Mutual adaptation in buyer-supplier relationships

In buyer-supplier relationships, effective partnerships require mutual adaptation to execute strategies effectively. Using LISREL, we test a model of relational exchange factors that includes dependence, joint action and trust and their influence on the mutual adaptation of supplier and buyer firms in the U.S. automotive industry. The results of the study indicate that both economic and social dimensions of the relationship impact mutual adaptation, but that these two are not necessarily complementary. Specifically, supplier adaptation is negatively impacted by trust between supplier and buyer, but positively impacted by dependence and joint action. Buyer adaptation, on the other hand, is positively impacted by trust between the two, joint action and the adaptation undertaken by the supplier. The negative relationship between trust and supplier adaptation may be symptomatic of deeper issues in the U.S. automotive industry that should merit concern.     

Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence

We consider a persuasion game between a decision‐maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identified by two parameters: (i) “quality” or his likelihood of observing the state (i.e., learning what the best decision is) and (ii) “agenda” or the preferred decision that is independent of the state. An informed expert may feign ignorance but cannot misreport. We offer a general characterization of the equilibrium. From the decision‐maker's standpoint, (a) higher quality is not necessarily better, (b) extreme agendas are always preferred, and (c) the optimal panel may involve experts with identical (rather than conflicting) agendas.     

Intellectual Property Rights and the Quality of Transferred Technology in Developing Countries

This paper addresses the effects of a stronger patent system in developing countries on the quality of transferred technology and welfare. We show that a stronger patent system can reduce the quality of licensed technology. The presence of technology licensing may encourage the developing country to adopt a stronger patent system compared with the situation where licensing is not an option.     

Technology transfer with commitment

Summary. This paper considers technology transfer in a duopoly where the firms have two types of commitment strategies: incentive delegation and capacity installation. It turns out that the possibility of technology transfer significantly differs under these two types of commitment as well as depending on whether one or both firms commit. Under strategic incentive delegation, the possibility of technology transfer is minimal when both firms use the incentive delegation strategy and the costs of incentive delegation are negligible. If both firms choose the incentive delegation strategy and the costs of incentive delegation are significant then the possibility of technology transfer rises compared to a situation with no pre-commitment. In case of commitment to a capacity level before production, the possibility of technology transfer does not change when both firms simultaneously commit to their capacity levels. Different sets of results arise when only one firm can pre-commit. Received: February 10, 1997; revised version: December 16, 1999     

Complex dynamics in the market for loans

Decisions in Economics and Finance - This paper demonstrates that endogenous fluctuations are possible in the market for loans. In the context of a three-period overlapping generations economy, the...     

Local Leadership and Public Good: Evidence from The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India

Journal of Quantitative Economics - The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme is unique in combining self-selection of beneficiaries through demand for work and decentralization of...     

Optimal certification policy,entry, and investment in the presence of public signals

We explore the optimal disclosure policy of a certification intermediary where (i) the seller decides on entry and investment in product quality, and (ii) the buyers observe an additional public signal on quality. The optimal policy maximizes rent extraction from the seller by trading off incentives for entry and investment. We identify conditions under which full, partial or no disclosure can be optimal. The intermediary's report becomes noisier as the public signal gets more precise, but if the public signal is sufficiently precise, the intermediary resorts to full disclosure. However, the social welfare may reduce when the public signal becomes more informative.     

Examining relational and resource influences on the performance of border region SMEs

At the U.S.–Mexico border, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are embedded in dual natured institutional and cultural contexts that share common functional and morphological characteristics. In this context firms are challenged by moving from one organizing template to another as embedded network influences constrain and enhance strategic outcomes. We develop and test a model of the impact of embeddedness components including social capital, personal relations and economic interaction on firm outcomes. Our results indicate that these components combine to influence the development of valuable resources and firm adaptation. We find that resources and adaptation significantly relate to SME performance.     

Real effects of separating investment and operating cash flows

This paper investigates the rationale for the measurement of a firm's periodic performance through the accounting classification of its cash outflows into operating cash flow and investment. We show that when the accounting system does not attempt to measure periodic performance and reports only aggregate cash flow, equilibrium capital market prices are such that there is a perverse informational cost to investment over and above the real cost of investment. This induces distortions in the firms' equilibrium investment. We show that other sources of information, consisting of forecasts of future returns to investment play a vital counterbalancing role when the accounting system is inadequate in this way. An accounting signal that provides noisy information on periodic performance decreases the informational cost to investment and moves the economy closer to first best.The first author wishes to acknowledge financial support from McKnight Foundation and the Accounting Research Center, University of Minnesota. An earlier version of the paper was titled Capitalization vs. Expensing: Effects on Investment.