Mean square error estimation in multi-stage sampling

Summary: Suppose for a homogeneous linear unbiased function of the sampled first stage unit (fsu)-values taken as an estimator of a survey population total, the sampling variance is expressed as a homogeneous quadratic function of the fsu-values. When the fsu-values are not ascertainable but unbiased estimators for them are separately available through sampling in later stages and substituted into the estimator, Raj (1968) gave a simple variance estimator formula for this multi-stage estimator of the population total. He requires that the variances of the estimated fsu-values in sampling at later stages and their unbiased estimators are available in certain `simple forms'. For the same set-up Rao (1975) derived an alternative variance estimator when the later stage sampling variances have more ‘complex forms’. Here we pursue with Raj's (1968) simple forms to derive a few alternative variance and mean square error estimators when the condition of homogeneity or unbiasedness in the original estimator of the total is relaxed and the variance of the original estimator is not expressed as a quadratic form.  We illustrate a particular three-stage sampling strategy and present a simulation-based numerical exercise showing the relative efficacies of two alternative variance estimators. Received: 19 February 1999     

Does technology licensing matter for privatization?

In mixed oligopolies, technology licensing from a cost‐efficient firm to a cost‐inefficient firm has been widely observed. This paper examines the relationship between privatization and licensing (by public or private firms) with the consideration of either a domestic or a foreign private firm. We find that (a) in the case of a domestic private firm, public licensing facilitates privatization, but private licensing hinders privatization; (b) in the case of a foreign private firm, both public and private licensing facilitate privatization. Our results yield important policy implications on privatization.     

Profit Raising Entry

Common wisdom suggests that entry reduces profits of incumbent firms. On the contrary, we demonstrate that if the incumbents differ in marginal costs and the entrants behave like Stackelberg followers, then entry may benefit the cost efficient incumbents while hurting the cost inefficient ones. And the total outputs of all incumbents may be higher under entry.     

Technology Collaboration and Foreign Equity Participation: A Theoretical Analysis

Technology transfer to the developing nations has been predominantly characterized by technology collaborations between the multinationals and the local firms of these developing countries. When a multinational offers a new technology to a local firm, the firms may have different perceptions regarding the success rate of the technology in the local conditions. This paper discusses various types of contractual arrangements with equity participation by the multinational, which dominate pure technology collaboration agreements.     

Relations Between Stock Returns and Fundamental Variables: Evidence from a Segmented Market

This study examines relations between stock returns and potential explanatory factors in Korea, an important and segmented emerging market. Our results show that Korean stock returns in general and returns on stocks listed in Section 1 in particular are significantly positively related to book-to-market, sales-price, and debt-equity ratios, but not significantly related to market value of equity. Returns on stocks listed in Section 2 are, however, negatively related to market value of equity and not significantly related to the other three variables. Among the variables investigated by us, book-to-market ratio has the greatest explanatory power for stock returns and it indicates superior returns for value stocks. Our findings strengthen the international evidence of the role of book-to-market ratio in explaining stock returns by demonstrating its significance even in the segmented Korean market.     

Environmental Regulation: An Incentive for Foreign Direct Investment

Empirical evidence has so far failed to confirm that lenient environmental regulation attracts investment from polluting firms. In a Cournot duopoly with a foreign firm and a domestic firm, we show that the foreign firm may want to relocate to the domestic country with stricter environmental regulation, when the move raises its rival domestic firm's cost by sufficiently more than its own. The domestic (foreign) country's welfare is (usually) lower with foreign direct investment.     

Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market

In an economy with unionized labor market, we show that the payoff of an outside innovator may be higher under royalty licensing than under fixed-fee licensing and auction, if bargaining power of the labor union is sufficiently high. This result holds for both decentralized and centralized bargaining. It follows from our analysis that a combination of fixed-fee and output royalty can be preferable to the innovator compared to both royalty only licensing and auction (or fixed-fee licensing). We discuss the implications of positive opportunity costs of the licensees.     

Christofides’ randomized response technique in complex sample surveys

Christofides (2003) has given an improved modification of Warners (1965) pioneering randomized response (RR) technique in estimating an unknown proportion of people bearing a sensitive characteristic in a given community. As both these RR devices are shown to yield unbiased estimators based only on simple random sampling (SRS) with replacement (WR) but in practice samples are mostly taken with unequal selection probabilities without replacement (WOR), here we present methods of estimation when Christofides RR data are available from unequal probability samples. Warners (1965) RR device was earlier shown by Chaudhuri (2001) to be applicable in complex surveys. For completeness we present estimators for the variance of our estimator and also describe what to do if some people opt to divulge truths.This research is partially supported by CSIR grant No. 21(0539)/02/EMR-II     

Termination Clauses in Long-Term Contracts

Many long-term contracts incorporate a termination clause. This paper argues that when agents have hidden information, such a clause has a beneficial incentive effect—it enables a principal to screen agents' private information at a lower cost. In a two-period model, this paper characterizes the optimal long-term contract with a termination clause, which specifies that the principal will switch agents in the second period when the first-period cost is high. The analysis delineates how the optimality of this clause depends on the intertemporal cost correlation structure, on the limits to agents' liability, and on the principal's degree of commitment.