Cost performance of Brazilian soccer clubs: A Bayesian varying efficiency distribution model

This paper analyzes the cost efficiency of Brazilian first league soccer clubs using a Bayesian Varying Efficiency Distribution (VED) model. We confirm that the model fits the data well with all coefficients correctly signed and in line with the theoretical requirements. From the efficiency results, it was clear that the Brazilian soccer league operates at a lower performance in comparison to other international soccer leagues. Factors which contributed to this finding as well as other policy implications are provided.     

The Wealth Effects of Reducing Private Placement Resale Restrictions

Recently, the US Securities and Exchange Commission reduced resale restrictions on Rule 144 private placements from 12 months to 6 months with the intention of lowering the cost of equity capital for issuing firms. In Canada, similar regulatory changes were adopted several years ago, providing a unique opportunity to test the wealth effects of reducing private placement resale restrictions. We find that shortening resale restrictions reduces the liquidity portion of offer price discounts, and thus lowers the cost of equity capital for issuing firms, but has no significant effect on announcement‐period abnormal returns after controlling for issuer type. However, there is a fundamental shift in the types of firms making private placements of common stock after the legislation‐induced easing of resale restrictions. Specifically, we find that smaller firms and firms with greater information asymmetry are less likely to issue privately placed common stock after the legislative change, suggesting that the easing of resale restrictions reduces the costly signal that helps to overcome the Myers and Majluf (1984) underinvestment problem.     

The Dynamics of Jabotabek Development

This paper examines the dynamics of urban development of the Jakarta metropolitan region, called Jabotabek, from 1980 through the early 1990s. We focus on the rapidly changing spatial allocation of residences and business, finding that Jabotabek is following expected developmental patterns but faces special and some critical problems Population densities remain unusually high and urban development is hindered by very poor land market institutions—weakly defined property rights particularly for traditional low income residents, complete lack of active land use planning, and relatively low infrastructure investments. Industry is rapidly suburbanising to take of advantage of low land prices and wages in suburban Botabek. With toll road construction east and west from the city, within the five-year period 1986–1991, Jabotabek moved from being a monocentric city where core city industrial activity dominated to a predominantly multi-centred city. These developments and implicit government policy have hurt small-scale industry, which ultimately will hinder the whole development process. Issues of spatial mismatch, where low income workers' residences and workplaces become inordinately spatially separated due to government policies in land markets, herald increasing problems of urban underemployment and social unrest.     

Innovation type and external knowledge search strategies in KIBS: evidence from Canada

Service Business - Do different types of innovation require distinct kinds of external knowledge search strategies? This paper explores this question using an original innovation survey of 385 KIBS...     

Family firms and corporate social performance: evidence from Korean firms

This study examines the effects of family firms on the corporate social performance of Korean firms and analyses how their effect varies depending on the presence of family CEOs or chaebols. Based on the agency theory, we find that family firms exhibit lower corporate social performance. In particular, there is no difference in the performance of related stakeholders, such as society, consumers, environment, and employees, compared to non-family firms, but corporate governance registers as low performance. We further find that family firms managed by family CEOs show lower corporate social performance, whereas chaebol firms show higher corporate social performance.     

投资者保护与创业

我们通过私募资金市场(private capital mar- ket)搜寻模型的均衡,来研究投资者保护对外部融资可得性(availability)、企业家才能(entrepreneurship)和创业所产生的影响。除了搜寻成本(friction)之外,我们还考察了合约成本,特别是由于企业家(entrepre- neur)可能侵夺融资人(financier)所导致的事中和事后(expost)道德风险问题。在我们的模型中,政府选择投资者保护水平,以确定项目盈余(match surplus)在创业者与融资人之间的可转让性。结果表明任何鼓励(抑制)企业家才能的做法也会鼓励(抑制)创业。因此,投资者保护的创业效应取决于各种搜寻成本和合约成本的相对影响。只有当投资者保护对与事中道德风险相比的事后道德风险问题产生更大的影响时,加强投资者保护才能促进创业。我们也发现搜寻成本削弱了投资者保护的积极效应,同时,合约成本则修正了标准的荷氏(Hosios)效率条件。     

Opacity of young businesses: Evidence from rating disagreements

A conventional wisdom in the contemporary corporate finance literature argues that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are informationally opaque. We use data from two credit information companies and in particular their disagreements over the creditworthiness of SMEs to study the empirical relevance of this often invoked assumption. Our panel data analysis shows that once unobserved firm-effects are controlled for, the disagreements (i.e., rating splits) are inversely related to the age of firms. We are not able to document such a robust relationship between the disagreements and the size of firms. This finding holds a lesson for empirical corporate finance researchers who need firm-level proxies for informational imperfections and asymmetries: of the two often-used proxies, firm size is not as closely related to informational opacity as firm age is.     

Bribery in Indonesia: some evidence from micro-level data

This paper outlines and tests a model in which firms seek to reduce the cost of taxes and regulatory compliance by offering bribes to government officials. It finds that firms' profitability (scaled by production costs) largely determines both the amounts paid and the time spent negotiating bribes with officials. Competition between arms of the bureaucracy for bribe income seems to be a result of decentralisation, but the analysis suggests that this competition would lead to a spreading of bribes among a larger number of officials rather than to a significant increase in their total amount. Local governments may be able to raise more revenue by reducing the number of taxes and regulations and using part of the increased revenue to raise the salaries of officials, while devoting more effort to restraining corrupt behaviour. But progress may be blocked by central government tax officials increasing their demands for bribes.     

Contracts,Negotiation, and Learning: An Examination of Termination Provisions

Taking a temporal view of learning in partnerships, we argue that learning to contract from prior relationships can be manifested not only in an increase in the level of contractual detail but also in a decrease in negotiation time for a given level of contractual detail. We analyse the influence that the length of prior relationships and the detail of termination provisions have on negotiation time, or the time period that it takes for partners to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. We find that: (1) the length of prior relationships has a curvilinear, U‐shaped effect on negotiation time, suggesting the possibility of diverse learning mechanisms as the relationship unfolds; (2) the impact of the detail of termination provisions on negotiation time varies across different types of termination provisions; and (3) it takes a shorter time to negotiate certain types of termination provisions when partners have longer prior relationships. Beyond suggesting the need to investigate the consequences of contractual provisions for collaborators, our study proposes negotiation time as an additional indicator of a learning‐to‐contract effect that complements existing ones.