Does easy availability of cash affect corruption? Evidence from a panel of countries

Using annual panel data of 54 countries for the period 2005-14, we examine whether currency in circulation, both aggregate and in large denominations, affects the level of corruption in a country. Standard panel data models suggest that the ratios of (i) aggregate currency in circulation to M1 and, (ii) large denomination banknotes to M1 are both statistically significant determinants of corruption. Tests for reverse causality within a panel Granger framework reveal a uni-directional causality of corruption with the first variable, but a bi-directional one with the second. These findings suggest that a limitation in the supply of high-denomination banknotes, inter alia, could be a tool to fight corruption, and bring to the fore the important role of payment systems, extending an earlier study by Goel and Mehrotra (2012). The results also highlight that, along with the government, the central bank of an economy can also play an important role in the fight against corruption.     

Aging and Productivity Among Judges: Some Empirical Evidence from the High Court of Australia

A number of studies have shown that productivity declines with age in a wide range of activities. Based on United States experience, it has been argued that one profession that might be an exception to this phenomenon is the judiciary. This study explores the relationship between aging and productivity for a sample of retired judges of the High Court of Australia. The High Court provides a useful test for the hypothesis that older judges are more productive because, in contrast to the United States, most, if not all, judges write their own judgments. Thus, ghostwriting does not cloud the issue of judicial productivity. The findings support the life-cycle hypothesis, which suggests the age-citation profile should increase, reach a peak and then decline as judges get closer to retirement. Thus, the results are consistent with the view that the productivity of judges over their working lives follows a similar pattern to other professions such as academia.     

The role of corporate social responsibility in strengthening multiple stakeholder relationships: A field experiment

This research relied on a field experiment involving a real-world instance of corporate philanthropy to shed light on both the scope and limitations of the strategic returns to corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, the authors demonstrate that the impact of CSR in the real world is not only less pervasive than has been previously acknowledged but also more multifaceted than has been previously conceptualized. The findings indicated that contingent on CSR awareness, which was rather low, stakeholders did react positively to the focal company not only in the consumption domain but in the employment and investment domains as well. Stakeholder attributions regarding the genuineness of the company’s motives moderated these effects. Sankar Sen (sankar_sen@baruch.cuny.edu) is a professor of marketing at the Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York. He received his Ph.D. in marketing in 1993 from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. His research focuses on consumer decision making. He is interested, more specifically, in consumer reactions to company actions, particularly in the domain of CSR. His research has appeared inCalifornia Management Review, Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Economic Theory, and others. C. B. Bhattacharya (cb@bu.edu) received his Ph.D. in marketing from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1993 and his M.B.A. from the Indian Institute of Management in 1984. Prior to joining Boston University, he was on the faculty at the Goizueta Business School, Emory University. His specific expertise is in the areas of customer retention and the roles of CSR and organizational identification in designing marketing strategy. He served on the editorial review board of theJournal of Marketing from 2002 to 2005 and has published in journals such as theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Marketing, Journal of Applied Psychology, andOrganization Science. He speaks frequently at many academic and business forums and won the William Novelli Best Paper Award at the Social Marketing Conference in 1997. Dr. Bhattacharya received the 2001 Broderick Prize for Research Excellence at Boston University and the Emory Williams Distinguished Teaching Award in 1995, the highest teaching award at Emory University. He is also part of the select group of faculty members onBusiness Week’s Outstanding Faculty list. Prior to his Ph.D., he worked for 3 years as a product manager for Reckitt Benkiser PLC. He has consulted for organizations such as the Hitachi Corporation, Procter & Gamble Company, Bell South, The Prudential Bank, Information Resources Inc., Airwick Industries, Silo Inc., and the High Museum of Art. Daniel Korschun (danielk@bu.edu) is a doctoral candidate in marketing at Boston University. His current research interests include brand management, CSR, and interorganizational relationships.     

Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge

We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate,patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that are functions of the'amount of knowledge disclosed', by the leading to the laggingagent, are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure. In hersequential-offers bargaining games, the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor, and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee.     

HETEROGENEITY,REDISTRIBUTION, AND THE FRIEDMAN RULE*

We study monetary models with nondegenerate stationary distributions of money holdings. We find that the Friedman rule does not typically maximize ex post social welfare. An increase in the rate of growth of the money supply has two effects: the standard distortionary, or rate‐of‐return, effect makes money a less desirable asset for all moneyholders. A second, redistributive effect, creates a transfer from one type of agent to the other. An increase in the rate of growth of money away from the Friedman rule can produce a rate‐of‐return effect that dominates the standard effect.     

Shaking Up (and Keeping Intact) the Old Boys’ Network: The Impact of the Mandatory Gender Quota on the Board of Directors in India

Journal of Business Ethics - Prior research on the impact of mandatory quotas in one dimension of diversity, on other dimensions, shows contradictory results. We seek to resolve this puzzle by...