PARETO HONOURING POVERTY REDUCTION

Policy reforms often pit the poor against the poor by triggering a fall in poverty for some but an increase in poverty for others. Aggregated national measures gloss over these fine patterns and pronounce ‘a reduction in poverty’– is such aggregation across poor individuals ethically permissible? Addressing this type of aggregation is a hard issue. This paper has made an attempt in that direction by outlining an axiomatically grounded aggregate measure of such gains or losses, duly giving more importance to the losses to a poor compared to the gains of another poor.     

Host-country policy – commitment or no-commitment: a theoretical analysis

This paper develops a model of foreign entry strategy and examines welfare of the host-country under two situations - (i) where host-country government commits to the tax policy, (ii) where host-country government does not commit to the tax policy. It turns out that under the non-committed government policy the foreign firm does not prefer to hold equity share in the domestic project. The host-country welfare, however, is more under the committed government policy than the non-committed government policy when the foreign firm has sufficiently higher bargaining power. The possibility of technology choice by the foreign firm reduces the range of bargaining power of the foreign firm over which the host-country welfare is more under the committed policy compared to the non-committed policy.     

Welfare Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: Cost Saving vs. Signaling

We compare the effects of two types of foreign direct investment (FDI) (viz., FDI for trade cost saving and FDI for signaling foreign cost of production) on consumer surplus, profit of the host-country firm and host-country welfare. We show that the effects are dramatically different. If the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, FDI (compared to export) always makes the consumers better off and the host-country producer worse off, while the effect on host-country welfare is ambiguous. However, if the FDI is to signal the foreign cost of production, FDI (compared to export) always makes the host-country producer better off and increases host-country welfare, while it makes the consumers almost always worse off.     

Risk preferences estimation of exporting firms under exchange rate uncertainty

This note empirically analyses how exchange rate fluctuations affects firms’ optimal production and exporting decisions. A firm’s elasticity of risk aversion determines the direction of the impact of exchange rate risk on exports. Based on a flexible utility function that incorporates all possible risk preferences, a unique structurally estimable equation is derived. Quantile regression method is used to estimate this equation and compute the risk aversion elasticities for a panel of Indian firms. This approach allows us to demonstrate how characteristics of exporters at the intensive margin varies with the level of elasticities across the conditional exchange rate distribution.     

Privatization, Incentive Delegation and Foreign Direct Investment

Despite the empirical relevance, the privatization literature paid little attention to the effects of the owner-manager relationship and the implications of foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus on these aspects, and show the relationship between privatization and greenfield FDI when the owners design strategic managerial incentive contracts. We show that there is complementarity between privatization and greenfield FDI. Whether incentive delegation (compared to no incentive delegation) increases the degree of privatization in the presence of FDI is ambiguous; it depends on whether the degree of privatization that attracts FDI is higher or lower than the degree of privatization that maximizes domestic welfare under FDI.