External Economies of Scale and Insufficient Entry

Empirical evidence suggests that many industries are characterized by external economies of scale, yet the literature on the welfare effects of entry has ignored this aspect. We show that entry can be insufficient instead of excessive in the presence of external economies of scale. Using an example with specific demand and cost functions and Cournot competition, we show that insufficient entry occurs for any positive cost of entry and the possibility of insufficient entry increases with a higher cost of entry. Hence, anti-competitive entry regulation may not be justified in industries with strong external economies of scale, which may occur due to knowledge spillover.     

Model assisted survey sampling strategy in two phases

Postulating a super-population regression model connecting a size variable, a cheaply measurable variable and an expensively observable variable of interest, an asymptotically optimal double sampling strategy to estimate the survey population total of the third variable is specified. To render it practicable, unknown model-parameters in the optimal estimator are replaced by appropriate statistics. The resulting generalized regression estimator is then shown to have a model-cum-asymptotic design based expected square error equal to that of the asymptotically optimum estimator itself. An estimator for design variance of the estimator is also proposed.     

Patents,imitation and welfare

We consider the effects of product and process patents on profits and welfare. In a duopoly model, we show that if the cost of imitation is not very large, prisoner's dilemma occurs under process patent, thus creating lower profit of each firm under process patent than under product patent. Welfare is higher under process (product) patent for very small (not very small) cost of imitation. Although the possibility of cross-licensing never makes lower welfare under process patent for all costs of imitation, welfare is never lower under product patent under infinitely repeated game.     

Complex dynamics in the market for loans

Decisions in Economics and Finance - This paper demonstrates that endogenous fluctuations are possible in the market for loans. In the context of a three-period overlapping generations economy, the...     

Optimal patent licensing—Two or three-part tariff

We look into technology transfer by an insider patentee in a spatial duopoly model under three types of licensing contracts—(i) two-part tariff with fixed fee and per-unit royalty, (ii) two-part tariff with fixed fee and ad-valorem royalty and (iii) general three-part tariff with fixed fee, per-unit and ad-valorem royalties. Under two-part tariff contracts, the licenser is better off with the per-unit royalty contract but the general contract does better than the other contracts. In contrast to the existing literature, all three licensing contracts may make the consumers worse-off compared to no licensing, with the lowest consumer surplus achieved under the general licensing contract. Welfare under the general licensing contract is equal to the welfare under two-part tariff with ad-valorem royalty and it is higher than the welfare under no licensing but lower than the welfare under two-part tariff with per-unit royalty. Hence, the general three-part licensing contract is privately optimal but not socially optimal. Similar conclusions hold also under a nonspatial linear demand model with differentiated products.