measures the cost of reducing pollution from the Kanpur leather industry which is a prime source of pollution in India’s largest river basin of...     

Determinants of a Digital Divide in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Spatial Econometric Analysis of Cell Phone Coverage

This paper investigates the determinants of disparities in coverage by cell telephone systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. It uses a spatially disaggregated probit for over 990,000 grid cells with adjustments for spatial autocorrelation. Determinants include potential market size (population); cost factors related to accessibility (elevation, slope, distance from a main road, and distance from the nearest large city); and competition policy. Estimates indicate significant results for the supply–demand variables, and very strong results for the competition policy index.Simulations suggest that a generalized improvement in competition policy could lead to huge improvements in cell phone area coverage, and to an overall coverage increase of nearly 100%.     

Infinite-horizon competitive programs are optimal

For infinite-horizon optimal-growth problems the standard result in the literature says that a program is optimal if and only if associated with it is a sequence of present-value prices at which the program satisfies (i) a set of myopic competitive conditions, and (ii) an asymptotic transversality condition. The principal result of this paper points out the interesting and surprising fact that at least for a class of multisector models where the production side is described by a simple linear model, and there are some limiting primary factors, the competitive conditions alone characterize an optimal program.